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ABSTRACT
NAVIGATING THE TENSION BETWEEN BENEVOLENCE AND HONESTY:
ESSAYS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROSOCIAL LIES
Emma Levine
Maurice Schweitzer
Many of our most common and difficult ethical dilemmas involve balancing
honesty and benevolence. For example, when we deliver unpleasant news, such as
negative feedback or terminal prognoses, we face an implicit tradeoff between being
completely honest and being completely kind. Using a variety of research methods, in
both the laboratory and the field, I study how individuals navigate this tension. Each
chapter in this dissertation addresses the tension between honesty and benevolence at a
different level. In Chapters One and Two, I examine how honesty and benevolence
influence moral judgment. In Chapter Three, I explore how honesty and benevolence
influence interpersonal trust. In Chapter Four, I explore how honesty and benevolence
influence psychological well-being. Finally, in Chapter Five, I examine how different
stakeholders view tradeoffs between honesty and benevolence in an important domain:
healthcare. Across these chapters, I identify three key themes. First, for moral judgment
and interpersonal trust, benevolence is often more important than honesty. As a result,
those who prioritize benevolence over honesty by telling prosocial lies, lies that are
intended to help others, are deemed to be moral and trustworthy. Second, despite
philosophers’ assumption that individuals would rarely consent to deception, I
demonstrate that individuals frequently want to be deceived. Individuals want others to
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deceive them when it protects them from harm. This desire manifests itself in systematic
circumstances and during individuals’ most fragile moments. Third, honesty and
benevolence are associated with interpersonal and intrapersonal tradeoffs. Although
benevolence seems to be more central for interpersonal judgments and relationships,
honesty seems to be more central for creating personal meaning. Throughout these
chapters, I discuss the implications of these findings for the study of ethics,
organizational behavior, and interpersonal communication.
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INTRODUCTION
Deception is typically considered to be a vice, and honesty a virtue. For centuries,
philosophers have touted the moral inviolability of honesty (Bacon, 1872, Bok, 1978;
Kant, 1785; St. Augustine, 421, cited in Gneezy, 2005), and modern psychologists,
behavioral scientists, organizational behavior scholars, and practitioners have largely
echoed this view (e.g., Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Wojciszke, 2005; Schweitzer,
Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006; Tenbrunsel, 1998; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006).
Many companies proclaim the importance of honesty in their codes of conduct, assuming
that honesty, and honesty alone, is the foundation of ethical practice. For example,
Microsoft’s number one moral value is “Honesty and integrity” and Dell’s key moral
claim is “We are honest”. Furthermore, many practitioners must take oaths of honesty.
For example, physicians are explicitly told they “shall be honest in all professional
interaction” (American Medical Association Code of Ethics, 2006). Although honesty is
important for interpersonal relationships and organizational conduct, honesty often
conflicts with other moral values, such as kindness, compassion, and hope.
Many of our most common and difficult ethical dilemmas involve balancing the
tension between honesty and benevolence. People routinely face this conflict in their
personal lives, when deciding how to communicate with friends and family members, and
in their professional lives, when deciding how to deliver difficult news and critical
feedback. Honesty and benevolence also conflict during some of our most demanding
and emotional ethical decisions. For example, when healthcare professionals and loved
ones communicate information to sick and elderly individuals, they must strike a delicate
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balance between providing hope and care, and communicating honestly. Or, when
employees have to decide whether or not to report the transgression of a close friend, they
must decide whether to use honesty or loyalty as a moral guide.
Despite the frequency with which honesty and benevolence collide, little research
examines how people navigate this conflict and virtually no research offers prescriptive
advice on how to balance this tension in personal or professional relationships. The goal
of this dissertation is to fill this gap by a) answering fundamental questions about how
people reason through the moral conflict between honesty and benevolence, by b)
examining the interpersonal and intrapersonal consequences of this conflict, and by c)
examining how communicators and targets judge conflicts between honesty and
benevolence in high-stakes organizational settings. This dissertation is composed of five
chapters. Each chapter explores the tension between honesty and benevolence through a
different lens. Chapters One and Two explore moral judgments of this tension. Chapter
Three examines the interpersonal consequences of this tension. Chapter Four examines
the intrapersonal consequences of this tension, and Chapter Five examines this tension
within the healthcare context.
The moral consequences of honesty and benevolence
In the first chapter of my dissertation, I explore moral judgments of prosocial lies
in collaboration with Maurice Schweitzer. Prosocial lies, lies that are intended to help
others, reflect a conflict between honesty and benevolence. Across three studies using
economic games, we find that individuals who tell prosocial lies are perceived to be more
moral than individuals who tell the truth.
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In Chapter Two, I build on these findings to develop a descriptive moral theory of
deception. Through a large inductive study, and a series of experiments (N = 1313)
participants, I demonstrate that lay people have a codified set of rules that guide their
moral judgments of deception. A basic theory underlies these implicit rules: deception is
perceived to be ethical and individuals prefer to be deceived when honesty causes
unnecessary harm. Perceptions of unnecessary harm are influenced by two dimensions:
the degree to which honesty will help or harm an individual at the moment of
communication, and the instrumental value of truth. Perceptions of “unnecessary harm”
dictate nine implicit rules – pertaining to the targets, topics, and timing of a conversation
– that specify the systematic circumstances in which deception is perceived to be ethical.
I demonstrate that unnecessary harm is the key driver of moral judgments of deception
and I rule out a series of alternative mechanisms that have been proposed in normative
and moral psychology (e.g., perceptions of autonomy, self-interest). This research
provides insight into how individuals value honesty and deception for making moral
judgments, for learning information about themselves, and for communicating with
others.
The interpersonal consequences of honesty and benevolence
In Chapter Three, I explore the interpersonal consequences of honesty and
benevolence by exploring the relationship between prosocial lying and trust. One of the
key claims that philosophers and scholars have made against deception is that it harms
trust. For example, philosopher Sir Francis Bacon famously argued that deception
deprives, “people of two of the most principal instruments for interpersonal action—trust
and belief” (from “On Truth”, cited in Tyler & Feldman, 2006). Empirical research in
3

organizational behavior and economics has largely supported this claim, demonstrating
that that deception harms relationships (Ford, King, & Hollender, 1988; Lewis & Saarni,
1993; Tyler & Feldman, 2006), elicits negative affect (Planalp, Rutherford, & Honeycutt,
1988), decreases liking, (Tyler, Feldman, & Reichert, 2006) triggers retaliation (Boles et
al., 2000; Croson et al., 2003), and does indeed harm trust (Schweitzer et al., 2006).
In this chapter, Maurice Schweitzer and I challenge these claims. In nearly all
empirical investigations of the consequences of deception, scholars have confounded
deception with self-interest. In this research, we disentangle deception from self-interest,
and demonstrate that deception often increases trust. Specifically, we demonstrate that
prosocial lies increase benevolence-based trust. Consistent with prior claims, we also find
that prosocial lies harm integrity-based trust. We present four studies in which we
document the robustness of these results and introduce new paradigms for the study of
trust. These findings expand our understanding of the interpersonal consequences of
deception and deepen our insight into the mechanics of trust.
The intrapersonal consequences of honesty and benevolence
In Chapter four, in collaboration with Taya Cohen, I explore how honesty and
benevolence influence well-being in everyday life. In a large-scale field experiment, we
randomly assigned individuals to be honest, kind, or conscious of their communication
(our control condition) in every interpersonal interaction for three days. We examine the
impact of our interventions on predicted and actual hedonic and eudaimonic well-being
and we identify three main results. First, individuals predict that honesty will be far less
enjoyable (i.e., less hedonically rewarding) than kind or conscious communication,
causing individuals to avoid honesty. Second, this prediction is incorrect: the experience
4

of communicating honestly is more enjoyable than individuals predict. Third, honesty
yields greater meaning (i.e., eudaimonia) than kind or conscious communication, and as a
result, has greater long-term impact on individuals’ lives. This research sheds new light
on the relationships among communication, morality, and well-being. Furthermore, this
research complements Chapters 1-3 by highlighting the interpersonal and intrapersonal
tradeoffs of honesty and benevolence. Although benevolence may be more important for
moral judgment and trust, honesty may be more important for promoting personal
meaning.
The organizational consequences of honesty and benevolence
Finally, in Chapter Five I examine how individuals navigate the tension between
honesty and benevolence in healthcare communication, in collaboration with Joanna
Hart, Kendra Moore, Emily Rubin, Kuldeep Yadav, and Scott Halpern. Professional
medical organizations (American Medical Association Code of Ethics, 2006; World
Medical Association International Code of Ethics, 2016) and ethicists (Apatira et al.,
2008; Beste, 2005; Herring & Foster, 2012; Sarafis, Tsounis, Malliarou, Lahana, 2014)
often prohibit deception. This prohibition is motivated by normative assumptions
regarding the negative consequences of deception, rather than empirical evidence. In this
research, we empirically investigate physicians’, patients’, and healthy adults’ moral
judgments and preferences for deception and identify three important findings. First,
individuals believe that it is more ethical to use deception when discussing future
predictions (e.g., prognoses) than discussing present knowledge (e.g., diagnoses).
Second, physicians think very differently about lies of omission and commission than
patients and healthy adults do. Physicians believe that lies of commission are less ethical
5

than lies of omission, but patients and healthy adults often believe the opposite. We
introduce a theoretical framework to explain these findings and we discuss the clinical
and psychological implications of this research for medicine, behavioral ethics, and
human communication. This work highlights the practical relevance of studying reactions
to deceptions and demonstrates how preferences for deception can trigger predictable
asymmetries between communicators and targets during challenging conversations.
Conclusion
This dissertation makes fundamental contributions to our understanding of moral
judgment, interpersonal relationships, well-being, and practical ethics. In Chapters One, I
answer the basic psychological question: Is deception perceived to be ethical? In Chapter
Two, I explore this issue further and develop a descriptive moral theory of deception. Just
as Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler’s (1986) foundational work on community standards
of fairness overturned the assumption that individuals universally value self-interest, and
demonstrated that concerns about fairness place systematic constraints on market
behavior, the first two chapters of this dissertation challenge the assumption that people
universally value truth, and demonstrates that concerns about interpersonal harm place
systematic constraints on honest communication.
Second, this dissertation provides insight into how honesty and benevolence
influence relationships and well-being. Philosophers, theologians, and leaders regularly
espouse moral values and make claims about what it means to live a virtuous life. We
know very little, however, about what virtues actually improve well-being and
relationships. Chapter Three sheds light on this question by exploring the interpersonal
consequences of honesty and benevolence, and Chapter Four sheds light on this question
6

by examining how honesty and benevolence influence well-being in everyday life.
Although organizational scholars have typically refrained from making normative claims,
recently, scholars have called for a greater integration between organizational and
normative ethics (e.g., Barry & Rehel, 2014). This dissertation answers this call by
providing practical insights on the consequences of distinct moral virtues.
Finally, this dissertation demonstrates the organizational importance of
challenging normative assumptions about the consequences of deception, and ethical
principles broadly. In medicine, ethical principles are in place to ensure the protection
and well-being of patients. And yet, we know very little about the ethical principles that
patients care about and how current ethical guidelines affect patient well-being. In
Chapter Five of my dissertation, I explore patients’ and physicians’ attitudes towards
deception, and find evidence that physicians’ ethical training may not always
accommodate patients’ desire for (false) hope. This research highlights how individuals’
roles shift their preferences for deception, contributing to miscommunication and
potential conflict in high-stakes settings.
Taken together, these chapters examine the tension between honesty and
benevolence from every angle, thereby contributing fundamental knowledge to the study
of moral judgment, trust, and well-being and providing practical advice to those who
must manage this tension in their personal and professional relationships.
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CHAPTER 1.
ARE LIARS ETHICAL?
ON THE TENSION BETWEEN BENEVOLENCE AND HONESTY

Emma E. Levine
Maurice E. Schweitzer

Published in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology in 2015.

ABSTRACT
We demonstrate that some lies are perceived to be more ethical than honest
statements. Across three studies, we find that individuals who tell prosocial lies, lies told
with the intention of benefitting others, are perceived to be more moral than individuals
who tell the truth. In Study 1, we compare altruistic lies to selfish truths. In Study 2, we
introduce a stochastic deception game to disentangle the influence of deception,
outcomes, and intentions on perceptions of moral character. In Study 3, we demonstrate
that moral judgments of lies are sensitive to the consequences of lying for the deceived
party, but insensitive to the consequences of lying for the liar. Both honesty and
benevolence are essential components of moral character. We find that when these values
conflict, benevolence may be more important than honesty. More broadly, our findings
suggest that the moral foundation of care may, at times,be more important than the moral
foundation of justice.
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ARE LIARS ETHICAL? ON THE TENSION BETWEEN BENEVOLENCE AND
HONESTY
“To me, however, it seems certain that every lie is a sin…” – St. Augustine (circa 420 A.D.)
“By a lie, a man annihilates his dignity.” – Immanuel Kant (circa 1797)
“…deception is unethical.” – Chuck Klosterman, The New York Times, “The Ethicist” (2014)

For centuries, philosophers and theologians have characterized lying as unethical
(Kant, 1785; for review, see Bok, 1978). Similarly, ethics scholars have argued that
honesty is a critical component of moral character (e.g. Wojciszke, 2005; Rosenberg,
Nelson, Vivekananthan, 1998) and a fundamental aspect of ethical behavior (e.g. Ruedy,
Moore, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2013).
The conceptualization of lying as immoral, however, is difficult to reconcile with
its prevalence. Lying is common in everyday life (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; Kashy &
DePaulo, 1996). Not only do people lie to benefit themselves (e.g. lying on one’s tax
returns), but people also lie to benefit others (e.g. lying about how much one likes a gift)
or to serve both self-interested and prosocial motives. This broader conceptualization of
lying to include prosocial or mixed-motive deception has been largely ignored in ethical
decision-making research.
In studies of ethical decision-making, scholars have routinely confounded
deception with self-serving motives and outcomes. This is true of both theoretical and
empirical investigations of deception (e.g., Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Shalvi, Dana,
Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011; Shalvi, 2012; Tenbrunsel, 1998; Boles, Croson &
Murninghan, 2000; Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, & Bazerman, 2012; Ruedy, Moore, Gino,
& Schweitzer, 2013; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Koning,
12

Steinel, Beest, & van Dijk, 2011; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004; Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013;
Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, 2005). For example, ethics scholars who have
conflated lying with self-serving motives have investigated behaviors like cheating on
one’s taxes (e.g. Shu, et al., 2012), inflating self-reported performance (e.g., Mazar et al.,
2008; Ruedy et al., 2013; Mead, et al., 2009), misreporting a random outcome for
financial gain (e.g. Shalvi et al., 2011) and lying to a counterpart to exploit them (Koning,
et al., 2011; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004).
Related research has studied the interpersonal consequences of deception. This
work has found that lying harms interpersonal relationships, induces negative affect,
provokes revenge, and decreases trust (Tyler, Feldman, & Reichert, 2006; Boles, Croson
& Murnighan, 2000; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow,
2006; Croson, Boles, & Murnighan, 2003). All of this research, however, has studied lies
that are motivated by self-interest, such as the desire for reputational or financial gains.
As a result of this narrow conceptualization of deception, what we know about the
psychology of deception is limited. Quite possibly, our understanding of deception may
simply reflect attitudes towards selfish behavior, rather than deception per se.
In contrast to prior research that has assumed that deception is immoral, we
demonstrate that lying is often perceived to be moral. In the present research, we
disentangle deception from self-interest and explore the moral judgment of different
types of lies. Across three studies, we find that lying to help others increases perceptions
of moral character.
Our research makes two central contributions to our understanding of deception
and moral judgment. First, we challenge the universal presumption that deception is
13

immoral and that honesty is moral. We demonstrate that perceptions of honesty and
deception are far more complex than prior work has assumed. This qualifies extant
research and illustrates the need to explore a broader set of dishonest behaviors when
investigating attitudes towards deception. Second, we explore the conflict between two
universal moral foundations: justice and care. Justice is a moral foundation that
prioritizes fairness, honesty and moral principles and rules; care is a moral foundation
that prioritizes the obligation to help and protect other people (Gilligan, 1982; Haidt &
Graham, 2007; Walker & Hennig, 2004). Prior studies that have focused on violations of
either justice or care offer little insight into how individuals resolve dilemmas with
competing moral principles. Our investigation has broad practical significance because in
many settings, justice and care conflict. Prosocial lies reflect this conflict.
Prosocial lies
In routine interactions, individuals often face opportunities to tell prosocial lies.
We may tell a host that their meatloaf was delicious, a child that we love their artwork, or
a colleague that his or her work makes an interesting contribution. Consistent with prior
research, we define lies as false statements made with the intention of misleading a target
(Depaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). We define prosocial lies as false
statements made with the intention of misleading and benefitting a target (Levine &
Schweitzer, 2013). We distinguish prosocial lies from altruistic lies and define altruistic
lies as a subset of prosocial lies; altruistic lies are false statements that are costly for the
liar and are made with the intention of misleading and benefitting a target (Erat &
Gneezy, 2012; Levine & Schweitzer, 2013).
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We also distinguish prosocial lies from white lies. White lies involve small stakes
and are “of little moral import” (Bok, 1978: 58). White lies can be either self-serving or
prosocial. We define white lies as false statements made with the intention of misleading
a target about something trivial. In contrast, prosocial lies are intended to benefit the
target and can have small or substantial consequences. For example, parents may tell
prosocial lies about their marriage to protect their children (e.g. Barnes, 2013),
government authorities may tell prosocial lies to citizens, hoping to protect them (e.g.
Bok, 1978), and doctors may tell prosocial lies about the severity of a prognosis to help a
patient (e.g. Park, 2011; Palmieri & Stern, 2009; Iezzoni, Rao, DesRoches, Vogeli&
Campbell, 2012). In fact, a recent study found that over 55% of doctors describe
prognoses in a more positive manner than warranted, and over 10% of doctors explicitly
lie to patients (Iezzoni, et al., 2012).
A few studies have explored the frequency of deception in routine
communication. This work found that individuals lie in approximately 20% of their social
interactions, and many of these lies are prosocial (DePaulo et al., 1996). Studies have also
found that women tell more prosocial lies than men (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Dreber &
Johannesson, 2008) and that prosocial lies are most often told to close family members
(DePaulo & Kashy, 1998) and to people who are emotionally invested in the content of
the lie (DePaulo & Bell, 1996). Prosocial lies are often told as a form of politeness
(Brown & Levinson, 1987; Goffman, 1967).
In the present research, we explore moral judgments of prosocial lies. Prosocial
lying is an ethically ambivalent act; prosocial lying signals care for others (a positive
moral signal), but also disregard for the moral principle of honesty (a negative moral
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signal). By pitting the signals of care and honesty against each other, we build our
understanding of the relationship between ethical conflicts and moral character
judgments.
Judging moral character
To manage and coordinate interpersonal relationships, individuals assess the
moral character of those around them (e.g. Reeder, 2009). Research on moral character
judgments has largely focused on perceptions of an actor’s motives. When individuals
observe an unethical act, they can make either personal or situational attributions for the
action (e.g. Knobe, 2004; Yuill & Perner, 1988; Young & Saxe, 2008). In making these
attributions, individuals seek to understand the intentionality of the actor’s actions
(Alicke, 1992; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Bloom, 2003). Individuals
make inferences about an actor’s intentionality by using characteristics of the decisionmaking process as information (see Ditto, Pizzaro, & Tannenbaum, 2009 for review). For
example, individuals who make quick moral decisions are perceived to be more moral
than individuals who take their time to arrive at a moral decision, because a quick
decision signals that an actor was certain about her judgment (Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro,
2013).
Recent research has expanded our understanding of the different signals, such as
decision speed, that influence perceptions of ethicality. However, there is still much to
learn about the traits and values that really matter for judgments of moral character (e.g.
Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, & Yzerbyt,
2012).
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Scholars argue that justice and care are two key components of moral character
(Walker & Hennig, 2004; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). Justice
reflects respect for overarching moral rules, such as “do not lie.” Care reflects the
obligation to help and protect others (Gilligan, 1982; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Walker &
Hennig, 2004). Though many scholars identify these two components as the core
foundations of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969; Gilligan, 1982), others have expanded
the set of moral foundations to include Purity, Authority, and In-group Loyalty (Haidt &
Graham, 2007, Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). In our investigation, we focus on justice
and care.
Extant ethics research has primarily studied acts that violate either justice or care
(e.g. Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011). In these cases, the ethical choice is
often clear. However, when justice and care conflict, the ethical choice is unclear.
Surprisingly, little work has examined the moral judgment of competing moral principles
(for an exception, see Uhlmann & Zhu, 2013). In the present research, we explore the
tension between justice and care by studying prosocial lies. Prosocial lies represent a
justice violation (e.g. “Never tell a lie”) that signals care.
The majority of research in moral psychology argues that, at its core, “morality is
about protecting individuals” (Haidt & Graham, 2007: 100). Caring for others is
fundamental to the human experience and humans are hardwired to detect harm to others
(de Waal, 2008; Graham, et al., 2011; Craig, 2009). For example, individuals often
construe immoral acts as causing harm, even when no objective harm has been done
(Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014). Some scholars have even suggested that moral rules of
justice evolved to protect people from harm (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). That is, the
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reason we value justice may have more to do with its role in protecting individuals, than
our preference for formal rules (Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991; Rai
& Fiske, 2011).
Consistent with this notion, we postulate that when justice causes harm to
individuals (i.e., when justice and care conflict), concerns for care will supersede
concerns for justice. Consequently, we expect observers to judge individuals who tell lies
that help others to be more moral than individuals who are honest, but harm others.
The present research
Across three studies, we examine moral judgments of individuals who tell
prosocial lies. In Study 1, we find that altruistic lies are perceived to be moral. We
compare altruistic lies to selfish truths and find that individuals who lie to help others are
perceived to be more moral than individuals who are honest. In Study 2, we disentangle
deception, outcomes, and intentions. We find that intentions matter profoundly, but that
the outcomes associated with deception do not influence judgments of morality.
In Study 3, we extend our investigation by disentangling the consequences of
lying for the liar and the consequences of lying for the deceived party. We find that lies
that neither help nor harm others are perceived to be immoral, but lies that help others,
regardless of their cost to the liar, are perceived to be moral. Taken together, our studies
demonstrate that the perceived ethicality of deception is labile. Intentions matter, and in
at least some domains, caring for others is perceived to be more diagnostic of moral
character than honesty.
Study 1
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In Study 1, we examine moral judgments of altruistic lies and selfish truths. In our
first study, participants judged an individual’s actions in a deception game. In this
experiment, lying benefited the deceived party at a cost to the deceiver. In this study, we
find that altruistic lies are perceived to be moral.
Method
Participants. We recruited 215 participants from a city in the northeastern United
States to participate in a study in exchange for a $10 show-up fee.
Procedure and Materials. We randomly assigned participants to one of two
conditions in a between-subjects design. Participants observed and then judged an
individual who either told an altruistic lie or was selfishly honest.
We told participants that they would observe the decision another participant had
made in a prior exercise, called “The Number Game.” The prior participant’s decision in
The Number Game served as our manipulation of lying.
The Number Game. We modified the deception game (Erat & Gneezy; 2012;
Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun, & Murnighan, 2009; Gneezy; 2005) to create The Number
Game.
In The Number Game, two individuals were paired and randomly assigned to the
role of either Sender or Receiver. The payoffs for each pair of participants were
determined by the outcome of a random number generator and the choices made by the
Sender and the Receiver. We refer to the individual who sent the message (who either
lied or was honest) as “the Sender” throughout our studies. We refer to the Sender’s
partner (the individual who received the message) as “the Receiver.” In our studies,
participants observed and judged the behavior of one Sender in The Number Game.
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The rules of The Number Game were as follows:
1. Senders were told a number supposedly generated by a random number
generator (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5). In our study, the number was always 4.
2. The Sender then had to report the outcome of the random number
generator to his/her partner, the Receiver. The Sender could send one of
five possible messages to the Receiver. The message could read, “The
number picked was [1, 2, 3, 4, or 5].”
 The Sender knew that the number the Receiver chose (1, 2, 3, 4, or
5) determined the payment in the experiment. The Sender also
knew that the only information the Receiver would have was the
message from the Sender and that most Receivers chose the
number indicated in the Sender’s message.
 The Sender knew there were two possible payment options, A and
B. If the Receiver chose the correct number, the Sender and the
Receiver would be paid according to Option A. Otherwise, the
Sender and the Receiver would be paid according to Option B.
3. In Study 1, the payoffs for Option A were $2 for the Sender and $0 for the
Receiver. The payoffs for Option B were $1.75 for the Sender and $1 for
the Receiver.
4. After receiving the Sender’s message, the Receiver chose a number: 1, 2,
3, 4 or 5. The Receiver knew that his/her choice determined the payment
in the experiment, but the Receiver did not know the payoffs associated
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with the choices. The Sender’s message was the only piece of information
the Receiver had.
Therefore, Senders faced the following options:
A.

Send an honest message, e.g. “The number picked was 4.”
Honesty was most likely to lead to an outcome that was costly for the
Receiver, and beneficial for Sender (i.e. selfish).

B.

Send a dishonest message, e.g. “The number picked was [1, 2, 3, or 5].”
Lying was most likely to lead to an outcome was beneficial for the
Receiver, and was costly to the Sender (i.e. altruistic).

Design of the present study. Participants in our study learned the rules of The
Number Game and had to pass a comprehension check to continue with the study.
Participants who passed the comprehension check learned about the behavior of a
prior Sender. Specifically, participants observed a Sender who either sent an honest, but
selfish message (Option A) or sent a deceptive, but altruistic message (Option B). We
provide a summary of the payoffs associated with each choice in Table 1.
Dependent variables. After learning about the Sender’s choice and the outcome
of The Number Game, participants rated the Sender. We used seven-point Likert scales
for all ratings.
Participants rated whether the Sender was ethical, moral, and a good person, and
the extent to which the Sender’s decision was ethical and moral (α = .93). These items
were anchored at 1 = “Not at all” and 7 = “Extremely.”
Participants also rated the benevolence of the Sender using two items: “This
person is kind” and “This person has good intentions,” (r(196)=.83), and the honesty of
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the Sender using two items: “This person is honest” and “This person tells the truth,”
(r(196)=.96). These items were anchored at 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly
agree.”
We also asked two multiple-choice recall questions to ensure participants had
paid attention to our manipulations: “What message did the Sender send to his or her
Receiver?” and “What was the actual number chosen by the random number generator?”1
After participants submitted their responses, we collected demographic
information and asked participants what they thought the purpose of the study was. We
ran this study for the length of one laboratory session and we report all data exclusions
and manipulations (Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn, 2011).
Results
We report results from 196 participants (62.2% female; Mage= 20.4 years, SD =
2.38) who passed the comprehension check and completed the entire study; 19
participants failed the comprehension check at the start of the experiment and were
automatically eliminated from the study. We present the means and standard deviations
of each of our scales, as well as the inter-scale correlation matrix in Table 2. An
exploratory factor analysis (Varimax rotation) yielded two factors that accounted for
74.06% of the variance. The first factor (eigenvalue = 5.32) consisted of the five morality
items and the two benevolence items (loadings ≥ |.79|), and the second factor (eigenvalue
= 1.77) consisted of the two honesty items (loadings ≥ |.86|).

1

A total of 94.9% of participants correctly answered both recall questions. We report
analyses for all participants who completed the entire study, but none of our findings
change when we restrict our sample to only those who correctly answered the recall
questions.
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Although perceived benevolence and moral character are closely linked (e.g.
Haidt & Graham, 2007) and loaded onto one factor, benevolence is theoretically distinct
from morality (e.g. Haidt & Graham, 2007; Walker & Hennig, 2004; Leach et al., 2007;
Brambilla et al., 2012). Consequently, we present analyses of benevolence and moral
character separately. However, our results follow the same pattern if we combine these
items into one construct. This was the case across all three of our studies.2
We conducted a one-way ANOVA to examine the effect of altruistic lying on
perceived benevolence, honesty, and moral character. Participants judged altruistic liars
to be more moral (M = 5.03, SD = 1.13) than selfish truth-tellers (M = 4.30, SD = 1.09),
F(1, 194) = 21.52, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .100 (see Figure 1). Participants also judged altruistic
liars to be more benevolent (M = 5.36, SD = 1.29) than selfish truth-tellers (M = 3.98, SD
= 1.32), F(1, 194) = 53.90, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .217. However, altruistic liars were judged to
be less honest (M = 3.50, SD = 1.19) than selfish truth-tellers (M = 5.06, SD = 1.40), F(1,
194) = 69.98, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .265.
--Figure 1 here
--Discussion
In contrast to prior research that assumes that dishonesty undermines moral
character, we find that, at least in some cases, lying increases moral character. In

2

We thank an anonymous reviewer for his/her recommendation to explore our factor
structure.
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particular, we find that individuals perceive those who tell altruistic lies to be more moral
than those who tell selfish truths. Study 1 suggests that when benevolence and honesty
conflict, benevolence may be more important than honesty.
Study 2
In Study 2, we extend our investigation of deception and judgments of moral
character. In this study, we use a deception game similar to the game we used in Study 1.
In Study 2, however, we independently manipulate intentions, outcomes, and deception.
This design enables us to measure the effect of deception, controlling for (selfish and
altruistic) intentions. That is, in this study, we disentangle the effects of honesty and
benevolence.
In Study 2, we also introduce informational uncertainty. In many practical
contexts, individuals tell lies, but are uncertain of the consequences. For example, we
may tell a colleague that his presentation was great with the intention of helping by
boosting his confidence. This lie, however, may actually lead to an unintended outcome
such as overconfidence and less preparation. We disentangle intentions from outcomes to
investigate perceptions of lies that are told with good intentions but lead to negative
outcomes.
Method
Participants. We recruited 237 participants from a city in the northeastern United
States to participate in a study in exchange for a $10 show-up fee.
Procedure and Materials. As in Study 1, participants observed the decisions an
individual made in an exercise called “The Number Game.” We randomly assigned
participants to one of eight experimental conditions in a 2(Intentions: Altruistic vs.
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Selfish) x 2(Lying: Lie vs. Truth) x 2(Outcome: Altruistic vs. Selfish) between-subjects
design. Specifically, participants observed a Sender who either lied or sent an honest
message, whose intentions were either selfish or altruistic, and whose choice ultimately
led to an outcome that was either altruistic or selfish.
The Number Game. The Number Game in Study 2 was similar to the game we
used in Study 1, with two notable changes. First, we introduced a stochastic element to
the game to disentangle the effects of outcomes and intentions. Specifically, Senders in
this game knew that the message that s/he selected was only delivered to the Receiver
75% of the time. Senders learned that 25% of the time, the computer overrode their
decision and delivered the opposite message to the Receiver. That is, whether or not the
Receiver received a truthful or deceptive message was probabilistically determined. In
the actual experiment, the computer overrode the confederate Sender’s decision (i.e.
intentions) half of the time so that our cells were evenly balanced.
Second, Senders in this experiment played The Number Game with one of two
possible payment structures. These payment structures enabled us to manipulate whether
deception or honesty was associated with selfish or altruistic intentions. We provide a
summary of the payoffs associated with each choice in Table 1.
The first payment structure was identical to the one we used in Study 1. This
payment structure represented the choice between selfish honesty (Option A) and
altruistic lying (Option B). The second payment structure represents the choice between
altruistic honesty and selfish lying. In the second payment structure, Senders learned that
they would receive $1.75 and the Receiver would receive $1 if the Receiver chose the

25

correct number (Option A). Otherwise, the Sender would receive $2 and the Receiver
would receive $0 (Option B). (As in Study 1, the correct number was always 4).
Therefore, Senders with the second payment structure faced the following
options:
A.

Send an honest message, e.g. “The number picked was 4.”
Honesty was most likely to lead to an outcome that benefitted the Receiver
and was costly to the Sender (i.e. altruistic).

B.

Send a dishonest message, e.g. “The number picked was [1, 2, 3, or 5].”
Lying was most likely to lead to an outcome that was costly to the
Receiver and benefitted the Sender (i.e. selfish).

Design of the present study. Participants in our study learned the rules of The
Number Game and had to pass a comprehension check to continue with the study.
Participants who passed the comprehension check then learned about the choice
the Sender made in The Number Game. Participants observed a Sender who either lied or
sent an honest message, who’s choice was either intended to be altruistic or selfish, and
who’s choice led to an outcome (which was probabilistically determined) that was either
altruistic or selfish.
For example, in the {Lying, Altruistic Intentions, Selfish Outcomes} condition,
participants learned the following: the Sender sent a dishonest message to the Receiver;
the Sender intended to help the Receiver earn an extra dollar (at a $0.25 cost to the
Sender); the computer overrode the Sender’s decision and the Receiver actually received
the honest message. Consequently, the Receiver chose the correct number and earned $0
and the Sender earned $2. This selfish outcome, however, was not the Sender’s intention.
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Dependent variables. After learning about the Sender’s choice and the outcome
of The Number Game, participants rated the Sender. We collected the same measures in
this study as those we used in Study 1 (α = .95; r’s > .86).
We also asked three multiple-choice recall questions to ensure participants had
paid attention to our manipulations: “What message did the Sender send to his or her
Receiver?”, “What message did the Receiver receive?” and “What was the actual number
chosen by the random number generator?”3
After participants submitted their responses, we collected demographic
information and asked participants what they thought the purpose of the study was. We
ran this study for the length of one laboratory session and we report additional measures
we collected in this study in the online supplemental materials.
Results
We report results from 211 participants (63.5% female; Mage= 24 years, SD =
7.21) who passed the comprehension check and completed the entire study; 26
participants failed the comprehension check and were automatically eliminated from the
study. We present the means and standard deviations of each scale, as well as the interscale correlation matrix in Table 2. An exploratory factor analysis (Varimax rotation)
yielded one factor that accounted for 77.10% of the variance (eigenvalue = 6.94).
Consistent with Study 1, we report the results of our manipulations on moral character,

3

A total of 75.8% of participants correctly answered all three recall questions. We report
analyses for all participants who completed the entire study, but none of our findings
change when we restrict our sample to only those who correctly answered all of the recall
questions.
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benevolence, and honesty separately. However, the pattern of results is the same when we
combine all of our items into one measure of moral character.
We conducted a three-way ANOVA on our dependent variables, using Intentions,
Lying, and Outcomes as factors. We found no main effects or interaction effects of
Outcomes, and consequently collapsed across this factor in subsequent analyses. That is,
outcomes did not influence moral judgments in this study, and our findings are
unchanged when we include Outcomes as a factor. In other words, whether or not lying
actually led to its intended consequence did not influence perceptions of moral character.
Moral character. A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of Lying, F(1, 207)
= 34.22, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .142, and a main effect of Intentions, F(1, 207) = 77.26, p < .001,
η2𝑝 = .272, on perceptions of the Sender’s moral character. Specifically, participants
believed that the Sender was more moral when s/he was honest (M = 4.98, SD = 1.34)
than when s/he lied (M = 3.97, SD = 1.46) and when s/he had altruistic intentions (M =
5.21, SD = 1.26) than when s/he had selfish intentions (M = 3.71, SD = 1.30). We did not
find a significant Lying x Intentions interaction, F(1, 207) = 1.10, p = .295, η2𝑝 = .005.
In order to compare altruistic lying and selfish honesty, we conducted a series of
planned contrasts. Consistent with Study 1, a contrast between the Altruistic Lie and the
Selfish Truth conditions revealed that Senders who told altruistic lies were judged to be
more moral than Senders who told selfish truths (M = 4.80, SD = 1.30 vs. M = 4.31, SD =
1.27), t(100) = 2.04, p = .043, d = .38. We depict these results in Figure 2. Notably,
altruistic lies and altruistic truths were rated as moral, (significantly above the midpoint
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on the scale, p < .001). Only selfish lies were rated as immoral (significantly below the
midpoint of the scale, p < .001).
--Figure 2 here
--Benevolence. A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of Lying, F(1, 207) =
29.52, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .125, and a main effect of Intentions, F(1, 207) = 92.91, p < .001,
η2𝑝 = .310, on perceptions of the Sender’s benevolence. Specifically, participants believed
that the Sender was more benevolent when s/he was honest (M = 4.92, SD = 1.44) than
when s/he lied (M = 3.91, SD = 1.71) and when s/he had altruistic intentions (M = 5.32,
SD = 1.38) than when s/he had selfish intentions (M = 3.54, SD = 1.42). We also found a
marginally significant Lying x Intentions interaction, F(1, 207) = 2.95, p = .087, η2𝑝 =
.014, such that selfish intentions, relative to altruistic intentions, were perceived to be less
benevolent when they were associated with lying (Maltruistic = 4.97, SD altruistic = 1.58 vs.
Mselfish = 2.91, SDselfish = 1.14), t(104) = 5.61, p < .001, d = 1.56, than when they were
associated with honesty (Maltruistic = 5.64, SDaltruistic = 1.10 vs. Mselfish = 4.21, SD selfish =
1.40), t(105) = 2.64, p < .01, d = 1.14. That is, selfishness is perceived to be less
benevolent – or more malevolent – when it is associated with deception than when it is
associated with honesty.
Planned contrasts between the Selfish Truth and the Altruistic Lie conditions
revealed that participants perceived the Sender to be more benevolent when s/he told an
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altruistic lie (M = 4.97, SD = 1.58) than when s/he told a selfish truth (M = 4.21, SD =
1.40), t(100) = 2.91, p < .01, d = .51.
Honesty. A two-way ANOVA also revealed a main effect of Lying, F(1, 207) =
167.35, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .447, and a main effect of Intentions, F(1, 207) = 35.46, p < .001,
η2𝑝 = .146, on perceptions of the Sender’s honesty. Specifically, participants believed that
the Sender was more honest when s/he told the truth (M = 5.53, SD = 1.31) than when
s/he lied (M = 3.14, SD = 1.54) and when s/he had altruistic intentions (M = 4.93, SD =
1.61) than when s/he had selfish intentions (M = 3.75, SD = 1.92).
We also found a significant Lying x Intentions interaction, F(1, 207) = 5.18, p
=.024, η2𝑝 = .024, such that the same lie was perceived to be less honest, relative to truthtelling, when it was associated with selfish intentions (Mtruth = 5.18, SDtruth = 1.47 vs. Mlie
= 2.42, SDlie = 1.20), t(103) = 10.68, p < .001, d = 2.06, compared to altruistic intentions
, (Mtruth = 5.85, SDtruth = 1.07 vs. Mlie = 3.91, SDlie = 1.51), t(106) = 7.59, p < .001, d =
1.48. In other words, an otherwise identical lie is perceived to be less dishonest when it is
associated with altruism.
Planned contrasts between the Selfish Truth and the Altruistic Lie conditions
revealed that participants perceived the Sender to be less honest when the Sender told an
altruistic lie (M =3.91, SD = 1.51) than when the Sender told a selfish truth (M = 5.18, SD
= 1.47), t(100) = 4.83, p < .01, d = .85.
Discussion
In Study 2, we manipulated intentions, deception, and outcomes independently
and found that intentions influenced judgments of moral character more than deception or
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outcomes. In this study, participants judged Senders who told altruistic lies to be more
moral than Senders who told selfish truths. In this study, the only decisions participants
judged to be immoral were selfish lies.
We also found that judgments of honesty influenced judgments of benevolence
and judgments of benevolence influenced judgments of honesty. Controlling for
deceptive behavior, altruistic intentions signaled honest character, and controlling for
intentions, honesty signaled benevolent character. That is, a single moral behavior
triggered a halo of unrelated moral trait attributions. However, as expected, judgments of
benevolence were more sensitive to intentions and judgments of honesty were more
sensitive to deception.
Importantly, we also found that outcomes, when disentangled from deception and
intentions, had no effect on moral judgments of deception. These findings offer new
insight into the psychology of deception. The consequences of deception, and unethical
behavior generally, are uncertain. Interestingly, we find that whether or not (dis)honesty
actually helped or hurt did not influence judgments of moral character.
Study 3
In Studies 1 and 2, we examined altruistic lies. Altruistic lies are costly for the liar
and beneficial for the target. In Study 3, we manipulate the consequences of deception for
the Sender and the Receiver independently. This enables us to disentangle attributions of
benevolence from attributions of altruism, and to contrast altruistic lies with non-altruistic
prosocial lies. In this design, we also include a control condition that directly examines
perceptions of lying, free of consequences for the liar and the deceived party.
Method
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Participants. We recruited 300 adults to participate in an online survey via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Procedure and Materials. As in Studies 1 and 2, participants learned about the
decisions an individual made in an exercise, called “The Number Game.” In Study 3, we
randomly assigned participants to one of eight cells in a 2(Lying: Lie vs. Truth) x
2(Consequences for the Sender: None vs. Cost) x 2(Consequences for the Receiver: None
vs. Benefit) between-subjects design. That is, participants learned the following about a
Sender: the Sender either lied or was honest; lying was either costly for the Sender or had
no effect on the Sender; and lying either benefited the Receiver or had no effect on the
Receiver.
The Number Game. The Number Game in Study 3 was similar to the game we
used in Study 1. Participants learned about a Sender who either accurately reported or
lied about the outcome of a random number generator. We manipulated the payoffs
associated with honesty and lying by manipulating the payments associated with
decisions in The Number Game.
In Study 3, participants viewed one of four possible payment structures. These
payment structures varied the payoffs associated with lying for the Sender and the
Receiver. These payment structures, depicted in Table 1, operationalized one of four
types of lies:
1. Control Lie: Lying, relative to honesty, had no effect on the Sender or the
Receiver.
2. Self-sacrificial Lie: Lying, relative to honesty, hurt the Sender and had no
effect on the Receiver.
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3. Prosocial Lie: Lying, relative to honesty, had no effect on the Sender and
benefited the Receiver.
4. Altruistic Lie: Lying, relative to honesty, hurt the Sender and benefited the
Receiver.
Participants learned about a Sender who faced the opportunity to tell one of the
four types of lies described above. For example, Senders in the Prosocial Lie conditions
had the opportunity to send a dishonest message to the Receiver, which would have no
effect on the Sender but would benefit the Receiver. In each condition, participants
learned that the Sender either lied or told the truth. Honesty was associated with the same
payoffs in all conditions ($2 for the Sender, $0 for the Receiver).
As in Studies 1 and 2, participants had to pass a comprehension check to ensure
that they understood The Number Game before they could continue with the experiment.
Participants who failed the comprehension check were automatically removed from the
study.
Dependent variables. After learning about the Sender’s choice and passing the
comprehension check, participants rated the Sender. We developed new scales in Study 3
to better distinguish judgments of moral character from judgments of benevolence and
honesty.
Moral character. We measured moral character using six items (α = .96) we
adapted from Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum (2013). Specifically, we asked participants
whether the Sender had “good moral character” (1 = “Extremely immoral character”, 7 =
“Extremely moral character”), was “an ethical person” (1 = “Extremely unethical
person,” 7 = “Extremely ethical person”), was “a morally good person” (1 = “Extremely
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morally bad person,” 7 = “Extremely morally good person”), “will behave morally in the
future” (1= “Extremely likely to behave immorally”, 7 = “Extremely likely to behave
morally”), “made the morally right decision” (1 = “Extremely immoral decision” 7 =
“Extremely moral decision”), and “made the ethical decision” (1 = “Extremely unethical
decision”, 7 = “Extremely ethical decision.”).
Benevolence. Participants rated the Sender’s benevolence using four items (α =
.89): This person is [benevolent, empathic, caring, selfish (reverse-scored)]. These items
were anchored at 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree.” We adapted this
scale from Uhlmann et al.’s (2013) perceived empathy scale, but we included additional
items to measure benevolence rather than general empathy (e.g. selfish, benevolent).
Honesty. Participants rated the honesty of the Sender using three items (α =.91):
This person [is honest, tells the truth, is deceptive (reverse-scored)]; 1 = “Strongly
disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree.”
As in Study 1, we also asked two multiple-choice recall questions to ensure
participants had paid attention to our manipulations: “What message did the Sender send
to his or her Receiver?” and “What was the actual number chosen by the random number
generator?”4
After participants submitted their responses, we collected demographic
information and asked participants what they thought the purpose of the study was. We

4

A total of 87.0% of participants correctly answered both recall questions. We report
analyses for all participants who completed the entire study, but none of our findings
change when we restrict our sample to only those who correctly answered the recall
questions.
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determined our sample size in advance and we report all data exclusions and
manipulations.
Results
We report results from 269 participants (45.6% female; Mage= 32 years, SD =
11.03) who passed the comprehension check and completed the entire study; 31
participants failed the comprehension check and were automatically eliminated from the
study. We present the means and standard deviations of each scale, as well as the interscale correlation matrix in Table 2. Although we devised new scales to measure moral
character and benevolence, these constructs remained closely related and loaded together
on one factor (Exploratory factor analysis, Varimax rotation, loadings ≥ |.65|). Consistent
with Studies 1 and 2, we report the results of our manipulations on moral character and
benevolence separately, but our findings remain the same when we combine moral
character and benevolence into one scale.
We conducted a three-way ANOVA on our dependent variables, using Lying,
Consequences for the Sender, and Consequences for the Receiver as factors. We found no
main effects or interaction effects of Consequences for the Sender. That is, whether or not
lying was costly for the Sender did not influence judgments of the Sender’s moral
character, benevolence, or honesty. Notably, prosocial lies were not judged differently
than were altruistic lies. We collapse across Consequences for the Sender in our
subsequent analyses, but our findings are unchanged when we include Consequences for
the Sender as a factor.

35

Moral character. We find no main effects of Lying, F(1, 265) = .02, p = .887, η2𝑝
= .000, or Consequences for the Receiver, F(1, 265) = 2.70, p = .100, η2𝑝 = .010, on
perceptions of moral character. Importantly, we did find a significant Lying x
Consequences for the Receiver interaction, F(1, 265) = 41.20, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .135. When
lying helped the Receiver, the Sender was judged to be more moral when s/he lied (M =
4.88, SD = 1.36) than when s/he told the truth (M = 3.90, SD = 1.37), t(132) = 4.41, p <
.001, d = 1.01. Conversely, when lying had no effect on the Receiver, the Sender was
judged to be less moral when s/he lied (M = 3.62, SD = 1.25) than when s/he told the
truth (M = 4.64, SD = 1.10), t(135) = 4.66, p < .001, d = .87. Consistent with our findings
in Studies 1 and 2, prosocial lying increased perceptions of moral character. Lies that
neither helped nor harmed the Receiver, however, decreased perceptions of the Sender’s
moral character.
Benevolence. A two-way ANOVA revealed main effects of Lying, F(1, 265) =
3.76, p = .053, η2𝑝 = .014, and Consequences for the Receiver, F(1, 265) = 5.61, p = .020,
η2𝑝 = .021, on perceived benevolence. Specifically, participants believed that the Sender
was more benevolent when s/he lied (M = 4.09, SD = 1.49) than when s/he was honest (M
= 3.81, SD = 1.12) and when lying helped the Receiver (M = 4.12, SD = 1.54) than when
it had no effect Receiver (M = 3.78, SD = 1.04).
However, these effects were qualified by a significant Lying x Consequences for
the Receiver interaction, F(1, 265) = 45.98, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .148. When lying helped the
Receiver, the Sender was judged to be more benevolent when s/he lied (M = 4.76, SD =
1.50) than when s/he told the truth (M = 3.48, SD = 1.30), t(132) = 6.13, p < .001, d = .91.
36

Conversely, when lying did not help the Receiver, the Sender was judged to be less
benevolent when s/he lied (M = 3.41, SD = 1.13) than when s/he told the truth (M = 4.13,
SD = 0.79), t(135) = 3.44, p < .001, d = .74. This interaction demonstrates that the main
effect of lying on benevolence is driven by judgments of prosocial lies.
Honesty. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Lying, F(1, 265) =
77.76, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .227, on perceived honesty. Participants rated the Sender as less
honest when s/he lied (M = 3.41, SD = 1.57) than when s/he told the truth (M = 4.97, SD
= 1.39). We find no effect of Consequences for the Receiver on perceived honesty, F(1,
258) = 1.19, p = .276, η2𝑝 = .004. The Sender was judged to be similarly honest when
lying helped the Receiver (M = 4.28, SD = 1.51) and when lying had no effect on the
Receiver (M = 4.11, SD = 1.81).
We do find a significant Lying x Consequences for the Receiver interaction, F(1,
265) = 13.11, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .047. Consistent with our findings in Study 2, the difference
in perceived honesty between a truth and a lie was greater when lying had no effect on
the Receiver, (Mtruth = 5.19, SDtruth = 1.31 vs. Mlie = 2.99, SDlie = 1.57), t(135) = 8.84, p <
.001, d = 1.52, than when lying helped the Receiver (Mtruth = 4.74, SDtruth = 1.43 vs. Mlie =
3.83, SDlie = 1.46), t(132) = 3.65, p < .001, d = .63. That is, deception was perceived to be
more honest when it helped another person.
Judgments of different types of lies. Although Consequences for the Sender had
no effect on moral judgments, we sought to better understand perceptions of lies with
respect to our control condition. We conducted planned contrasts for each type of lie and
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we depict these results in Figures 3-5. We summarize perceptions of moral character for
each type of lie below and in Table 3.
In our control condition, lying was inconsequential. That is, deception and
honesty resulted in the same payoffs. In this condition, participants rated the Sender as
significantly less moral when s/he lied (M = 3.58, SD = 1.30) than when s/he told the
truth (M = 4.52, SD = 1.08), t(67) = 3.03, p < .01, d = .79. This contrast documents an
aversion to lying.
We find the same pattern of results for self-sacrificial lies: Participants rated the
Sender as significantly less moral when s/he told a self-sacrificial lie (M = 3.68, SD =
1.20) than when s/he told the truth (M = 4.75, SD = 1.12), t(67) = 3.44, p = .001, d = .92.
We find no difference between ratings of self-sacrificial lies and inconsequential lies.
We find the opposite pattern of results for prosocial and altruistic lies. Participants
rated the Sender as significantly more moral when s/he told a prosocial lie (M = 5.03, SD
= 1.32) than when s/he told the truth (M = 3.87, SD = 1.45), t(62) = 3.58, p < .001, d =
.84. Similarly, participants rated the Sender as significantly more moral when s/he told an
altruistic lie (M = 4.75, SD = 1.40) than when s/he told the truth (M = 3.93, SD = 1.31),
t(69) = 2.69, p < .01, d = .60. We find no difference between ratings of prosocial and
altruistic lies.
Prosocial lies and altruistic lies were both rated to be more moral than lies that
had no consequences (ts > 3.92, ps < .01, ds > .86). Truth-telling was also rated to be
more moral in the control condition than truth-telling in the altruistic lie condition (t =
2.04, p = .042, d = .49) and marginally more moral than truth-telling in the prosocial lie
condition (t = 1.87, p = .063, d = .51), even though the payoffs for truth-telling were
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identical across these conditions. Taken together, our results suggest that having the
opportunity to lie to help another party causes lying to appear to be more moral and
causes honesty to appear to be less moral.
--Figures 3-5, Table 3
---Discussion
In Study 3, we find that individuals who lie to help others, regardless of whether
or not the lie is costly for them, are perceived to be more moral than individuals who are
honest. Consistent with our findings in Studies 1 and 2, prosocial motives influenced
perceptions of moral character more than deception did.
In addition, we find evidence of a direct distaste for lying. Individuals who told
lies that had no consequences for either themselves (the liars) or the deceived party were
perceived to be less moral than individuals who were honest. Consistent with Study 2,
this result suggests that perceptions of deception are not solely determined by the
consequences and intentions associated with lying. To our knowledge, this is the first
study to examine moral judgments of deception, independent of its consequences.
General discussion
Because extant research has conflated deception with self-serving motives and
outcomes, our understanding of deception is limited. We know little about how common
forms of deception, and conflicts between honesty and benevolence broadly, influence
judgment and behavior.
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Across three studies, we explore moral judgments of prosocial lies. In Study 1, we
find that altruistic lies are perceived to be more moral than selfish truths. In Study 2, we
independently manipulate deception, prosocial intentions, and prosocial outcomes. We
find that outcomes did not influence judgments of moral character, but, consistent with
prior work, intentions mattered profoundly (e.g. Alicke, 1992; Ames & Fiske, 2013).
Although deception also had an effect on moral character, we find that the effect of
intentions was larger than that of deception. Consequently, individuals with altruistic
intentions are perceived to be more moral, more benevolent, and more honest, even when
they lie.
In our third study, we examine different types of lies. We find that perceptions of
prosocial lies do not depend on self-sacrifice; altruistic lies and prosocial lies both
increase perceptions of moral character. We also find evidence for a direct aversion to
deception; lies that had no consequences for the liar or the deceived party were perceived
to be immoral.
Theoretically, our findings make several contributions. First, we demonstrate the
importance of a broader conceptualization of deception. Whereas prior studies of ethical
decision-making and moral character have conflated deception with selfishness, we
distinguish self-serving deception from altruistic, prosocial, and inconsequential
deception. We find that individuals who tell lies that help others are perceived to be
moral.
Second, our investigation expands the study of ethical decision making to
conflicts between honesty and benevolence. Prior work has studied violations of either
honesty or benevolence in isolation, or acts that violate both honesty and benevolence at
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the same time. To our knowledge, our work is the first to examine character judgments
when these values conflict. In our studies, benevolence was more closely related to moral
character than honesty. Although we cannot conclude that the principle of benevolence is
always more important than honesty, we can conclude that, at least in some cases,
prosociality has a greater effect on moral character than does deception.
Third, our findings offer insight into lay beliefs about universal moral values. We
conceptualize prosocial lying not only as a conflict between honesty and benevolence,
but more broadly as a conflict between justice and care. Prosocial lying reflects the
violation of an ethical rule in order to care for another person. Providing care and
avoiding harm towards others is a fundamental human tendency. Our findings
demonstrate that care is, at least sometimes, more important than justice for moral
character judgments. Importantly, our work illustrates the importance of studying
conflicting moral rules (e.g. Broeders, van den Bos, Müller & Ham, 2011).
Our study of justice and care also extends our understanding of deontological and
utilitarian principles. Deontological philosophers argue that lying is immoral because it
violates the sacred value of the right to truth (Kant, 1785). Utilitarians argue that the
ethicality of lying depends upon its consequences (e.g. Martin Luther, cited in Bok, 1978;
Bentham, 1843). Our findings support elements of both schools of thought. When lies are
inconsequential, individuals do penalize liars for violating the principle of honesty.
However, when lies help others the utilitarian consideration of consequences outweighs
the deontological prohibition of deception. These findings reflect the ambivalence that we
have for deception and quite possibly, many other moral violations. Perhaps our true
moral compass reflects both deontological and utilitarian values.
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Our work also contributes to the literature on moral dilemmas. In our
investigation, we created a framework to explore a common type of ethical dilemma.
Although prior research on ethical dilemmas and moral reasoning has substantially
expanded our understanding of ethical decision-making, most of this work has studied
extreme circumstances. For example, scholars use paradigms such as the trolley problem
to study the dilemma of killing one person to save many (Broeders, van den Bos, Müller
& Ham, 2011; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Moore, Clark, & Kane,
2008), and the Heinz dilemma to study the dilemma of stealing an expensive drug to save
a life (Kohlberg, 1981). Our investigation extends our understanding of moral judgment
by exploring conflicting moral principles in a context that pervades our everyday lives.
Limitations and future directions
Future work is needed to understand judgments of the full range of deceptive
behaviors. In our studies, the intentions associated with lying were clear. In many
settings, however, a liar’s intentions are ambiguous. In addition to benefiting others,
many prosocial lies also benefit the deceiver. For example, when a colleague asks if you
enjoyed her talk, the prosocial lie (“It was great!”) may benefit both the colleague
(causing her to feel better) and the deceiver (avoiding a protracted discussion about the
fatal flaws in the research). That is, a single act of deception may be both prosocial and
self-serving. Future research should examine how individuals judge lies that have mixed
or uncertain motives.
Future work should also explore how prosocial lying influences a broader set of
perceptions and behaviors. For example, a substantial body of research suggests that
deception harms trust (e.g. Boles, Croson & Murninghan, 2000; Schweitzer, Hershey, &
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Bradlow, 2006), but trust scholars have primarily investigated the consequences of selfish
lies. Recent studies suggest that the relationship between deception and trust depends on
the extent to which the liar’s motives are believed to be prosocial (Levine & Schweitzer,
2013; Wang & Murnighan, 2013). More research is needed to understand when prosocial
lies, and ethical violations broadly, can increase trust and cooperation.
Prosocial lying may also signal negative character traits. For example, prosocial
lying may harm perceptions of moral traits other than benevolence and honesty, such as
courage (Walter & Hennig, 2004; Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum, 2013). If individuals
consider prosocial lying to be cowardly, prosocial lying may decrease, rather than
increase, perceptions of moral character. Prosocial lying may also have negative effects
over time, as the signal value of benevolence weakens and the liar becomes less credible.
More broadly, we call for future research to expand our understanding of conflicts
between moral principles. A substantial literature has explored characteristics of ethical
decision-making when the ethical choice is clear (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; Tenbrunsel,
1998; Boles, Croson, & Murninghan, 2000); and a large literature has explored conflicts
between deontological and utilitarian principles (e.g. Greene et al., 2004; Moore et al.,
2008). However, scholars have largely overlooked behaviors that signal competing moral
values (for exceptions, see Gino & Pierce, 2009; Gino & Pierce, 2010).
Ethicists and psychologists have argued that morality reflects a set of values, such
as honesty, benevolence, restraint, and loyalty (e.g. Leach et al., 2007; Brambilla,
Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998; Reeder &
Spores, 1983; Noddings, 1984; Walker & Hennig, 2004; Blasi, 1984; Aquino & Reed,
2002) and that these values reflect different moral foundations, such as justice, care,
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purity, and authority (e.g. Haidt & Graham, 2007). We investigate the conflict between
justice and care, but important work remains with respect to understanding how
individuals resolve—and judge others who resolve—conflicts between other principles,
such as fairness and mercy (Kidder, 1995; Wiltermuth & Flynn, 2012; Flynn &
Wiltermuth, 2010), and harm versus purity (e.g. Uhlmann & Zhu, 2013). We argue that
the study of conflicting moral principles represents a substantial challenge for ethical
decision-making scholars.
Conclusion
Scholars, managers, and parents routinely extoll the virtues of honesty and warn
of the dire consequences of deception. Deception, however, is not only pervasive but also
employed by some of the same people who enjoin others to avoid its’ use. In this work,
we disentangle deception from intentions and outcomes. We investigate prosocial lies,
lies told to benefit others, and find that prosocial lies are judged to be more moral than
honesty.
Prosocial lies represent a conflict between two moral foundations: justice and
care. Prior work has overlooked how individuals resolve conflicts between moral
principles, and we call for future work to develop this important line of investigation.
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TABLES
Table 1
Payoffs used in each study
Type of Lie

Payoffs associated
with Truth

Payoffs associated
with Lie

Study 1

Altruistic Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$1.75
$1.00

Study 2

Altruistic Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$1.75
$1.00

Selfish Lie

Sender
Receiver

$1.75
$1.00

$2.00
$0.00

Control Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$2.00
$0.00

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$1.75
$0.00

Prosocial Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$2.00
$1.00

Altruistic Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$1.75
$1.00

Study 3

Self-Sacrificial
Lie

Note. In Study 2, the values displayed correspond to the intended outcome, but not
necessarily the realized outcome, associated with each choice. In Study 2, the computer
overrode the Sender’s choice 25% of the time, such that the computer sent an honest
message in place of a dishonest message, or a dishonest message in place of an honest
message.
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Table 2. Scale Statistics in Studies 1, 2, and 3
Study 1
Scale
1. Moral Character
2. Benevolence
3. Honesty

M(SD)

1

2

4.67 (1.16)
4.67 (1.68) 0.77*
4.29 (1.51) 0.24*

0.10

Study 2
Scale
1. Moral Character
2. Benevolence
3. Honesty

M(SD)

1

2

4.47 (1.49)
4.44 (1.66) 0.89*
4.34 (1.87) 0.72* 0.66*

Study 3
Scale
1. Moral Character
2. Benevolence
3. Honesty

M(SD)

1

2

4.27 (1.37)
3.95 (1.32) 0.83*
4.19 (1.67) 0.64* 0.48*

Note. *p < .01.
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Table 3. Summary of Results (Study 3)

Type of Lie

Consequences of Lying
To Sender
To Receiver

Perceptions of
moral character

Prosocial Lie

No consequences

Helps

Increase

Altruistic Lie

Harms

Helps

Increase

Self-Sacrificial Lie

Harms

No consequences

Decrease

Inconsequential Lie
(Control)

No consequences

No consequences

Decrease
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FIGURES

7

*

Moral character

6
5
4
3
2
1
Selfish Truth

Altruistic Lie

Figure 1: Moral character judgments in Study 1. Error bars represent ±1 SE. * p < .05.
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7

*
6

*

Moral character

5

4

3

2

1
Altruistic Truth

Selfish Lie

Selfish Truth

Altruistic Lie

Focal contrast:
Selfish truth vs. Altruistic lie

Typical contrast:
Altruistic truth vs. Selfish lie

Figure 2: Moral character judgments in Study 2. Error bars represent ±1 SE. * p < .05.
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Honesty

Lying

7

Lies that do not help the deceived party
decrease moral character

Lies that help the deceived party
increase moral character

6

Moral character

**
5

*

*

*

4

3

2

1
1 Lie
Control

2
Self-Sacrificial
Lie

3

Prosocial Lie

4
Altruistic
Lie

Figure 3: Moral character judgments in Study 3. Error bars represent ±1 SE. * p < .01, **
p < .001.
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Honesty
7

Lies that do not help the deceived party
decrease perceived benevolence

Lying
Lies that help the deceived party
increase perceived benevolence

6

Perceived Benevolence

**
5

**

*

4

3

2

1
1 Lie
Control

2
Self-Sacrificial
Lie

3

Prosocial Lie

4
Altruistic
Lie

Figure 4: Perceived benevolence in Study 3. Error bars represent ±1 SE. * p < .01, ** p <
.001.
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Honesty
7

Lies that do not help the deceived party
decrease perceived honesty

Lying
Lies that help the deceived party
decrease perceived honesty

6

Perceived Honesty

**

**

*

5

4

3

2

1
1 Lie
Control

2
Self-Sacrificial
Lie

3

Prosocial Lie

4
Altruistic
Lie

Figure 5: Perceived honesty in Study 3. Error bars represent ±1 SE. * p < .01, ** p <
.001.

61

CHAPTER 2.
COMMUNITY STANDARDS OF DECEPTION
Emma E. Levine

ABSTRACT
When is lying ethical? Through a large inductive study, and a series of experiments
(N = 1313), I develop and test a descriptive moral theory to address this fundamental
question. I find that deception is perceived to be ethical when it prevents unnecessary harm.
There are two key dimensions that influence perceptions of unnecessary harm: the degree
to which deception prevents harm to an individual at the moment of communication, and
the instrumental value of truth. I identify nine implicit rules – pertaining to the targets of
deception and the topic and timing of a conversation – that specify the systematic
circumstances in which deception is perceived to be ethical. I document the causal effect
of each implicit rule on the endorsement of deception, and I demonstrate that judgments of
unnecessary harm explain reactions to these implicit rules better than several other
constructs (e.g., self-interest, perceptions of autonomy, moral duty) that have been assumed
to motivate the use or avoidance of deception in past philosophical and psychological
scholarship. This research provides insight into when and why people value honesty, and
paves the way for future research on when and why people embrace deception.
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COMMUNITY STANDARDS OF DECEPTION

Moral decency ensures for us the right to be deceived as surely as the right to
truth: to extol the latter and deny the former is to misunderstand being human.
–

David Nyberg, The Varnished Truth (1993)

A central justification for the moral prohibition of deception is the conviction that
deception robs individuals of their autonomy and their right to truth (Bacon, 1872; Bok,
1978; Kant, 1959/1785). For example, Sissela Bok, the modern voice on the philosophy
of deception, proclaimed that deception is only ethical when it upholds the principle of
autonomy: the only lies that are ethical are the ones that can be “openly debated and
consented to [emphasis added] in advance” (Bok, 1978, p. 181).
This justification for truth telling assumes that people universally value truth and
would only consent to deception in rare circumstances. Individuals, however, frequently
choose to avoid information and eschew truth (see Sweeny, Melnyk, Miller, & Shepperd,
2010 for a review). In fact, people are often complicit in others’ attempts to deceive them.
Individuals routinely avoid spoiling surprises and accept false compliments, even when
they suspect deceit. Many individuals also avoid learning about negative news that they
cannot control (e.g., Yaniv, Benador, & Sagi, 2004). Consider a patient who can learn
whether or not he has an incurable disease. He may prefer not to know – or even to be
deceived – about the disease precisely because he wishes to maintain his autonomy: the
freedom to live as if he were not ill. In this case, the patient may believe that honesty
would cause him unnecessary harm and that deception would be ethical.
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Existing research on deception has failed to consider when and why people want
to be deceived and how this affects the moral judgment and use of deception in
interpersonal contexts. In the present investigation, I integrate philosophical and
psychological scholarship to unearth community standards of deception, the implicit
psychological principles that individuals use to justify deception. Rather than assuming
that most people value honesty as a rule and that deception is a rare exception, I assume
that people have numerous, systematic rules that govern judgments of and preferences for
deception.
No prior research has documented these rules. Consequently, basic questions on
deception remain unanswered. For example, when specifically do individuals endorse
deception? What qualities of a target justify the use of deception? What qualities of true
information justify deception? How do individuals’ own preferences for information,
honesty, and deception influence their moral judgments of deception?
Through a large inductive study, and a series of vignette experiments, I answer
these questions. I demonstrate that lay people have a codified set of rules that guide their
moral judgments of deception. A basic theory underlies these implicit rules: deception is
perceived to be ethical and individuals consent to being deceived when honesty causes
unnecessary harm. Perceptions of unnecessary harm are driven by two key factors: the
degree to which deception will prevent immediate harm to an individual at the moment of
communication, and the instrumental value of truth (i.e., the degree to which honest
information may yield meaningful learning, growth, or behavioral change). Individuals
are particularly likely to endorse deception when honesty causes immediate harm and
when honesty has no instrumental value. These two factors are influenced by attributes of
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the target (i.e., the person being deceived), as well as the timing and topic of
conversation. For example, the emotional fragility of the target, the target’s capacity to
understand truthful information, and the possibility that honest feedback can be
implemented in the future all critically influence perceptions of unnecessary harm and
consequently, the endorsement of deception.
This research makes important contributions to our understanding of deception,
moral judgment, and human communication. In developing a descriptive moral theory of
deception, I challenge prior assumptions about individuals’ judgments of and preferences
for deception. It is important to develop descriptive, rather than normative, moral theories
because descriptive theories predict social judgment, moral reasoning, and everyday
human behavior (e.g., Knobe & Nichols, 2008; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007, Haidt,
2001). Just as Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler’s (1986a, 1986b) foundational work on
community standards of fairness overturned the assumption that individuals universally
value self-interest, and demonstrated that concerns about fairness place systematic, rather
than anomalous, constraints on market behavior, the present research challenges the
assumption that people universally value truth, and demonstrates that concerns about
unnecessary harm place systematic constraints on honest communication.
Thus, this research highlights the circumstances in which truthful information will
not be shared with others and the circumstances in which honesty will be penalized.
Integrating community standards of fairness into the study of economic behavior shed
light on predictable market failures (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986a, 1986b).
Similarly, integrating community standards of deception into the study of social
communication sheds light on predictable communication frictions. This research offers
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novel insight into the rules that govern how people provide and respond to personal
critiques, negative performance feedback, and terminal prognoses.
The Ethics of Deception
Normative Views
Consistent with extant research, I define deception as “the transmission of
information that intentionally misleads others” (Levine & Schweitzer, 2015, p. 89). For
centuries, philosophers and theologians have characterized deception as unethical.
Perhaps the most famous condemner of deception is Immanuel Kant, who believed that
deception was categorically unethical (Kant, 1959/1785). In Kant’s view, deception is
unethical because all individuals have a right to truth, and lying undermines that right.
Similarly, Sir Francis Bacon (1872) argued that deception is unethical because it deprives
people of “trust and belief.” Both Kant and Bacon believed that deception is unethical, at
least in part, because it destroys trust between individuals and trust in contracts, which
ultimately causes societal harm. This deontological view of deception, however, predates
Kant and Bacon. For example, Saint Augustine (circa 420 A.D.) argued that “every lie is
a sin” (cited in Gneezy, 2005) and the Judeo-Christian Bible positions one’s duty not to
lie as one of the Ten Commandments (e.g., “Thou shalt not bear false witness,” Exodus
20:16).
Some philosophers, however, have proposed alternative credentials for judging
deception. In contrast to the deontological prohibition of deception, Utilitarians argue that
deception is morally justified when its benefits outweigh its costs, (Bentham, 1843;
Martin Luther, cited in Bok, 1978). Importantly, Utilitarians do not consider who bears
those costs and benefits. For Utilitarians, a small lie that tremendously benefits the liar
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may be morally indistinguishable from a small lie that tremendously benefits the
deceived party.
Despite the prominence of consequentialist thinking on many moral issues,
modern rhetoric on deception largely follows the deontological tradition (e.g., Saarni &
Lewis, 1993; Klosterman, 2014; Harris, 2013). Economists, for example, who have long
positioned consequentialism as a normative standard, notably disparage deception.
Experimental economics prohibit deception in laboratory experiments because they
believe that deception undermines participants’ trust in future experiments (Ariely &
Norton, 2007; Jamison, Karlan, & Schechter, 2008; Levitt & List, 2007; Ortmann &
Hertwig, 2002). Recently, several public figures and sources of moral guidance have also
disparaged deception. For example, in the past two years, three ethics columnists for the
New York Times wrote articles that warned readers of the dangers of deception (Appiah,
Bloom, & Yoshino, 2015a, 2015b; Klosterman, 2014)5, and best-selling author Sam
Harris recently authored a popular philosophy book titled Lying in which he asserts that,
“lying, even about the smallest matters, needlessly damages personal relationships and
public trust” (2014, p. 2).
Often, individuals’ discomfort with deception stems not only from the belief that
deception undermines trust, but also from the belief that deception undermines the
target’s autonomy: the ability to make independent and rational decisions. Kant alludes to
the importance of autonomy, suggesting that lying violates one’s personal right to truth,

5

Interestingly, while this manuscript was being written, the New York Times did feature a
column suggesting that deception is often ethical (Dworkin, 2015). The column features
many of the same rules and justifications introduced in the present manuscript.
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but the modern philosopher Sissela Bok most clearly articulates the importance of
autonomy. In her famous “Test of Publicity,” Sissela Bok asks, “which lies, if any, would
survive the appeal for justification to reasonable persons” (Bok, 1978, p. 93). To pass this
test, a lie must be acceptable to the deceived party. That is, the deceived party must
consent in advance to the lie being told (Bok, 1978, p. 181). Although Bok does concede
that some lies may pass this test (e.g., lies of trivial importance, or lies in extreme
circumstances) she largely assumes that people rarely – if ever – would consent to being
deceived. Thus, in Bok’s view, deception is rarely assumed to be ethical.
Descriptive Views
In the present research, I descriptively explore Bok’s Test of Publicity. I build and
test a theory that explains when reasonable people justify deception and consent to being
deceived. Although individuals are unlikely to consent to being told selfish lies (lies that
help the liar and harm the deceived party) recent research suggests that individuals are far
more likely to consent to prosocial lies (lies that help the deceived party).
A large body of research documents individuals’ negative reactions to and distaste
for selfish lies. Selfish lies can trigger distrust, disliking, negative affect, and retaliation
(Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000; Croson, Boles, & Murnighan, 2003; Tyler,
Feldman, & Reichert, 2006) and often prompt other forms of fraudulent behavior (SmithCrowe, Tenbrunsel, Chan-Serafin, Umphress, & Joseph, 2015). Prosocial lies, however,
are quite different from selfish lies in both their motivation and their consequences (see
Wiltermuth, Newman, & Raj, 2015 for a review). The central motivation for prosocial
lying is the desire to help or prevent harm to others. In routine conversations, individuals
may tell prosocial lies to make others more confident or to avoid hurting others’ feelings
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(DePaulo & Bell, 1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). In economic interactions, individuals
may tell prosocial lies to help generate more money for a specific counterpart or to
restore equality (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Gino & Pierce, 2009, 2010; Levine & Schweitzer,
2014, 2015; Wiltermuth, 2011).
Importantly, prosocial lies are often welcomed by targets and can yield
interpersonal benefits. For example, Levine and Schweitzer (2014, 2015) found that
individuals who told prosocial lies (i.e., lied about the outcome of a coin-flip to earn
money for a partner) were perceived to be more ethical and were trusted more than
individuals who told the truth, and harmed others.
These results suggest that individuals care more deeply about harm than following
moral rules such as “never lie.” Indeed, scholars have suggested that perceptions of harm
and care are the core of all moral judgments, and ethical rules only evolved to protect
people from harm (Gray & Keeney, 2015; Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014; Gray, Young, &
Waytz, 2012). However, we do not yet know the rules that govern judgments of harm in
everyday communication. The present research documents these rules and demonstrates
that systematic perceptions of harm influence the justification of deception far more than
past normative frameworks have assumed. In the present research, I compare the
frequency with which individuals draw upon utilitarian and deontological reasoning to
justify deception to the frequency with which individuals draw upon a harm-avoidance
framework to justify deception. I also explore the importance of autonomy and consent to
justifications of deception, demonstrating that individuals are willing to consent to
deception when it prevents harm.
The Present Research
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To establish a descriptive moral theory of deception, I begin with an inductive
study. The motivation for using an inductive approach is three-fold. First, the goal of this
research is to identify an overarching theory that describes moral judgments of deception.
Inductive research is well-suited for exploratory theory generation because it does not
impose any pre-existing assumptions onto participant responses (Gray, 2013). Second, I
wanted to capture the language and context of a wide range of participant responses. This
is useful for developing psychological insight and theory, as well as crafting realistic
vignettes and experiments to use in the second stage of this research. Third, this approach
corresponds with the methods suggested by Bok’s Test of Publicity (1978). Bok asks
individuals to consider the lies that reasonable people would consent to and justify. The
present study empirically addresses Bok’s famous thought experiment.
To provide convergent evidence of the implicit rules identified and the theory
developed in the inductive study (Study 1), I experimentally manipulate the implicit rules
in a series of vignettes (Studies 2 and 3). This empirical approach is informed by
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler’s (1986a) approach to establishing community standards
of fairness. In each vignette, I simply asked participants whether lying or honesty was the
ethical decision.
Studies 2 and 3 achieve two main goals. First, they provide causal evidence of the
relationship between implicit rules and moral judgments of deception. Whereas Study 1
simply unearths circumstances that are salient when considering the ethicality of
deception, Studies 2 and 3 cleanly demonstrate that these circumstances causally
influence moral judgments. Second, Studies 2 and 3 explore the underlying mechanisms.
Across 12 vignettes, I demonstrate that perceptions of unnecessary harm underlie the
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effects of implicit rule violations on moral judgments of deception (Study 2) and I rule
out a series of alternative mechanisms (Study 3).
Before beginning my investigation, it is important to clearly articulate the scope
of the present research. First, this research focuses on understanding moral judgments of
deception within a single conversation between a communicator (i.e., a potential liar) and
a target (i.e., a potential deceived party). Individuals may view deception as unethical,
broadly, because it destroys trust over time. The present research does not refute this
possibility. In fact, there is interesting research to be done that addresses why people
endorse deception in the context of a particular conversation but refuse to endorse it as a
general practice. However, as a starting point, the present research examines when and
why a lie is seen as ethical within the context of a single conversation.
Second, in line with Bok’s Test of Publicity, I focus primarily on the perspective
of the target. I unearth the lies that targets would consent to being told and then I explore
whether these lies are also perceived to be moral by communicators and impartial third
parties. Although communicators and third parties may be guided by additional implicit
rules that targets do not see as justified, identifying those rules is beyond the scope of the
present research.
Study 1
In Study 1, I used open-ended survey questions to ascertain the circumstances in
which individuals would want to be deceived (i.e., consent to deception) and I examined
how this converged with moral judgments of deception. I then used a three-stage coding
process to establish a common set of implicit rules and develop a descriptive moral
theory of deception.
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Method
Participants. To ensure that my effects were robust to the characteristics of any
particular population, I recruited two separate samples to complete Study 1. The first
sample consisted of 117 adults recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (50% female; Mage
= 37 years). The second sample consisted of 187 adults recruited from a U.S. university
laboratory pool (59% female; Mage = 24 years).6 I do not find systematic differences
across these two samples. Thus, I report results collapsed across samples.
Procedure. All participants completed an online survey in which they answered
free-response questions about deception. I randomly assigned participants to one of two
conditions in a between-subjects design: Preferences or Ethics. Participants either
answered three questions about their preferences for deception (the Preferences
condition) or the general ethicality of deception (the Ethics condition).
In the Preferences condition, I first asked participants to, “Think about when
you would want someone to lie to you.” Then participants answered the following three
questions, “In what circumstances would you want someone to lie to you?”, “In what
circumstances would you not want someone to be completely honest with you?”, and
“Please come up with three concrete examples of instances in which you would want to
be lied to.” In other words, they indicated the lies that they would consent to being told.

6

Across all studies, stopping rules for data collection were decided in advance. For every study involving a
laboratory sample, I collected data for the length of one laboratory session (3 days), and then stopped data
collection. All laboratory participants were paid a $10 show-up fee in exchange for their participation in a
50-minute laboratory session. For MTurk samples, I targeted recruitment to be 100 participants/survey, 250
participants/survey and 150 participants/survey in Studies 1, 2, and 3 respectively. All MTurk participants
were paid $.50-$.75/survey.
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In the Ethics condition, I first asked participants to, “Think about when lying is
right and when lying is wrong.” Then participants answered the following three
questions, “In what circumstances is lying to someone the right thing to do?”, “In what
circumstances is being completely honest with someone the wrong thing to do?”, and
“Please come up with three concrete examples of instances in which it is ethical to lie.”
In both conditions, participants had to respond to each question for at least one minute,
and write at least 500 characters. Then, I collected demographic information for
exploratory purposes.
Analytical approach. My goal in this study was to develop a codified set of rules
and an underlying theory regarding lay perceptions of deception. Specifically, the goal
was to identify the rules and underlying mechanisms that describe when people consent
to being deceived and judge deception to be ethical. To do this, I adopted an iterative
coding procedure (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). I first read through 50 participants’ responses
and developed a preliminary coding scheme, informed by the present data, related
research (DePaulo et al., 1996), and pilot data.
To code Study 1, I trained two research assistants to independently code all of the
responses from both the Preferences and the Ethics perspectives using an initial coding
scheme. The initial coding scheme required coders to read through each participant’s
responses to all three questions and then code each participant’s responses according to
the expressed justification for deception. The initial coding scheme included 12 possible
justifications. I then met with both research assistants to collectively discuss the coding.
During this conversation, a single construct – (the prevention of) unnecessary
harm – emerged as the overarching justification for deception. When discussing
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unnecessary harm, participants discussed the degree to which deception could prevent
harm to the target at the moment of communication and the degree to which honesty
could yield instrumental benefits to the target, such as enlightenment and growth. That is,
participants generally endorsed deception when it prevented immediate harm to the target
and when honesty had no potential to benefit the target in the future.
After converging on this overarching justification, we also discussed 20
participant responses in detail and used this discussion to identify new coding categories
and to clarify the categorization scheme for the next round of coding. During this
discussion, we also realized that participants’ responses to the second survey question
often repeated content from their response to the first question. Furthermore, some
participants misinterpreted the second survey question. Consequently, the final coding
procedure focused on analyzing only responses to the first and third questions in the
survey (“In what circumstances is lying to someone the right thing to do?/In what
circumstances would you want someone to lie to you?” and “Please come up with three
concrete examples of instances in which it is ethical to lie./ Please come up with three
concrete examples of instances in which you would want to be lied to.”).
Whereas the initial coding scheme focused primarily on identifying different
reasons that deception is perceived to be ethical (or preferred to the truth), the final
coding scheme focused on first categorizing responses along the two proposed
components of unnecessary harm, and then categorizing the features of the target, honest
information, and context that participants used to explain the existence of unnecessary
harm. Specifically, because each participant was asked to broadly identify the
circumstances in which lying is ethical [they would like to be lied to], as well as specific
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examples of these instances, I was able to create a final coding scheme that categorized
responses according to the features of specific examples, and the components of
unnecessary harm. This approach allowed me to identify specific rules of deception – the
contextual circumstances in which honesty would cause unnecessary harm and in which
deception would be justified. In the final coding scheme, I also examined the frequency
of utilitarian and deontological approaches to deception to explore whether the
motivation to prevent harm was more salient than these two justifications that have
pervaded rhetoric and scholarship on deception.
I then trained two new research assistants to use the final coding scheme (see
Table 1). The new research assistants first coded 10 responses together and made
revisions to the coding manual as needed. Then, they coded 10 responses individually,
met to discuss questions and discrepancies, and then made another set of revisions to the
coding manual. We discussed these 20 codes as a group and made one final set of
revisions to the coding manual. After this meeting, one research assistant coded the
remainder of the data set (304 responses in total). The second research assistant coded 50
randomly selected responses to establish the reliability of the final coding scheme. I
report the reliabilities (Kappa) between the two coders in Table 1. These numbers reflect
the agreement achieved across the 70 responses that both research assistants coded.
For all subsequent analyses, I use only codes from the single research assistant
who coded all responses according to the final coding manual. I only used the second
coder’s codes to establish reliability.
Final coding scheme. Participants’ open-ended responses were classified in four
different ways. First, responses were coded according to the participant’s framework for
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justifying deception: Deontology, Utilitarianism, and Harm Avoidance (see Table 1,
Panel A for descriptions). All participants that used a Harm Avoidance framework were
also coded according to the dimension of unnecessary harm: the immediate harm of
honesty and instrumental value of honesty. Additionally, all participants that used a Harm
Avoidance framework were coded according to the attributes of the target, the attributes
of the honest information (i.e., the topic of conversation), and the context of the
conversation that specified the presence of unnecessary harm. Each of these categories
had a variety of sub-categories that were not mutually exclusive (see Table 1 for all
subcategories, definitions, examples, and reliabilities). There were 9 categories in the
final coding scheme. Each participant’s responses were coded into as few or as many
categories as were relevant. For example, some participants did not mention any
attributes of the target that justified deception, whereas other participants stated that
deception is ethical when someone is too young to understand the truth and when
someone is too emotional to handle the truth (coded as “Target cannot understand the
truth” and “Target is emotionally fragile,” both sub-categories of “Attributes of target”).
These nine categories specify nine implicit rules of deception. There were three
criteria for maintaining a category in the final coding scheme. First, the category had to
be represented in more than one participant’s response. This cutoff is intentionally low.
Because the inductive study captures the salience of different circumstances in which
deception may be justified, rather than the strength of the relationship between any
particular circumstance and the justification of deception, I wanted to include rules that
may not be particularly salient but very closely map onto the proposed dimensions of
unnecessary harm.
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Second, the category had to reflect a Harm Avoidance framework. There were a
few justifications that appeared with some regularity that I did not include in the final
coding scheme because they did not pertain to the prevention of harm: for example, lying
to create a surprise or to win a game of poker. It is possible that there are other common
justifications for deception that do not pertain to the prevention of harm, but that is not
the focus of the present investigation.
Third, the coders needed to come to consensus on the meaning of the category.
Several categories were dropped from the final coding scheme because they were too
vague and did not lead to strong agreement. For example, the initial coding scheme
included a category that read, “When the target is looking for something other than
truth.” However, this category was too broad and could be more easily categorized into
the conditions that would lead the target to avoid truth (e.g., when s/he is fragile). I
provide an example response and how it was coded in Appendix A.
--Figure 1 about here-Results
Below, I report the frequency with which participants rely on three moral
frameworks when justifying deception: Deontology, Utilitarianism, and Harm
Avoidance. I also review the components of unnecessary harm – the degree to which
deception prevents immediate harm to the target, and the degree to which honesty has
instrumental value for the target. Then, I review the attributes of the target, topic, and
conversation that influence these perceptions, and consequently, specify the implicit rules
of deception.
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Deontology. A total of 5% of participants took a deontological approach to lying
and reported that lying was never acceptable. These participants did not provide any
justifications for the use of deception.
Utilitarianism. A total of 36.9% of participants justified deception that helped or
prevented harm to parties other than the target (e.g., society, the liar, third parties). I
conceptualize these justifications as utilitarian because they involved the calculation of
costs and benefits, but were not focused solely on preventing harm to the target. In other
words, these participants were not sensitive to who bore the burdens and benefits of
deception.
Harm Avoidance (Preventing unnecessary harm). A total of 91% of participants
justified deception that prevented unnecessary harm to the target. Participants focused on
two types of harm: immediate harm at the moment of communication, and harm that
yielded no instrumental benefits.
A total of 70.8% of participants justified deception that prevented immediate
harm to the target. For example, individuals justified deception when honesty would
immediately hurt a target’s feelings or cause embarrassment.
A total of 69.4% of participants justified deception when honesty had no
instrumental value to the target. For example, individuals justified deception when
honesty would not have any meaningful impact on a target’s future thinking or behavior.
---Table 1 about here--Implicit rules
In addition to revealing the abstract principles that justify the use of deception,
participants elucidated the specific circumstances in which those principles apply (i.e.,
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the circumstances in which deception prevents unnecessary harm). These circumstances
illustrate a number of implicit rules of deception, which pertain to the attributes of the
target, the topic of honest information, and the context of the conversation. These rules
can be summarized as:
It is acceptable to lie to targets when they are:
1. Emotionally fragile
2. Unable to understand the truth
3. In their final days of life
It is acceptable to lie about information that is:
4. Subjective
5. Trivial
6. Uncontrollable
It is acceptable to lie when:
7. Honest information would disrupt a sacred event
8. Honest feedback can no longer be implemented
9. Honesty would embarrass the target in front of others
I provide descriptions of these rules and the frequency with which these rules
appeared in Table 1 (Panel B). These rules only pertain to honesty that has the potential
to be hurtful to the target (e.g., critical feedback or bad news). Each of these rules
describes circumstances in which honesty would be particularly harmful at the moment of
communication (and thus deception would be particularly beneficial) and/or
circumstances in which honesty would not have instrumental value. For example,
participants endorsed lying to emotionally compromised targets (Rule 1) because they
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believed that honesty would cause the greatest immediate harm to fragile targets.
Participants also believed that honesty would cause unnecessary harm when a
conversation preceded – and had the potential to ruin – an event that was of special
significance to the target, like the target’s wedding (Rule 7) and when a conversation
occurred in public (Rule 9). Honesty causes unnecessary harm in these circumstances
because there are temporary features of the target or context that increase the intensity of
harm and hinder the target’s ability to cope. Thus, many participants expressed that
communicators should lie during these moments, but perhaps reveal the truth at a later
time.
The remainder of the rules document circumstances in which honesty is perceived
to lack instrumental value. Specifically, participants endorsed lying to targets that could
not understand the truth (Rule 2) and targets that were near death (Rule 3). In these
circumstances, honesty would not be understood deeply enough to yield instrumental
value (Rule 2) or would not alter future learning or behavior because the target’s future
was limited (Rule 3).
Similarly, the subjectivity (Rule 4) and the triviality (Rule 5) of the honest
information influenced the extent to which honesty was perceived to yield meaningful
instrumental benefits. Participants did not believe that others were morally obligated to
voice their subjective and trivial opinions honestly, nor did participants want to be
honestly told all of the subjective and trivial opinions of others. In Table 2, I summarize
how each rule relates to the proposed dimensions of unnecessary harm.
---Table 2 about here---
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It is important to note that these nine rules may not be an exhaustive list of
implicit rules of deception. A key strength of the inductive approach is that it allows
researchers to derive theory based on participants’ own thoughts and identify overarching
constructs, rather than imposing them. However, a weakness of this approach is that it
primarily captures the most salient implicit rules. For that reason, I focus my analysis on
how each rule describes the presence of unnecessary harm, rather than the percentage of
participants that mention each rule (which I report in Table 1). The frequency with which
each rule is mentioned may reflect the frequency with which each type of rule is
considered in routine conversation, but it does not necessary reflect the predictive power
of each rule violation.
Discussion
Deception is perceived to be ethical and individuals consent to being deceived
when deception prevents unnecessary harm. Furthermore, individuals are far more likely
to focus on avoiding unnecessary harm than they are to engage in purely deontological or
utilitarian thinking when considering their preferences for or judgments of deception.
Perceptions of unnecessary harm are driven by the degree to which deception will
prevent immediate harm to the target and the potential for honesty to yield instrumental
benefits.
I depict the relationship between these two factors and the endorsement of
deception in Figure 1. When honesty is immediately painful and is not associated with
instrument benefits (lower right quadrant), I expect most individuals to endorse
deception. In these circumstances, honesty causes unnecessary harm. When honesty is
immediately painful, but is associated with instrumental benefits (upper right quadrant), I
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expect individuals to equivocate. In these circumstances, honesty causes necessary harm.
For this reason, individuals are likely to believe that the honest information should
eventually be shared. However, they may advocate for temporary deception or the use of
sensitive language to blunt the immediate harm. In other words, individuals are likely to
advocate for discretion.
When honesty is not immediately painful and is associated with instrumental
benefits (upper left quadrant), I expect most individuals to endorse honesty. When
honesty is not immediately painful and is not associated with instrumental benefits (lower
left quadrant), I do not expect people to have strong moral preferences. However, they
may weakly prefer honesty, consistent with past research demonstrating that individuals
prefer honesty when they lack a compelling reason to use deception (Levine, Kim &
Hamel, 2010; Levine & Schweitzer, 2014). I empirically explore the validity of this twodimensional framework in Study 2.
---Figure 1 about here--This study revealed nine implicit rules that specify the conditions in which
honesty causes unnecessary harm. Although these rules were derived inductively, in
hindsight many of them could have been hypothesized a priori based on past research. In
particular, research on information avoidance provides convergent evidence of many of
these implicit rules. For example, past research demonstrates that individuals often avoid
painful information about outcomes they cannot control, like incurable diseases (Yaniv et
al., 2004; see also Shiloh, Ben-Sinai, & Keinan, 1999). The present research suggests that
individuals may actually desire that others deceive them in these same circumstances. In
their review of the information avoidance literature, Sweeny et al. (2010) outlined three
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central causes of information avoidance: 1) the extent to which an individual has control
over the consequences of the information, 2) the extent to which an individual can cope
with the information, and 3) the ease of interpreting the information. These causes of
information avoidance also arise as justifications for deception in the present
investigation. Individuals justified deception when they could not control the
consequences of the honest information (Rules 6 and 8), when the target would be unable
to cope with the honest information (Rule 1), and when the target would have difficulty
interpreting the honest information (Rule 2).
Individuals’ desire to be deceived about subjective information (Rule 4) also
dovetails with research on individuals’ desire to avoid uncertainty (Fox & Tversky, 1995;
Fox & Weber, 2002; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Although participants in Study 1 rarely
discussed uncertainty in their free responses, I suspect individuals would likely justify
deception about uncertain information for the same reason they justify deception about
subjective information: if painful information is not known to be absolute and objective,
people believe it is unnecessary to know.
Participants also generated common rules that reflect the importance of personal
dignity. For example, individuals are sensitive to the potential for public embarrassment
(Rule 9), and they treat the end of life (Rule 3) and sacred events (Rule 7) with special
care. Interestingly, many cultural, religious, and practical texts have discussed these
circumstances when considering the moral importance of dignity relative to truth. For
example, in the Babyloinian Talmud, a book of Jewish teachings compiled between 200
and 500 A.D., two rabbis discuss the ethics of falsely complimenting a bride on her
wedding day. After much debate, the rabbis decide that you should tell a bride she is
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beautiful on her wedding day, regardless of the truth. This particular discussion highlights
the importance of upholding dignity during sacred events, such as weddings (Telushkin,
1994). Furthermore, the importance of preserving dignity by avoiding public
embarrassment is discussed throughout Eastern cultural texts (e.g., Ho, 1976) and the
importance of preserving the dignity of those who lack cognitive capacity is discussed in
the medical ethics literature (e.g., Beach & Kramer, 1999; Richard, Lajeunesse, &
Lussier, 2010). In the present research, I provide a framework for understanding these
seemingly disparate ideas.
Study 2
In Study 1, I used an inductive study to ascertain a set of nine implicit rules of
deception. Although this approach provides insight into lay theories regarding the
justification of deception, it does not allow me to make any causal claims. In Study 2, I
use experiments to provide convergent evidence of the rules derived in Study 1 and to
causally demonstrate how implicit rule violations influence preferences for and
perceptions of deception. In Study 2, I manipulate the nine implicit rules derived in Study
1 across nine vignettes. I document how the violation of each implicit rule influences the
two proposed dimensions of unnecessary harm (immediate harm and instrumental value
of truth), and consequently, the endorsement of deception.
Participants
As in Study 1, I used multiple samples (participants recruited via Amazon
Mechanical Turk and participants recruited by a U.S. university laboratory) to document
the robustness of my effects. I conducted three separate surveys at different time points
with different samples. Each survey examined a different set of three implicit rules. The
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choice of sample for each survey reflects the order in which the surveys were conducted
and the availability of the sample. Because each survey has the same basic design and
ultimately serves the same purpose (to document the causal effect of implicit rule
violations on the endorsement of deception), I report the results of these surveys together
as a single study.
I collected data from a total of 731 participants across the three surveys. I report
the vignettes that appeared in each survey, the sample details, demographics, and any
design differences between the three surveys in Table 3 (see note).
---Table 3 about here--Procedure
Each survey featured three vignettes. Participants responded to multiple vignettes,
but never saw more than one version of the same vignette. I randomized the order in
which the vignettes were presented within each survey.
Each vignette examined one of the nine implicit rules identified in Study 1. In
each vignette, I manipulated whether or not the relevant implicit rule was violated.
Implicit Rule Violation was a between-subjects factor. Table 3 features the exact
vignettes that tested each implicit rule. For example, in the Presence of Others vignette, I
manipulated whether or not the target had the opportunity to receive negative feedback in
public or private. Receiving negative feedback in public reflects the violation of an
implicit rule (Rule 9).
The main dependent variable in each vignette was a dichotomous choice:
participants chose whether truth-telling or lying was the preferred communication tactic
in each vignette. I also manipulated Perspective; participants took the perspective of
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either an observer or the target when judging the preferred communication tactic. The
purpose of the Perspective manipulation was to examine whether or not targets’
preferences for deception converged with moral judgments, as in Study 1. In the first
survey, I manipulated Perspective between-subjects. In this survey, participants read the
vignette from either the perspective of an observer or the perspective of the target. In the
remaining two surveys, I manipulated Perspective within-subjects and randomized the
order of the two perspectives. In these surveys, all participants read the vignette from the
perspective of the observer and were asked to imagine they were the target or an observer
(order randomized). I manipulated Perspective as both a within-subjects and betweensubjects factor to examine whether or not perceptions differed in separate versus joint
evaluation (Hsee, 1996).
Dependent variables. In the Observer Perspective, participants answered the
following question, “Which of the following options is the more ethical response?” In the
Target Perspective, participants answered the question, “Of the following options, how
would you prefer that [the communicator] responds?” To answer these questions,
participants chose between telling the truth and lying. I include the exact wording of the
response options for each vignette in Appendix B.
After participants selected the most ethical [their most preferred] response,
participants answered a series of questions intended to examine the proposed
mechanisms: immediate harm (e.g., “To what extent would telling the truth in this
vignette cause pain to you [the individual]?”) and the instrumental value of truth (e.g.,
“To what extent would telling the truth in this vignette be valuable for your [the
individual’s] improvement or well-being?”). All items were measured using seven-point
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rating scales anchored at 1 = “Not at all” and 7 = “Extremely.” The items vary slightly in
each set of vignettes, as I refined the scales between studies. The scales maintained high
reliability in every vignette (all α’s > .74). I report all scale items in Appendix C. After
participants submitted their responses, I collected demographic information. 7
Results
The purpose of the vignettes was to demonstrate that judgments of deception are
governed by multiple rules, rather than to examine the differences between these rules.
Thus, consistent with Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler (1986a), I analyzed each vignette
independently. I also conducted a meta-analysis across all vignettes to test the proposed
theory.
Vignette-level results. I found no main effect or interaction effect of Perspective
on the endorsement of deception in any vignette (all ps > .16). In other words, targets and
observers did not differ in their endorsement of deception. Thus, I collapsed across
Perspective for my main analyses.
For my main analyses, I used chi-squared tests to compare the proportion of
participants who endorsed deception when an implicit rule was or was not violated. Table
3 includes all proportions and statistical tests. I find a significant main effect of each of
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Participants also answered a single-item recall question, which asked about the relevant
implicit rule. However, each scenario varied significantly with respect to the percentage
of participants that correctly answered the recall question. I report all recall questions and
the percentage of participants who answered them correctly in the online supplemental
materials. Excluding participants who did not answer the recall questions correctly does
not change any main results.
In the first two surveys, participants also provided an open-ended written response,
explaining what the communicator should say in each vignette. I do not examine
participants’ free responses in the present manuscript.
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the nine implicit rules violations on the endorsement of deception (all ps < .01, see Table
3).
I also mapped each implicit rule on to the proposed theoretical framework (see
Figure 2). Specifically, for each vignette, I plot the mean ratings of immediate harm and
instrumental value of truth in the Control condition and the mean ratings of immediate
harm and instrumental value of truth in the Implicit Rule Violation condition. The size of
each data point is proportional to the percentage of people who endorsed deception in
each condition. These graphs demonstrate that violating an implicit rule generally
increases perceptions of immediate harm and lowers perceptions of the instrumental
value of truth. The four quadrants of the proposed theoretical framework also closely
align with my empirical data. Specifically, the majority of participants endorsed
deception in vignettes that were judged to be in the high immediate harm-low
instrumental value (lower right) quadrant of the theoretical framework. Participants rarely
endorsed deception in vignettes that were judged to be in the low immediate harm-high
instrumental value (upper left) quadrant. And, participants were torn when reacting to
vignettes that were judged to be in the high immediate harm-high instrumental value
(upper right) quadrant.
---Figure 2 about here--Meta-analytic results. I also conducted a meta-analysis to test the proposed
theory more precisely. Across the nine vignettes, I expected perceptions of immediate
harm and the instrumental value of truth to mediate the effects of implicit rule violations
on the endorsement of deception. To conduct this meta-analysis, I combined all the data
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from the three surveys into one dataset. I ran a series of logistic regressions on the
endorsement of deception (1 = lying is endorsed, 0 = truth-telling is endorsed) including
Implicit Rule Violation, Perspective, immediate harm, instrumental value, gender, and
age as independent variables (see Table 4). In these regressions, I coded Implicit Rule
Violation as 1 if the relevant rule was violated (e.g., if the target was not able to
understand the information) and 0 otherwise. I coded Perspective as 1 in the target
condition and 0 otherwise. In all analyses, I included fixed effects for each vignette, and I
clustered standard errors at the Vignette and Participant levels.
The logistic regression results demonstrate that implicit rule violations powerfully
influence the endorsement of deception (b = 1.70, p < .001, Models 2 and 3), whereas the
perspective of the judge matters very little (b =-.10, ns, Model 3). The meta-analysis also
reveals that perceptions of immediate harm (b =1.19, p < .001) and instrumental value (b
=-.73, p < .001) influence the endorsement of deception (Model 5). Interestingly, there is
also an interaction between immediate harm and instrumental value (b = .093, p = .03,
Model 6), suggesting that these perceptions may have multiplicative, rather than additive,
effects on the endorsement of deception.
---Table 4 about here--In addition to the logistic regressions, I ran mediation analyses. I used the
bootstrap procedure with 10,000 samples to test the processes by which implicit rule
violations influence judgments of deception (SPSS Process Macro, Model 4, Hayes,
2013; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). The mediation model included Implicit Rule
Violation as the independent variable, perceptions of immediate harm and instrumental
value as simultaneous mediators, and the endorsement of deception as the dependent
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measure. I find significance evidence of mediation through both perceptions of
immediate harm (Indirect effect = 0.82, SE = .06, 95% CI [.71, .95]) and perceptions of
the instrumental value of truth (Indirect effect = .75, SE = .05, 95% CI [.65, .86]).
It is important to note, however, that I only have evidence of partial mediation.
Models 5 and 6 (Table 4) demonstrate that implicit rule violations have a direct effect on
the endorsement of deception, even after controlling for perceptions of immediate harm
and instrumental value. In other words, there are likely other features of the vignettes that
drive the endorsement of deception.
Discussion
Across nine vignettes, I provide convergent evidence of the implicit rules of
deception. Each of the nine implicit rules identified in Study 1 had a significant causal
effect on targets’ desire for and observers’ moral judgments of deception in Study 2.
Perceptions of immediate harm and instrumental value underlie these effects. When an
implicit rule is violated – for example, when a target does not have time to implement
feedback – honesty is perceived to be more painful at the moment of communication, and
honesty is perceived to yield less instrumental value. Thus, deception is perceived to be
ethical. The meta-analysis and theoretical mappings of each vignette provide strong
evidence of the centrality of these two mechanisms in predicting moral judgments of
deception.
Study 3
In Study 3, I extend the present investigation in two ways. First, I introduce the
perspective of the communicator (i.e., the potential liar). In Studies 1 and 2, I only
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examined individuals’ judgments of deception from the perspective of the target and from
the perspective of an impartial moral judge (i.e., observer). Although it is possible that
individuals in the Ethics condition in Study 1 took the perspective of the liar when
discussing the circumstances in which deception is ethical, it is difficult to know whether
this influenced their judgments. Thus, in Study 3, I explicitly explore the perspective of
liars, compared to targets, and observers.
Second, I rule out alternative mechanisms. Although I propose that perceptions of
unnecessary harm are central to moral judgments of deception, philosophical debates
have largely focused on three other factors: individuals’ moral duty to tell the truth (e.g.,
Kant, 1959/1785), the societal harm caused by lying (Bacon, 1872; Harris, 2013), and the
deleterious effect deception has on individual autonomy (e.g., Bok, 1978). Furthermore,
social scientists have largely assumed that individuals only use deception when it is in
their self-interest (e.g., when they will benefit from lying and are unlikely to get caught;
Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, & Ayal, 2015; Bereby-Meyer & Shalvi, 2015). Thus, I explore
whether any of these potential mechanisms underlie the relationship between implicit rule
violations and judgments of deception. Specifically, I compare perceptions of
unnecessary harm to the following five factors: perceptions of duty, societal harm,
autonomy violations, self-interest, and the probability of deception detection.
Methods
Participants. As in Studies 1 and 2, I recruited two separate samples to complete
this study. In Study 3, both samples completed the same survey. The first sample
consisted of 136 adults recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (43% female; Mage = 32
years). The second sample consisted of 142 adults from a U.S. university laboratory
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sample (61% female; Mage = 23 years). I find no effects of sample on the endorsement of
deception, thus, I report results collapsed across samples.
Procedure. The survey consisted of three vignettes. In each vignette, I
manipulated a different implicit rule and I manipulated whether participants judged the
ethicality of deception from the perspective of an observer, target, or liar. Implicit Rule
Violation and Perspective were both between-subjects factors. As in Study 2, participants
responded to multiple vignettes, but never saw more than one version of the same
vignette. I randomized the order in which the vignettes were presented.
Vignettes. I created new vignettes for Study 3 that manipulated three of the nine
implicit rules. Although I only explored a subset of the implicit rules in Study 3, I
purposefully chose rules that pertain to three different contextual drivers of unnecessary
harm. In the first vignette I manipulated an attribute of the target (i.e., his ability to
understand the truth). In the second vignette, I manipulated the timing of a conversation
(i.e., whether the target had time to implement change). In the third vignette, I
manipulated the context of the conversation (i.e., whether others were present).
Ability to understand. In the first vignette, participants had to decide whether or
not to inform a target that his daughter had died. I manipulated whether or not the target
suffered from dementia. This vignette corresponds with the rule: Lie to targets who
cannot understand the truth (Rule 2). This vignette mirrors the medical ethics concept of
“therapeutic fibbing” (Beach & Kramer, 1999), suggesting it may be ethical to lie to
Alzheimer’s and dementia patients to protect them from undue anxiety, suffering, and
confusion. This vignette also addresses the limitations of the “Ability to understand”
vignette featured in Study 2. In Study 2, I compared an adult to a child, who may differ
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on qualities other than their ability to understand difficult information. In Study 3, I held
age constant and simply manipulated cognitive capacity. The exact vignette appears
below.
Imagine a caregiver at a nursing home. The caregiver is responsible for Jeff, a
93-year-old man.
Control condition: Jeff is in good physical and mental health.
Violation condition: Although Jeff is in good physical health, he suffers from
severe dementia. This means that he often cannot make sense of his reality and
is easily confused.
The caregiver recently learned that Jeff’s estranged daughter, who he has not
heard from for over a decade, died two years ago.
One day, out of the blue, Jeff asks his caregiver if she has heard anything about
his family.
Time to implement change. The second vignette depicted an individual who had
made an error when writing a manuscript. I manipulated whether the mistake could be
corrected. This vignette corresponds with the rule: Lie when honest feedback can no
longer be implemented (Rule 8):
Imagine a graduate student, Jeff, who is planning to submit a paper for
publication. Jeff has poured months into his research and is very proud of the
resulting manuscript.
Jeff’s friend recently read Jeff’s manuscript and noticed a few errors.
Control condition: Jeff submitted the paper yesterday – meaning he is no
longer able to implement changes.
Violation condition: Jeff is submitting the final paper tomorrow – after he
submits the manuscript he will no longer be able to implement changes.
Jeff asks his friend what he thought of the manuscript.
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Presence of others. The third vignette depicted an individual who had delivered a
presentation poorly. I manipulated whether the opportunity to give feedback occurred in
public or private. This vignette corresponds with the rule: Lie when honesty would
embarrass the target in front of others (Rule 9):
Imagine a summer intern named Jeff, who just delivered his end-of-internship
presentation to his office.
Jeff’s PowerPoint slides were disorganized and he misspoke several times.
Jeff’s friend attended the presentation and believed that Jeff’s presentation
went very poorly. Jeff did not seem to realize that, and it is unclear what other
audience members thought.
Control condition: Immediately after the presentation, in a private space, Jeff
asks his friend what he thought of the presentation.
Violation condition: Immediately after the presentation, in front of several
remaining audience members, Jeff asks his friend what he thought of the
presentation.
Dependent variables.
Endorsement of deception. After participants read each vignette, I asked
participants, “In the course of this conversation, which of the following options is the
more ethical response?” Participants chose between: “Tell [the individual] the truth” and
“Lie to [the individual].” Unlike Study 2, the main dependent variable and the response
options were identical across all perspectives. The response options were followed by
short descriptions of the relevant truth or lie for each vignette. I include the exact wording
of all response options in Appendix D.
Potential mechanisms. After participants chose to endorse either deception or
honesty, participants answered a series of questions intended to examine the proposed
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mechanisms and rule out alternatives. All items were measured using seven-point rating
scales anchored at 1 = “Not at all” and 7 = “Extremely.”
Immediate harm and Instrumental value. Participants responded to four items
about the immediate harm of honesty (α = .80): “To what extent would honesty cause
pain to [the target] at the moment of communication?”, “To what extent would telling a
lie protect [the target’s] feelings at the moment of communication?”, “To what extent
would honesty cause harm to [the target] at the moment of communication?”, and “To
what extent would lying benefit [the target] at the moment of communication?”
Participants also responded to four items about the instrumental value of truth (α
= .83): “To what extent would telling the truth in this vignette have the potential to
influence [the target’s] future behavior?”, “To what extent would telling the truth in this
vignette be valuable for [the target’s] long-term well-being?”, “To what extent is the
honest information necessary for [the target] to know?”, and “To what extent is the
honest information useful for [the target’s] learning, growth or enlightenment?” I adapted
these items from Study 2.
Moral duty. Participants also responded to a single item about moral duty: “To
what extent does [the potential liar] have a moral duty to tell the truth?”
Societal harm. Participants responded to a single item about the degree to which
lying could cause societal harm: “To what extent might telling this lie harm society as a
whole?”
Autonomy. Participants responded to two items about the degree to which lying
violated the target’s autonomy (r = .46): “To what extent does this lie infringe upon [the
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target’s] autonomy?” and “To what extent does telling this lie prevent [the target] from
making informed decisions?”
Self-interest. Participants responded to two items about the degree to which lying
benefited the liar (r = .59): “To what extent is lying the easiest course of action for [the
potential liar]?” and “To what extent does lying spare [the potential liar] from conflict?”
Probability of detection. Finally, participants responded to two items about the
degree to which lying could ever be discovered (r = .26): “To what extent is the honest
information verifiable?” and “To what extent is it possible for [the target] to
independently uncover the truth?”
After participants submitted their responses, I collected demographic
information.8
Results
Analytical approach. As in Study 2, I analyzed each vignette independently and
then conducted a meta-analysis across all scenarios to test the proposed theory and
examine alternative mechanisms. For each vignette, I conducted a set of logistic
regressions to examine the effects of Implicit Rule Violation and Perspective on the
endorsement of deception (1 = lying is endorsed, 0 = truth-telling = endorsed). In these
regressions, I coded Implicit Rule Violation as 1 if the relevant rule was violated (e.g., if
the target was not able to understand the information) and 0 otherwise. I created two
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Participants also answered a single-item manipulation check, which asked about the
relevant implicit rule. I report these items and the corresponding results in the online
supplemental materials. I find a significant effect of Implicit Rule Violation on the
manipulation check in every vignette (ps < .01).
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dummy variables for the Perspective conditions. I created one variable called Target that
had the value of 1 in the Target Perspective condition and 0 otherwise; and I created one
variable called Liar that had the value of 1 in the Liar Perspective and 0 otherwise. The
Observer Perspective served as the control.
Vignette-level results. The results of the vignette-level logistic regressions
appear in Table 5. Figure 3 also depicts the proportion of participants who endorsed
deception in each experimental condition in each vignette.
---Table 5 and Figure 3 about here--In each vignette, I find a significant effect of implicit rule violation (ps < .05). In
the Ability to understand and Time to implement vignettes, I find no main or interaction
effects of Perspective (ps > .44). In other words, participants responded to implicit rule
violations similarly if they considered the situation from the perspective of a liar, target,
or an observer.
In the Presence of others vignette, I found significant, but unpredicted, perspective
effects (see Table 5, Column 3). Liars believed that lying was more ethical than observers
did (b = 1.40, p = .04). There were also significant Liar × Implicit Rule Violation (b = 1.57, p = .05) and Target × Implicit Rule Violation (b = -1.65, p = .05) interactions; the
implicit rule violation had a stronger effect on liars and targets than observers. These results
suggest that observers may fail to fully appreciate the value of deception in public contexts.
Meta-analytic results. I conducted a meta-analysis to test the proposed theory
and rule out alternative mechanism. Using the data from all three vignettes, I ran a series
of logistic regressions on the endorsement of deception (1 = lying is endorsed, 0 = truth-
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telling is endorsed) including Implicit Rule Violation, Perspective, gender, age, and the
seven mechanism measures as independent variables (see Table 6). In these analyses, I
included fixed effects for each vignette, and I clustered standard errors at the Vignette
and Participant levels.
The logistic regression results demonstrate that implicit rule violations powerfully
influence the endorsement of deception (all bs > .73, ps < .001, Models 2-7), whereas
perspective matters much less. As hypothesized, perceptions of immediate harm and
instrumental value also significantly influenced the endorsement of deception (all bs >
.51, ps < .05, Models 5-7). As in Study 2, I also found an interaction between immediate
harm and instrumental value (b = .09, p = .06 in Model 6 and b = .08, p < .001 in Model
7), providing further evidence that immediate harm and instrumental value have
multiplicative effects on the endorsement of deception. Of the alternative mechanisms I
examined, only perceptions of moral duty significantly impacted the endorsement of
deception (b = -.66, p < .001, Model 7).
---Table 6 about here--In addition to the logistic regressions, I ran mediation analyses. I used the
bootstrap procedure with 10,000 samples to test the processes by which implicit rule
violations influence judgments of deception (SPSS Process Macro, Model 4, Hayes,
2013; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). The mediation model included Implicit Rule
Violation as the independent variable, the seven potential mechanisms as simultaneous
mediators, and the endorsement of deception as the dependent measure. I find evidence
of mediation through both proposed mechanisms: immediate harm and instrumental
value.
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I also find significant mediation through perceptions of moral duty. However, the
direction of the effect does not echo philosophical assumptions about one’s duty to tell
the truth (e.g., Kant, 1959/1785). Lay people do not believe that they have a categorical
imperative to tell the truth. Rather, they believe that when an implicit rule is violated,
they have less duty to tell the truth, leading them to endorse deception. Figure 4 depicts
the full mediation model and all indirect effects.
As in Study 2, I only have evidence of partial mediation, suggesting there are
other features of the vignettes that drive the endorsement of deception.
---Figure 4 about here--Discussion
Study 3 documents two key results. First, implicit rule violations have largely the
same effects on targets’, liars’, and observers’ moral judgments of deception. Second,
perceptions of the immediate harm of honesty and the instrumental value of truth, the two
hypothesized dimensions of unnecessary harm, underlie the effects of implicit rule
violations on the endorsement of deception; perceptions of autonomy, societal harm, selfinterest, and the probability of detection do not.
It is important to note, however, that these alternative mechanisms are influenced
by implicit rule violations and do influence the endorsement of deception (see
Appendices E and F). For example, in the Ability to understand vignette, lying to the
target was seen as a greater autonomy violation when the target was of healthy mind than
when he suffered from dementia. Furthermore, in the Time to implement change vignette,
lying to the target was seen as more beneficial for the liar when the target could not
implement feedback than when he could. Thus, we cannot conclude that autonomy and
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self-interest do not matter for making judgments of deception. However, we can conclude
that autonomy and self-interest (as well as the probability of deception and perceptions of
societal harm) do not independently influence the endorsement of deception, once we
control for perceptions of harm to the target. Alternatively, perceptions of harm to the
target do independently influence the endorsement of deception, above and beyond the
effects of all other mechanisms I investigated.
Perceptions of moral duty also independently influence the endorsement of
deception. This result reveals novel insights about lay conceptions of duty. Although
moral duties are typically conceptualized as immovable obligations (Kant, 1959/1785),
lay people seem to conceptualize the moral duty to tell the truth as context-dependent.
When the truth causes unnecessary harm, lay people believe that they are freed of their
duty to tell the truth.
General Discussion
Across one inductive study and 12 vignettes (N = 1313), I unearth community
standards of deception, the implicit moral rules individuals use to justify deception.
Motivated by Bok’s Test of Publicity, I inductively derived these rules in Study 1 by
asking participants which lies they would consent to being told and which lies they find
to be ethical. I then provide causal evidence for each rule in Studies 2 and 3. Consistent
with research on the centrality of harm and care in moral judgment (Gray, Schein, &
Ward, 2014; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007), I find that
individuals’ implicit rules are motivated by an overarching desire to avoid causing
unnecessary harm. Each implicit rule describes a circumstance in which honesty would
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cause unnecessary harm (e.g., when a target is fragile or unable to implement feedback)
and thus, in which deception is ethical.
Most of the rules I identify have been explicitly discussed in past philosophical,
theological, or psychological scholarship. For example, the medical ethics literature has
long discussed the ethics of lying to cognitively impaired patients (e.g., Sokol, 2007) and
the information avoidance literature has discussed individuals’ desire to avoid
information that they cannot control or emotionally handle (Sweeny et al., 2010). Until
now, however, these ideas have been siloed in disparate literatures, and we have lacked a
parsimonious framework for understanding why individuals endorse deception in various
circumstances. Furthermore, rather than carefully consider these systematic
circumstances in which deception is seen as ethical, most modern rhetoric focuses on a
simpler message: deception is wrong. In the present research, I demonstrate that people
often view deception as right, they do so in systematic ways, and their logic is driven by
the simple desire to avoid causing unnecessary harm.
The framework I present also clarifies the two ways in which honesty is perceived
to cause unnecessary harm. First, there may be features of a particular context that
temporarily increase the emotional, psychological, or material pain associated with
honesty. These features, – such as a target’s emotional fragility, the presence of others, or
the timing of an important or sacred event – increase the harm associated with honesty at
the moment of communication. Second, there may be features of a particular context that
limit the instrumental benefits of honesty. Although honesty is often discussed as a moral
good in and of itself, the present research suggests that lay people value honesty because
of its instrumental benefits, such as enlightenment and growth, rather than its intrinsic
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value. In circumstances in which honest information does not lead to instrumental
benefits – for example, when truthful information is not meaningful, cannot be
understood, or cannot be implemented – individuals openly consent to and justify
deception.
Importantly, perceptions of unnecessary harm justify the use of both major and
minor lies. Minor, or white, lies are often perceived to be trivial and of little moral import
(Bok 1978; Brown & Levinson, 1987). The present research demonstrates that white lies
are often perceived to be ethical because they can spare the target from emotional harm,
and because they do not hinder the target’s understanding or growth in a meaningful way.
However, the present research also demonstrates that there are a variety of circumstances
in which major lies are perceived to be ethical. Lying about significant events, such as
infidelity or death, is often perceived to be moral. These judgments, however, hinge on
the degree to which the information is useful, rather than meaningful. Meaningfulness
and usefulness are two orthogonal qualities that independently influence the perceived
instrumental value of truth.
This research also demonstrates that lay theories do not necessarily align with
common normative positions on deception. Very few individuals hold a deontological
view of deception, believing that deception is categorically wrong. Furthermore, although
the proposed framework is notably consequentialist – individuals implicitly weigh the
short-term harm against the long-term benefits of truth – it is important to recognize that
most individuals focus narrowly on the consequences of lying for the target, rather than
the consequences for the liar or society writ large. In other words, lay beliefs reflect the
desire to avoid harm to a particular victim rather than a general utilitarian calculus.
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Broadly, this research illuminates the moral value of discretion in human
communication. Lay people believe that individuals should lie in many situations (e.g., in
front of others, or during times of strife), but reveal the truth later. Similarly, participants
said they wanted to be protected and deceived during particular moments, but that they
would want to uncover the truth at a later point in time. This reflects a pragmatic view of
honesty; people believe that the use of both honesty and deception should be constrained
by the particular needs of the particular people involved in a particular conversation. In
other words, lay people seem to conceptualize honesty and deception as tactics that can
and should be used to regulate other virtues and vices, such as enlightenment and harm,
rather than conceptualizing honesty and deception as categorical virtues and vices
themselves.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present research has several limitations that can be addressed by future
research. First, although the inductive study provides a solid foundation for an initial set
of implicit rules, future research may be needed to establish a complete set. It may be
useful, for example, to more deeply explore the responses of individuals who provided
utilitarian justifications for deception; there may be circumstances in which the benefits
conferred to liars are great enough that even targets would consent to deception. Asking
liars directly when they think lying is ethical may also be a fruitful endeavor. For
example, lies that protect the liar’s privacy may be broadly justified, despite not being a
salient to targets. Liars may also be more likely to justify lies that surprise or flatter
targets. Although the present theory focuses on deception that is motivated by the desire
to prevent harm, lies that cause pleasure may also be justified broadly.
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More research is also needed to understand how moral judgments of deception
change across time and perspectives. The two proposed dimensions of unnecessary harm
highlight a potential intertemporal tradeoff between immediate harm and long-term
instrumental benefits of honesty. At the moment of communication, individuals may
overweight the immediate harm caused by honesty. However, when thinking about a
potential conversation from a distance, individuals may be more attuned to the potential
long-term benefits of honesty. Thus, individuals may intend to be honest (and expect to
appreciate honesty) when they consider having an unpleasant conversation, but when the
moment to inflict (or experience) pain actually comes, they may prefer deception.
Communicators may be particularly likely to overweight the harm of negative
information, relative to targets, because they are motivated to avoid inflicting harm.
Although I do not find consistent evidence for perspective effects in the present
investigation, more research is needed to fully understand when and why communicators’
and targets’ perceptions of deception differ.
Individuals may also react differently to deception before and after it is used. The
present research examines a priori judgments of deception – the circumstances in which
individuals expect to judge deception as ethical. However, these judgments may diverge
from in vivo judgments (individuals’ beliefs about deception during a particular
conversation) and post hoc judgments (individuals’ reactions to telling a lie or being
deceived). It is possible, for example, that when individuals are emotionally fragile they
do not want to hear the truth, and they appreciate deception in the moment, but upon
learning of the deception become furious. Interestingly, the lies that people consent to in
advance may not be the same lies that people forgive others for telling.
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The proposed implicit rules also highlight a number of circumstances in which
deception may be used paternalistically. Although communicators and targets agree that
deception is more ethical when the target lacks cognitive capacity, is emotionally fragile,
or cannot implement feedback, communicators and targets may not necessarily make
identical assessments about the presence or absence of these circumstances. For example,
a communicator may be motivated to believe that a target is less competent or more
fragile than he or she really is. As a result, a communicator may behave paternalistically
and assume that a target cannot handle the truth, rather than soliciting information from
the target that would help the communicator make a more informed judgment. Indeed,
recent research suggests that individuals resent paternalistic lies. Although individuals
embrace deception when there is unambiguous agreement about whether lying benefits
the target, individuals resent lies that are motivated by a communicator’s assumptions
about what benefits the target (Lupoli, Levine, & Greenberg, 2016).
It may be safer to make assumptions about a target’s desire for deception in some
circumstances than others. In the present research, many individuals discuss extreme
events that produce momentary states of fragility or cognitive depletion and call for the
use of deception. These events, such as the death of a loved one or a state of drunkenness,
could happen to anyone and are likely to produce similar emotional and cognitive
consequences across individuals. Thus, these circumstances do not require
communicators to make nuanced assumptions about a target’s need for deception. In
many circumstances, however, communicators make dispositional assessments about a
target’s fragility, cognition, or need. For example, before delivering feedback, a manager
may simply ask himself if a particular employee can emotionally handle negative news. I
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suspect that these dispositional assessments are far riskier, and more likely to motivate
unwelcome deception, than the systematic circumstances described in the present
research.
The potential for paternalistic deception may also differ across relationships. In
close or hierarchical relationships, individuals may feel a particularly strong need to
protect the target. Thus, individuals may be most drawn towards deception in these
relationships. Indeed, past work has demonstrated that individuals may have very
different standards for morality across different types of relationships (Rai & Fiske, 2011,
2012). Although I find that individuals generally agree on the dimensions that justify the
use of deception, this does not mean that communicators will weigh these dimensions
rationally, consistently, or selflessly when they actually engage in difficult conversations
with different relational partners.
It will also be important to more carefully investigate how different forms of
deception are perceived. Across my vignettes, I compare lying and truth-telling in
response to direct questions. Although I explicitly force participants to endorse either
lying or truth-telling, I do not always specify the language that a communicator will use
to lie, or whether the lie is by omission or commission. These nuances likely influence
how individuals react to deception. For example, telling an ill-dressed target, “You look
fine,” may be seen as far more innocuous than saying “You look fantastic.” Furthermore,
changing the subject or using honest statements to convey a false impression (i.e.,
paltering, Rogers, Zeckhauser, Gino, Schweitzer, & Norton, 2014) may be seen as more
permissible than a blatant lie. Future research should examine how these strategies are
perceived, particularly from the perspective of both targets and communicators.
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Finally, future research should explore the behavioral consequences of the
implicit rules of deception. If honesty is considered immoral when it violates implicit
rules, receiving honest information may elicit moral outrage, anger, and contempt in
these circumstances. For example, a dying patient who wants his doctor to communicate
optimism, despite knowledge of near-certain death, may deeply resent his doctor for
crushing his hope. Or, an employee may lose trust in a manager who gives him negative
feedback in front of others, instead of using discretion and providing his truthful opinion
in private. Exploring the emotional and relational consequences of violating the implicit
rules of deception is an important next step for future research.
Conclusion
Deception is typically characterized as unethical, and existing research assumes
that individuals would rarely consent to being deceived. In contrast to these views, the
present research demonstrates that individuals frequently consent to and morally justify
deception, and they do so in systematic ways. Individuals seem to believe, consistent with
David Nyberg’s sentiment in the opening quote, that moral decency often demands
deception.
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Appendix A. Example Response and Coding

Note. This is an excerpt from one participant’s response to “In what circumstances would
you want someone to lie to you?” Key words are underlined and accompanying codes
follow arrows.
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Appendix B. Choice Options for Each Vignette in Study 2
Emotional fragility vignette
Ethics condition:


Which of the following options is the more ethical response?
o Tell the employee the truth – the manager should say that the report was
not well done
o Lie to the employee – the manager should say the report was fine

Preferences condition:


Of the following options, how would you prefer that your manager respond?
o Tell you the truth – the manager should say that the report was not
particularly well done
o Lie to you – the manager should say the report was fine

Deathbed vignette
Ethics condition:


Which of the following options is the more ethical response?
o Tell the individual the truth – the spouse should admit that s/he cheated on
the individual
o Lie to the individual – the spouse should not mention that s/he cheated on
the individual

Preferences condition:


Of the following options, how would you prefer that your spouse respond?
o Tell you the truth – the spouse should admit that s/he cheated on you
o Lie to you – the spouse should not mention that s/he cheated on you

Ability to understand vignette
Ethics condition:


Which of the following options is the more ethical response?
o Tell the patient the truth – the doctor should tell the patient s/he is likely to
die
o Lie to the patient – the doctor should not tell the patient that s/he is likely
to die

Preferences condition:


Of the following options, how would you prefer that your doctor respond?
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o Tell you the truth – the doctor should tell you that you are likely to die
o Lie to you – the doctor should not tell you that you are likely to die
Subjective vignette
Ethics condition:


Which of the following options is the more ethical response?
o Tell the employee the truth – the colleague should tell the employee that
she thinks the employee looks bad in the scarf
o Lie to the employee – the colleague should tell the employee that she
thinks the employee looks fine (or good) in the scarf

Preferences condition:


Of the following options, how would you prefer that your colleague respond?
o Tell you the truth – the colleague should tell you that she thinks you look
bad in the scarf
o Lie to you – the colleague should tell you that she thinks you look fine in
the scarf

Trivial vignette
Ethics condition:


Which of the following options is the more ethical response?
o Tell the host the truth – the guest should tell the host that the soup is too
salty
o Lie to the host – the guest should tell the host that the soup is good or fine

Preferences condition:


Of the following options, how would you prefer that your guest respond?
o Tell you the truth – the guest should tell you that the soup is too salty
o Lie to you – the guest should tell you that the soup is good or fine

Uncontrollable vignette
Ethics condition:


Which of the following options is the more ethical response?
o Tell the intern the truth – the friend should tell the intern that his stutter
decreased the quality of his presentation
o Lie to the intern – the friend should tell the intern that the presentation was
fine (or good)

Preferences condition:
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Of the following options, how would you prefer that your friend respond?
o Tell you the truth – your friend should tell you that your stutter decreased
the quality of your presentation
o Lie to you – your friend should tell you that the presentation was fine (or
good)

Disruption to special moments and event vignette
Ethics condition:


Which of the following options is the more ethical response?
o Tell the employee the truth – the manager should tell the employee that
s/he is getting laid off
o Lie to the employee – the manager should not tell the employee that s/he is
getting laid off

Preferences condition:


Of the following options, how would you prefer that your manager respond?
o Tell you the truth – the manager should tell you that you are getting laid
off
o Lie to you – the manager should not tell you that you are getting laid off

Time to implement vignette
Ethics condition:


Which of the following options is the more ethical response?
o Tell the employee the truth – the colleague should tell the employee that
he thinks the suit is inappropriate
o Lie to the employee – the colleague should tell the employee that he thinks
the suit is fine

Preferences condition:


Of the following options, how would you prefer that your colleague respond?
o Tell you the truth – the colleague should tell you that he thinks the suit is
inappropriate
o Lie to you – the colleague should tell you that he thinks the suit is fine

The presence of others vignette
Ethics condition:


Which of the following options is the more ethical response?
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o Tell the employee the truth – the manager should tell the employee that
the report was not particularly well done
o Lie to the employee – the manager should tell the employee that the report
was fine
Preferences condition:


Of the following options, how would you prefer that your manager respond?
o Tell you the truth – your manager should tell you that your report was not
particularly well done
o Lie to you – your manager should tell you that the report was fine

119

Appendix C. Mechanism Questions in Study 2
Immediate harm






To what extent would telling the truth in this scenario cause unnecessary harm?
(Survey Group 1-2)
To what extent would honesty cause pain to the [individual]? (Survey Group 1-3)
To what extent would telling a lie protect the [individual]'s feelings? (Survey
Group 1-3)
To what extent would honesty cause harm to the [individual]? (Survey Group 3
only)
To what extent would lying benefit the [individual]? (Survey Group 3 only)

Instrumental value





To what extent would telling the truth in this scenario have the potential to
influence the [individual]'s behavior? (Survey Group 1-3)
To what extent would telling the truth in this scenario be valuable to the
[individual]'s improvement* overall well-being? (Survey Group 1-3)
To what extent is the honest information necessary for the [individual] to know?
(Survey Group 3 only)
To what extent is the honest information useful for the [individual]'s growth or
enlightenment? (Survey Group 3 only)

Note. *The word improvement was removed from the Death bed vignette and from
Survey Group 3 to eliminate confusion.
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Appendix D. Response Options for Vignettes in Study 3

Ability to understand vignette
In the course of this conversation, which of the following options is the more ethical
response?



Tell Jeff the truth - Jeff's caregiver should tell him about his dead daughter
Lie to Jeff - Jeff's caregiver should not tell him about his dead daughter

Time to implement vignette
In the course of this conversation, which of the following options is the more ethical
response?



Tell Jeff the truth - Jeff's friend should tell Jeff about the errors
Lie to Jeff - Jeff's friend should not tell Jeff about the errors

The presence of others vignette
In the course of this conversation, which of the following options is the more ethical
response?

Tell Jeff the truth - Jeff's friend should tell Jeff his presentation went
poorly

Lie to Jeff - Jeff's friend should not tell Jeff his presentation went poorly

121

Appendix E. Effects of Implicit Rule Violations on Potential Mechanisms, Within Each Vignette (Study 3)

Control

M
SD
Ability to
Violation M
understand
SD
Control
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Time to
implement

M
SD
Violation M
SD
Control

The
presence
of others

M
SD
Violation M
SD

Immediate Instrumental
harm of
value of
truth
truth
5.35
4.75
1.19
1.25
5.55
3.88
1.32
1.54
p = .17
p < .01
3.39
6.05
1.32
0.97
4.54
5.03
1.33
1.23
p < .01
p < .01
4.73
5.92
1.07
0.97
5.04
5.44
1.27
1.17
p = .03
p < .01

Selfinterest
(of liar)
5.20
1.66
5.47
1.43
p = .15
4.08
1.75
5.11
1.49
p < .01
5.49
1.42
5.29
1.39
p = .24

Probability
Autonomy
of
(of target) detection
4.46
5.27
1.56
1.24
3.94
4.45
1.76
1.26
p = .01
p < .01
4.31
5.50
1.62
1.15
3.68
5.36
1.59
1.27
p < .01
p = .34
4.20
4.84
1.47
1.27
4.12
4.74
1.33
1.12
p = .63
p = .51

Societal
harm
2.51
1.67
2.35
1.68
p = .42
2.73
1.75
2.65
1.93
p = .71
2.65
1.73
2.82
1.85
p = .44

Moral
duty
5.39
1.60
4.93
1.77
p = .024
5.72
1.38
4.95
1.66
p < .01
5.14
1.43
4.78
1.61
p = .05

Note. The p-values reflect the results corresponding with one-way ANOVAs (within each vignette) using Implicit Rule
Violation (Control vs. Violation) as a factor, and each potential mechanism as the dependent variable.

Appendix F. Correlation Between Potential Mechanisms and Endorsement of Deception from Each Perspective
(Study 3)

Liar

Immediate Instrumental
harm of
value of
truth
truth
.431***
-.434***

Selfinterest
(of liar)
.239***

Probability
of
Autonomy detection
-.242***
-.188**

Societal
harm
-.255***

Moral
duty
-.496***

Observer

.344***

-.470***

.139*

-.299***

-.201**

-.101+

-.503***

Target

.443***

-.445***

.232***

-.262***

-.254***

-.169**

-.426***
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Note. +, *, **, *** denote significance at p ≤ .10, .05, .01 and .001 respectively

Tables
Table 1. Coding Categories for Justifications and Implicit Rules of Deception
Panel A. Broad Justifications for Deception

Harm to target
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Justifications for deception

Justification

Description for coders

Examples of participant responses

Immediate
harm of
honesty

These justifications include lies that are told to
avoid harm to the target at the moment of
communication. This type of harm is
immediate and not long-lasting.

• From my perspective, lying to someone else
is the right thing to do when we can avoid
hurting others or make others happy /
comfortable
• Lying may be the right thing to do when
telling that person the truth at that particular
moment may be harmful to them.

Instrumental
value of
honesty

These justifications focus on whether or not
there are any potential long-term benefits of
honesty. Specifically, is the honest information
important, actionable, and objective? These
responses suggest that lying is ok when
honesty does not have the potential to affect
future behavior or thinking in a meaningful
way or bring about any other benefit.

TOTAL

Utilitarian

• As long as it isn't something that's incredibly
important for them to know, why bother them
with it when you can save them from the
truth?
• I would want to be lied to under certain
circumstances where I cannot change the
result.

This is a composite category reflecting the presence of either dimension above: Immediate harm
or Instrumental value

These justifications incorporate costs and
benefits to parties other than the target of the
lie. Any responses that mention how a lie will
affect the liar, society, or third parties are
considered Utilitarian.

• Lying to someone else is the right thing to do
when it behooves both you and the other
person to have them believe the lie. Lying may
prevent conflicts...
• It's ok to lie if you're under cover trying to
save some prisoners of war. It's ethical if
you're trying to capture a killer.

Kappa

Ethics

Pref

Total

0.63

78.9%

60.7%

70.8%

0.74

65.7%

74.1%

69.4%

0.75

92.2%

89.6%

91.0%

0.65

52.4%

17.8%

36.9%

Never
(Deontological)

“Never” indicates that the participants
included a statement expressing that lying is
never acceptable. "Never" means that the
person does not provide any justifications or
examples of when/why lying is right.

• There is no instance where lying to someone
else is the right thing to do.
• I would never want someone to lie to me.
0.79

2.4%

8.1%

5.0%
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Attributes of Target

Panel B. Implicit Rules of Deception
Reason to lie

Definition

Examples of participant responses

1. Emotionally
fragile

When a person is in an emotionally fragile state
(bad day, feeling sad, depressed, drunk, etc.)

• When a person is mentally unstable and his or
her emotional well being is at stake.

2. Cannot
understand
truth

When a person cannot cognitively understand the
true information (a child, someone with
dementia, etc.)

• When children ask quiestions about things that
they should not know

3. Death Bed

When a person (the target) is at the end of their
life

• I would want someone to lie to me about how
long I might have to live if I were terminally ill.

When the truth is subjective (a function of
different tastes, individual differences,
preferences, a specific instance, etc.).

• I find a piece of clothing or accessory that I really
like and makes me feel good, I would prefer not to
have the person I'm with tell me he or she does
not like what I've chosen

Attributes of Topic

5. Trivial

6.
Uncontrollable

Context of Conversation
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Implicit Rules of Deception

4. Subjective

When the topic is trivial (does not matter in any
meaningful way to the target or others) or
honesty is not the purpose of the exchange (e.g.,
social conventions or politeness are more
important than honesty)
When the truth is about something that can never
be changed (e.g., someone’s height, a death, a
relationship that has ended) or that feels outside
of someone’s control (e.g., weight, others'
misdeeds)

7. Precedes
sacred event

When the truth is hurtful and may upset someone
before another unrelated event, such as a
wedding, honeymoon, special day.

8. Feedback
can no longer
be
implemented

When the conversation occurs after feedback
could be implemented (e.g., the person can no
longer change their clothing) or the conversation
occurs immediately before an event and there is
not enough time to implement feedback or
changes (e.g., a person is about to go on stage).

9. In front of
others

When the conversation occurs in front of others
(and might affect observers’ opinions, or
embarrass the target)

Kappa

Ethics

Pref

Ttal

0.85

4.8%

4.4%

4.7%

0.86

25.3%

3.0%

15.3%

0.92

7.8%

6.7%

7.3%

0.72

29.5%

29.6%

29.6%

• I would rather have someone lie to me in trivial
matters than important ones, because the
magnitude of the issue at hand is smaller.
0.81

34.9%

22.2%

29.2%

• If someone knew how my mother really felt
about me... I would prefer that the person would
lie and tell me said good things about me. My mom
is deceased now, so nothing could be changed
anyway.

0.83

6.0%

17.8%

11.3%

• Being told there is no bad news before an
important event so that the bad news can be
postponed.

0.85

4.2%

8.1%

6.0%

0.90

6.6%

10.4%

8.3%

1.00

0.6%

2.2%

1.3%

• If I were out with my friends at a bar and I asked
if I looked okay, I would prefer if my friends said
yes because if I did not, there would be nothing I
could do about it at the bar.
• If the truth would embarrass me in front of
important people

Note. The tables above reflect the coding scheme for justifications and implicit rules of deception. Kappa reflects the level of agreement between the
two research assistants who coded participant responses, for each coding category. The percentages listed reflect the percentage of participants that
listed each justification/implicit rule in the Ethics condition, the Preferences condition, and in total (respectively).
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Table 2. Implicit Rules and Dimensions of Unnecessary Harm
Source of implicit rule

Target

1. Emotional fragility
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Topic

Emotional reaction (psychological harm)

Dimension of unnecessary harm
Increased immediate harm (i.e. harm at the
moment of communication)

Potential to learn from information and implement change

Decreased instrumental value

Confusion (psychological harm)

Increased immediate harm (i.e. harm at the
moment of communication)

Potential to implement change

Decreased instrumental value

Emotional fragility (psychological harm)

Increased immediate harm (i.e. harm at the
moment of communication)

4. Subjective

Importance of information

Decreased instrumental value

5. Trivial

Importance of information

Decreased instrumental value

6. Uncontrollable

Potential to implement change

Decreased instrumental value

7. Disruption to special
moments and events

Distraction (psychological harm)

Increased immediate harm (i.e. harm at the
moment of communication)

8. Time to implement

Potential to implement change

Decreased instrumental value

Embarrassment (psychological harm)

Increased immediate harm (i.e. harm at the
moment of communication)

2. Ability to understand

3. Death bed

Context

Moral considerations

9. The presence of others

Table 3. Vignette Details and Results in Study 2
Implicit rule
(Vignette name)

Survey
group

1. Emotional
fragility

1

2. Ability to
understand

2
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Scenario Introduction
Imagine an employee who just
turned in his weekly marketing
report to his manager. Although
the employee usually delivers
good work, the manager unbeknownst to the employee does not think this report was
done well. The employee has a
meeting today with his manager.

Control Condition
The employee asks the manager what he
thought of the report.

Imagine a doctor who realizes that
her patient’s cancer is terminal,
meaning the cancer is not curable
and the patient will likely die.

The doctor's patient is a 44-year-old adult.
The patient can tell something is wrong and
is very distressed. The patient asks the
doctor if s/he is going to die.
7.7% endorse deception

Implicit Rule Violation Condition
The employee’s father was unexpectedly
hospitalized this morning and the employee is very
distressed. The manager knows this information.
The employee asks the manager what he thought of
the report.

3% endorse deception

19.5% endorse deception
χ2 = 18.36, p < .01
The doctor's patient is a 4-year-old child. The patient
can tell something is wrong and is very distressed.
The patient asks the doctor if s/he is going to die.
33.2% endorse deception

χ2 = 36.67, p < .01

3. Death bed

1

Imagine an individual who is
seriously ill. During the individual’s
illness, his spouse cheated on him.
The individual does not know this
and still deeply loves his spouse.

Although the individual is still ill, he is very
likely to recover. The individual is talking to
his spouse about their relationship and
asks if the spouse has ever been unfaithful.

The individual is still ill and is likely to die within the
next 24 hours. The individual is talking to his spouse
about their relationship and asks if the spouse has
ever been unfaithful.

31% endorse deception

63.8% endorse deception
χ2 = 28.67, p < .01

4. Subjective

3

Imagine an employee who must
deliver an important presentation.
She plans on wearing her favorite
silk scarf during the presentation.
She loves the scarf and thinks it
brings her good luck. Imagine that
the employee’s colleague –
unbeknownst to the employee thinks the scarf is hideous.

The colleague also knows that many other
employees share this opinion. The day of
her presentation, the employee shows up
in a suit and her silk scarf and asks how she
looks in it.

The colleague also knows, however, that many other
employees do not share this opinion. Many
colleagues like the scarf. The day of her
presentation, the employee shows up in a suit and
her silk scarf and asks how she looks in it.

39.4% endorse deception

71.2% endorse deception
χ2 = 54.98, p < .01

5. Trivial

2

Imagine an individual who is
hosting a dinner party. The host
serves soup, which one guest
finds to be very salty. The host
asks the guest what he thinks of
the soup.

This individual, the host, cooks very
often. The host is a professional chef
and is hosting the party to try out new
recipes for his/her restaurant. The
host serves soup, which one guest
finds to be very salty. The host asks
the guest what he thinks of the soup.
18% endorse deception

This individual, the host, does not cook very
often. The host has no professional cooking
training and is hosting the party for fun. The
host serves soup, which one guest finds to be
very salty. The host asks the guest what he
thinks of the soup.

37.8% endorse deception
χ2 = 18.82, p < .01
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6.
Uncontrollable

3

Imagine a summer intern who
just delivered his end-ofinternship presentation to his
office. The intern stuttered quite
a bit during the presentation.
The intern's friend attended the
presentation and believed that
the intern's stutter notably
decreased the quality of his
presentation, compared to his
fellow interns. Aside from the
stutter, the presentation was
pretty good.

The intern stuttered because he was
nervous during this particular
presentation. He can likely improve his
ability to speak without a stutter. The
intern's friend knows this information.
The intern asks his friend what he
thought of the presentation.

The intern stuttered because he has a
diagnosed speech impediment. The intern
cannot improve his ability to speak without a
stutter. The intern's friend knows this
information. The intern asks his friend what he
thought of the presentation.

18.8% endorse deception

56.5% endorse deception
χ2 =80.51, p < .01

7. Disruption
to special
moments and
events

2
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Imagine a manager who must
fire 10% of his workforce. It is a
Friday afternoon and top
management has just given the
manager a list of employees to
lay off. It is the beginning of
December and the manager has
until January 1st to inform
employees of their work status.
After January 1st, employees will
have 6 months - at full pay - to
search for new jobs and finish
their roles. Nothing about their
work will change until that time.
Imagine an employee who is on
the layoff list. This employee has
no idea that layoffs are coming,
but the employee does know
that the company is going
through a reorganization.

The employee drops by the manager’s
office on his/her way out the door on
Friday. The employee asks the
manager if there’s any news about the
reorganization.

The employee is getting married this weekend
- on Saturday - and s/he drops by the
manager’s office on his/her way out the door
on Friday. The employee asks the manager if
there’s any news about the reorganization.

22.9% endorse deception

52% endorse deception
χ2 = 35.16, p < .01

8. Time to
implement
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9. The
presence of
others

1

3

Imagine an employee who
must deliver an important
presentation. He will pitch a
new marketing plan to his
manager and colleagues. He
plans on wearing his favorite
black suit during the
presentation. Imagine that the
employee’s colleague –
unbeknownst to the employee
- thinks this suit is too tight and
that the suit is inappropriate
for the presentation.

The day before his presentation, the
employee tells his colleague that he
plans on wearing this suit and he asks
the colleague how he looks in it. At this
time, the employee has other suits
available that he can wear.

Imagine an employee who just
turned in his weekly marketing
report to his manager.
Although the employee usually
delivers good work, the
manager - unbeknownst to the
employee - does not think this
report was well done.

The employee has a one-on-one
meeting today with his manager. The
employee enters the manager’s office.
The employee asks the manager what
he thought of the report.

The employee is attending a company-wide
networking event today. The employee walks
into the event and begins talking to his
manager and several other colleagues. In front
of a group of colleagues, the employee asks the
manager what he thought of the report.

1.5% endorse deception

38.3% endorse deception

7.6% endorse deception

The day of his presentation, the employee
shows up in his suit and he asks his colleague
how he looks in it. At this time, the employee
has no other suits available that he can wear.

64.4% endorse deception
χ2 = 93.31, p < .01

χ2 = 115.90, p < .01

Note.
I ran three separate surveys at different points in time. Each survey (denoted by Survey group) featured three vignettes.
In Survey Group 1: Mturk, N = 267; 46.8% female; Mage = 35, Perspective was manipulated between subjects.
In Survey Group 2: U.S. university laboratory, N = 195; 52.3% female; Mage = 25, Perspective was manipulated within
subjects.
In Survey Group 3: Mturk, N = 269, 45.4% female; Mage = 38, Perspective was manipulated within subjects.

Table 4. Meta-analysis on all Vignettes in Study 2
Dependent variable = Endorsement of deception; 1 = lie, 0 = tell the truth
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Intercept

-0.79**

-1.44***

-1.39***

-1.41***

-3.28***

-1.36***

Gendera

0.24*
1.70***

1.70***

1.73***

0.94***

.92***

-0.10

-0.05

Immediate Harm of Truth

1.19***

.81***

Instrumental Value of Truth

-0.73***

-1.17***

Age

-0.00

Implicit Rule Violation

b

c

Perspective

Perspective x Implicit Rule Violation

-0.08
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Immediate Harm x Instrumental Value

.093*

Vignette Fixed Effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Cluster by Vignette

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Cluster by Participant

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

3585

3585

3585

3585

3585

3585

R2

0.07

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.48

0.49

Note. *, **, *** denote significance at p ≤ .05, < .01 and <.001 respectively
a
Gender is coded as 1 = female, 0 = male
b
Violation is coded as 1 = implicit rule violation, 0 = no rule violation
c
Perspective is coded as 1 = target, 0 = observer

Table 5. Vignette-level Analyses in Study 3

Dependent variable: Endorsement of deception; 1 = lie, 0 = tell the truth
Vignette:

Ability to understand

Time to Implement

Presence of Others

Implicit Rule Violationa

-1.21***
.98*

-3.11***
2.07**

-2.61***
2.49***

Liarb

-.12

-.72

1.40*

Targetc

.35

-.72

.92

Liar x Implicit Rule Violation

.18

.96

-1.57*

Target x Implicit Rule Violation

-.12

.60

-1.65*

R2

0.08

0.22

0.14

Intercept
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Note. *, **, *** denote significance at p ≤ .05, < .01 and <.001 respectively
a
Violation is coded as 1 = implicit rule violation, 0 = no rule violation
b
Liar is coded as 0 = target or observer perspective, 1 = liar perspective
b
Target is coded as 0 = liar or observer perspective, 1 = target perspective

Table 6. Meta-analysis on all Vignettes in Study 3
Dependent variable = Endorsement of deception; 1 = lie, 0 = tell the truth
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Intercept

-0.43+

-1.33***

-1.37***

-1.58***

-2.08***

.02

1.64*

Gendera

0.49***

Age

-.02+
1.35***

.75***

.73***

.91***

Immediate Harm of Truth

.90***

.51*

.53***

Instrumental Value of Truth

-.95***

-1.43***

-1.03***

.09+

.08***

Implicit Rule Violationb

1.36***

1.67***

Liarc

.13

.34

Targetd

-.01

.38*

Liar x Implicit Rule Violation

-.32

Target x Implicit Rule Violation

-.60
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Immediate Harm x Instrumental Value
Self-interest

.12

Autonomy

-.07

Probability of Detection

-.05+

Societal Harm

-.01

Moral Duty

-.66***

Vignette Fixed Effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Cluster by Vignette

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Cluster by Participant

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

834

834

834

834

834

834

834

R2

0.05

0.10

0.10

0.10

0.34

0.35

0.43

Note. +, *, **, *** denote significance at p ≤ .10, .05, .01 and .001 respectively
a
Gender is coded as 1 = female, 0 = male; bViolation is coded as 1 = implicit rule violation, 0 = no rule violation; cLiar is
coded as 0 = target or observer perspective, 1 = liar perspective; dTarget is coded as 0 = liar or observer perspective, 1 =
target perspective
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Figures

Figure 1. Theoretical Framework
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Figure 2. Mapping the Implicit Rules on to the Theoretical Framework (Study 2)
Panel 1: Implicit rules pertaining to attributes of the target
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Panel 2: Implicit rules pertaining to attributes of the honest information
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Panel 3: Implicit rules pertaining to attributes of the context
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Note. For each vignette, I plot the mean ratings of immediate harm (X axis) and instrumental value (Y axis) in the control
condition (white dot) and in the implicit rule violation condition (dark gray, spotted dot). The size of each data point is
proportional to the percentage of people who endorsed deception in each condition.

Figure 3. Implicit Rule Violations Across Perspectives (Study 3)

% of participants who chose
deception over honesty

Panel 1. Dementia and a daughter’s death (Ability to understand vignette)
Can understand truth: Good mental health
Cannot understand truth: Dementia

45.7%

29.8%

22.9%

20.8%

Liar

50.0%

44.2%

Observer

Target

Panel 2. Errors in a published versus unpublished manuscript (Time to implement

% of participants who chose
deception over honesty

vignette)

Can implement changes: Unpublished manuscript
Cannot implement changes: Published manuscript

31.1%

26.1%
4.3%

2.1%
Liar

23.9%
2.1%

Observer

Target

Panel 3. Public versus private feedback on a presentation (The presence of others
vignette)
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% of participants who chose
deception over honesty

Asks for feedback in private
Asks for feedback in public

46.8%

42.6%

29.8%

22.9%

15.6%
6.8%

Liar

Observer
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Target

Figure 4. Mediation Analysis in Study 3

Note. Numbers reflect the indirect effect and the 95% confidence interval around the indirect
effect for each proposed mechanism.
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CHAPTER 3.
PROSOCIAL LIES: WHEN DECEPTION BREEDS TRUST

Emma E. Levine
Maurice Schweitzer

Published in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes in 2015.

ABSTRACT

Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long asserted that deception harms
trust. We challenge this claim. Across four studies, we demonstrate that deception can
increase trust. Specifically, prosocial lies increase the willingness to pass money in the
trust game, a behavioral measure of benevolence-based trust. In Studies 1a and 1b, we
find that altruistic lies increase trust when deception is directly experienced and when it is
merely observed. In Study 2, we demonstrate that mutually beneficial lies also increase
trust. In Study 3, we disentangle the effects of intentions and deception; intentions are far
more important than deception for building benevolence-based trust. In Study 4, we
examine how prosocial lies influence integrity-based trust. We introduce a new economic
game, the Rely-or-Verify game, to measure integrity-based trust. Prosocial lies increase
benevolence-based trust, but harm integrity-based trust. Our findings expand our
understanding of deception and deepen our insight into the mechanics of trust.
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PROSOCIAL LIES: WHEN DECEPTION BREEDS TRUST

Trust is essential to organizations and interpersonal relationships (e.g., Blau,
1964; Golembiewski & McConkie, 1975; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Lewicki, Tomlinson, &
Gillespie, 2006; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998).
Trust increases leadership effectiveness (Atwater, 1988; Bazerman, 1994; Dirks, 2000),
improves the stability of economic and political exchange (Hosmer, 1995), reduces
transaction costs (Granovetter, 1985), facilitates cooperation (Valley et al., 1998), and
helps firms and individuals manage risk (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). Golembiewski
and McConkie (1975, p. 131) argued that, “There is no single variable which so
thoroughly influences interpersonal and group behavior as does trust.”
Consistent with prior research, we define trust as, “a psychological state
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the
intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). A
significant body of research has documented the negative effects of violating trust. For
example, trust violations can harm cooperation and bargaining outcomes (Lount, Zhong,
Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 2008; Croson, Boles, & Murninghan, 2003), lower
organizational commitment (Robinson, 1996), provoke retaliation (Bies & Tripp, 2006),
and, in more serious cases, trigger organizational-level failures (Gillepsie & Dietz, 2009).
Although there are many ways to harm trust, existing research identifies one
behavior as particularly toxic to trust: deception (e.g., Santoro & Paine, 1993; Boles,
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Croson, & Murninghan, 2000; Carr, 1968; O’Connor & Carnavale, 1997; Schweitzer &
Croson, 1999; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006; Croson et al., 2003; Bok, 1978).
Prior research suggests that deception is theoretically, philosophically, and empirically
antithetical to trust. For example, philosopher Sir Francis Bacon argued that dishonesty
deprives, “people of two of the most principal instruments for interpersonal action—trust
and belief” (from “On Truth”, cited in Tyler & Feldman, 2006). Empirical research has
also demonstrated that deception harms relationships (Ford, King, & Hollender, 1988;
Lewis & Saarni, 1993; Tyler & Feldman, 2006), elicits negative affect (Planalp,
Rutherford, & Honeycutt, 1988), decreases liking, (Tyler, Feldman, & Reichert, 2006)
and triggers retaliation (Boles et al., 2000; Croson et al., 2003). Furthermore, trust
scholars have found that acts of deception cause enduring harm to trust. Though
individuals can often repair trust following a violation (e.g., Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, &
Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer et al., 2006), trust violations accompanied by deception
irrevocably harm trust (Schweitzer et al., 2006).
We challenge the prevailing assumption that deception harms trust. We argue that
most philosophers, psychologists, and economists, have confounded deceptive behavior
with selfish intentions and outcomes. As a result, prior research that has documented the
harmful effects of deception may really tell us more about the consequences of selfish
behavior than deception per se.
We break new ground by demonstrating that some forms of deception increase
trust. Across four experiments, we demonstrate that prosocial lying can increase
behavioral and attitudinal measures of interpersonal trust. Consistent with prior work, we
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define deception as the transmission of information that intentionally misleads others
(see Murnighan, 1991; Boles et al., 2000; Gino & Shea, 2012). We define prosocial
deception as a type of deception. Prosocial lies involve the transmission of information
that misleads and benefits a target (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014).
Our program of research expands our understanding of trust by disentangling the
role of benevolence and integrity for building interpersonal trust. In our investigation, we
explore distinct forms of both deception and trust. We are the first to demonstrate that
some common forms of deception can increase trust.
We report results from a series of experiments. In Studies 1, 2, and 3, participants
experienced or observed deception and made decisions in a trust game. Across these
studies, we find that prosocial lies increase trust. This is true when deception is directly
experienced (Study 1a) and when it is merely observed (Study 1b). This pattern is also
true when the prosocial lies are mutually beneficial and help both the target and the
deceiver (Study 2).
In Studies 3a and 3b, we disentangle the effects of lying from the effects of
prosocial and selfish intentions. When we control for intentions, we find that deception
itself has no effect on trusting behavior. In other words, the decision to pass money in the
trust game reflects perceptions of benevolence, which is not undermined by deception.
Prosocial intentions, regardless of whether they are associated with deception or honesty,
significantly increase benevolence-based trust. In Study 3b, we demonstrate that our
results do not simply reflect a negative reaction to selfish behavior. Instead, we find that
prosocial deception increases trust compared to a neutral control condition.
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In our final study, we explore how prosocial deception influences distinct types of
trust. The trust game reflects benevolence-based trust; it operationalizes the willingness
to be vulnerable to interpersonal exploitation. We introduce a new economic game, the
Rely-or-Verify game, which reflects integrity-based trust. The Rely-or-Verify game
operationalizes the willingness to rely on the veracity of another person. Although
prosocial lying increases benevolence-based trust, it harms integrity-based trust. We
demonstrate that the same action can have divergent effects on different dimensions of
trust.
Prosocial lying
Prosocial lying is a common feature of everyday communication. For example, an
employee may tell a colleague that they delivered an excellent presentation when they did
not, or thank a gift giver for a gift they would have rather not received.
As children, we learn to tell prosocial lies to be polite (Talwar, Murphy, & Lee,
2007; Broomfield, Robinson, & Robinson, 2002). Prosocial deception is also common in
adult relationships (Tyler & Feldman, 2004). Adults lie in roughly 20% of their everyday
social interactions (DePaulo & Bell, 1996), and most of these lies are prosocial (DePaulo
& Kashy, 1998).
Individuals’ endorsement of prosocial lies reflects the broader approval of
unethical behaviors that help others. For example, individuals are more willing to cheat
when cheating restores equity (Gino & Pierce, 2009, 2010a; Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008),
helps disadvantaged others (Gino & Pierce, 2010b), and when the spoils of cheating are
shared with others (Wiltermuth, 2011; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2013). With respect to
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deception, prior experimental work has found that individuals are more willing to tell
prosocial lies than selfish lies (Erat & Gneezy, 2012) and perceive prosocial lies to be
more ethical (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014).
Prosocial lying serves a number of interpersonal aims. While many prosocial lies
are motivated by an altruistic desire to protect relational partners (e.g. DePaulo & Kashy,
1998) or provide interpersonal support (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Goffman, 1967), other
lies have both prosocial and self-serving motives. For example, prosocial lying can be
used to avoid conflict and facilitate uncomfortable social situations. When a wife asks her
husband if she looks fat in her dress, the husband may lie not only to protect his wife’s
feelings, but also to avoid conflict and a lengthy discussion about diet and exercise.
In the present research, we distinguish between lies that are costly for the liar and
lies that benefit the liar. We define altruistic lies as, “false statements that are costly for
the liar and are made with the intention of misleading and benefitting a target” (Levine
& Schweitzer, 2014: p. 108). We define mutually beneficial lies as false statements that
are beneficial for the liar and are made with the intention of misleading and benefitting
the target. We conceptualize altruistic and mutually beneficial lies as a subset of
prosocial lies. Consistent with Bok (1978), we also distinguish between prosocial lies and
white lies. White lies involve small stakes and can be prosocial or self-serving. Unlike
white lies, prosocial lies can have large stakes. For example, some doctors misrepresent
prognoses to give their patients comfort in their final weeks of life (e.g., Iezzoni, Rao,
DesRoches, Vogeli, & Campbell, 2012).
Prosocial lies and trust
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Prosocial lies are particularly relevant to the study of trust because they reflect a
conflict between two central antecedents of trust: benevolence and integrity. Trust
reflects an individual’s expectation about another person’s behavior. In contrast with
research that conceptualizes trust as a belief about one’s ability to carry out
organizational duties or effectively perform a particular job (Kim et al., 2004; Kim,
Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007), we conceptualize
trust as the willingness to be vulnerable to exploitation within an interpersonal interaction
(e.g. Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998),
Scholars have converged on three qualities of the trustee (the individual who is
trusted) that uniquely influence interpersonal trust: benevolence, ability, and integrity
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Butler, 1991). Benevolence reflects the extent to
which an individual has positive intentions or a desire to help the truster (Butler &
Cantrell, 1984; Mayer et al., 1995). Ability reflects an individual’s technical skills,
competence, and expertise in a specific domain (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; Giffin, 1967;
Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Integrity reflects an individual’s ethicality and reputation for
honesty (Mayer et al., 1995; Butler & Cantrell, 1984). In this work, we investigate the
tension between benevolence and integrity.
Existing trust research highlights the importance of benevolence for building
interpersonal trust. In dyadic relationships, trust hinges on concerns about exploitation
(Barney & Hansen, 1994; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Bhattacharya, Devinney & Pillutla,
1998), and perceptions of benevolence can allay these concerns. Individuals who are
perceived to have benevolent motives are perceived to be less likely to exploit a potential
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truster, and consequently, are more likely to be trusted (e.g., Weber, Malhotra, &
Murnighan, 2004; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; Pillutla, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2003;
Dunn, Ruedy, & Schweitzer, 2012; Lount & Pettit, 2012).
Prior work has also suggested that integrity is a critical antecedent to interpersonal
trust. Establishing a direct link between integrity and trust, however, has been difficult.
Part of this difficulty stems from the subjective nature of integrity: the belief that “the
trustee adheres to a set of principles that the truster finds acceptable” (Mayer et al., 1995,
p. 719; Kim et al., 2004). In addition, in nearly every investigation of the link between
integrity and trust, integrity has been confounded with benevolence (e.g. Kim et al., 2004;
Schweitzer et al., 2006). That is, prior trust research that has studied behaviors that
violate ethical principles and cause harm to others, reflecting low integrity and low
benevolence. For example, prior work has studied lies that exploit others for financial
gain (Koning, Steinel, Beest, & van Dijk, 2011; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004; Schweitzer et
al., 2006). These lies violate the principle of honesty and demonstrate selfishness. Not
surprisingly, these lies harm trust. However, an individual may also lie to benefit a
counterpart. This behavior violates the principle of honesty, but demonstrates
benevolence. Existing trust work does not give us insight into how individuals might
resolve these competing signals.
Research on corruption and favoritism, however, provides evidence that
individuals can place enormous trust in individuals who have demonstrated low integrity.
For example, scholars have documented high trust among members of crime rings
(Baccara & Bar-Isaac, 2008; Bowles & Gintis, 2004) and among members of
151

communities that have been influenced by organized crime (Meier, Pierce, & Vaccaro,
2013). In these groups, individuals trust in-group members, but distrust out-group
members. Individuals within the group are trusted because they care for and protect ingroup members, even if they have demonstrated low integrity with respect to their
interactions with out-group members.
We conjecture that for interpersonal trust judgments, the concern for benevolence
is more deeply rooted than the concern for integrity. The preference individuals have for
ethical rules, such as fairness and honesty, may derive from the more fundamental
concern for protecting people from harm (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Turiel, 1983).
That is, benevolence may be the primary concern and integrity may be a derivative,
secondary concern. Consistent with this proposition, Levine & Schweitzer (2014) found
that when honesty harms other people and deception does not, honesty is perceived to be
less ethical than deception.
We postulate that individuals who project high benevolence, even if they also
project low integrity, will engender trust. We expect this to be particularly true for trust
judgments that involve vulnerability to interpersonal exploitation. As a result, we
hypothesize that prosocial lies, which demonstrate high benevolence, but low integrity,
will build trust.
Overview of current research
Across our studies, we use deception games (adapted from Erat & Gneezy, 2012;
Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun, & Murnighan, 2009; Gneezy, 2005) and trust games (adapted
from Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). We use deception games to operationalize
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prosocial lies, because these games allow us to cleanly manipulate the intentions
associated with deception and, consequently, draw causal inferences about the role of
intentions and deception in building trust.
We use the trust game in our first three studies, because it operationalizes the
fundamental components of an interpersonal trusting decision: the willingness to be
vulnerable based on positive expectations of another (Rousseau et al., 1998; Pillutla et al.,
2003). The trust game reflects benevolence-based trust and is the predominant paradigm
used to measure trust throughout psychology and economics (e.g., Berg et al., 1995;
Schweitzer et al., 2006; McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith, 2003; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman,
& Soutter, 2000; Malhotra & Murninghan, 2002; Malhotra, 2004). In the standard trust
game, the truster is endowed with money and has the opportunity to keep the money or
pass the money to the trustee. The amount of money grows if the truster passes it to the
trustee. The trustee then has the opportunity to either return some portion of the money to
the truster or keep all of the money for himself. The truster’s initial decision to pass
money represents trust (Pillutla et al., 2003; McCabe et al., 2003; Glaeser et al., 2000;
Malhotra & Murninghan, 2002; Malhotra, 2004). Though trust game decisions may also
reflect preferences for equality and risk (Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2003), the external
validity of trust game decisions has been documented with financial investment decisions
(e.g., Karlan, 2005) and prior work has closely linked trust game behavior with attitudinal
measures of trust (e.g., Houser, Schunk, & Winter, 2010; Schweitzer et al., 2006).
We begin our investigation by examining the consequences of altruistic lies. In
Study 1a, participants were paired with a confederate who either told an altruistic lie to
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the participant or was selfishly honest. Participants then played a trust game with the
confederate. In Study 1a, we find that being deceived increases trust; participants were
more trusting of confederates who lied to them than they were of confederates who were
honest. In Study 1b, we rule out reciprocity as an alternative explanation. In this study,
participants observed, rather than experienced, altruistic deception and then made trust
decisions. We find that individuals trust altruistic liars, even when they did not benefit
from the prosocial deception.
In Study 2, we extend our investigation by examining different types of lies. In
this study, we find that even when prosocial lying helps the liar, deception increases trust;
non-altruistic prosocial lies, and mutually beneficial lies increase trust. In Studies 3a and
3b, we isolate the effects of intentions and deception by manipulating them orthogonally.
In Study 3a, we find that deception itself has no direct effect on benevolence-based trust,
but that intentions matter immensely. Prosocial individuals who told lies or were honest
were trusted far more than selfish individuals who lied or were honest. In Study 3b, we
include two control conditions and demonstrate that relative to control conditions,
prosocial intentions increase trust and selfish intentions decrease trust.
Our first set of studies demonstrate that trust rooted in perceptions of benevolence
is not undermined by deception. In our final study, we explore the influence of deception
on trust rooted in perceptions of integrity. We introduce a new type of trust game, the
Rely-or-Verify game, in which trust decisions rely on perceptions of honesty. In this
study, we identify a boundary condition of the effect we observe in our initial studies. We
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find that deception does not harm trust decisions that are rooted in perceptions of
integrity.9
Study 1
In Studies 1a and 1b, we explore the relationship between altruistic lying and
trusting behavior. In Study 1a, participants played a trust game with a counterpart who
either told them an altruistic lie or told them a selfish truth. In Study 1b, participants
observed an individual who either told an altruistic lie or a selfish truth to a third party.
Together, Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that altruistic deception can increase trust and
that this result cannot be explained by direct reciprocity.
Study 1a
Method
Participants. We recruited 125 adults to participate in an online study in
exchange for payment via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Procedure and Materials. In this study, we randomly assigned participants to
one of two conditions in a between-subjects design. Participants played a deception game
with an individual who either told an altruistic lie or was selfishly honest. Participants
then played a trust game with the same partner.
Manipulation of altruistic lies. We used a modified deception game (Erat &
Gneezy; 2012; Cohen et al., 2009; Gneezy, 2005; Levine & Schweitzer, 2014) to

9

Across all of our studies, our sample size or the number of days that the study would
run was determined in advance, and no conditions or variables were dropped from any
analyses we report.
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operationalize altruistic lies. We referred to the deception game as “Exercise 1” in the
experiment.
In our version of the deception game, two individuals were paired and randomly
assigned to the role of either Sender or Receiver. The payoffs for each pair of participants
(one Sender and one Receiver) were determined by the outcome of a computer-simulated
coin flip and the choices the participants made. In the deception game, the Sender had the
opportunity to lie to the Receiver about the outcome of the coin flip. In the experiment,
we refer to the potential liar as “the Sender.”
The deception game unfolded in the following steps:
5. Senders were told the outcome of a computer-simulated coin flip. In our
study, the coin always landed on heads.
6. The Sender then had to report the outcome of the coin flip to his/her
partner, the Receiver. The Sender could send one of two possible
messages to the Receiver. The message could read, “The coin landed on
heads” or “The coin landed on tails.”
 The Sender knew that the outcome the Receiver chose (heads or
tails) determined the payment in the experiment. The Sender also
knew that the only information the Receiver would have was the
message from the Sender and that most Receivers chose the
outcome indicated in the Sender’s message.
 The Sender knew there were two possible payment options, A and
B. If the Receiver chose the correct outcome, the Sender and the
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Receiver would be paid according to Option A. Otherwise, the
Sender and the Receiver would be paid according to Option B.
7. In Study 1a, Option A was $2 for the Sender and $0 for the Receiver.
Option B was $1.75 for the Sender and $1 for the Receiver. Throughout
our studies, we manipulated the payments associated with Option A and
Option B to operationalize different types of lies. We summarize the
payoffs associated with each choice in Table 1.
8. After receiving the Sender’s message, the Receiver had to choose an
outcome: heads or tails. The Receiver knew that his/her choice determined
the payment in the experiment, but the Receiver did not know the payoffs
associated with the choice. The Sender’s message was the only piece of
information the Receiver had.
Therefore, Senders faced the following options:
C.

Send an honest message, e.g. “The coin landed on heads.”
Honesty was most likely to lead to an outcome that was costly to the
Receiver, and benefitted the Sender (i.e. selfish).

D.

Send a dishonest message, e.g. “The coin landed on tails.”
Lying was most likely to lead to an outcome that benefitted the Receiver,
and was costly to the Sender (i.e. altruistic).

In Study 1a, we assigned all participants to the role of Receiver and informed
them that their decisions would be matched with the decisions of a previous participant,
who had been assigned to the role of Sender. After reading the instructions for the
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deception game and passing a comprehension check10, participants received a message
from their partner, the Sender. The Sender’s message either read “The coin landed on
heads” (the Selfish Honesty condition) or “The coin landed on tails” (the Altruistic Lie
condition). Participants then made their prediction by choosing either “Heads” or
“Tails.”11 Participants did not know the possible payoffs when they made their choice.
After making their choice, participants learned more information about the
deception game. Specifically, we gave them all of the Sender’s private information.
Participants learned that the Sender knew the coin had landed on heads. Therefore,
participants learned that the Sender either lied to them or had been honest. In addition,
participants learned the payoffs associated with the Sender’s choice. Therefore,
participants learned that lying was altruistic and honesty was selfish. This was our
manipulation of altruistic lying.
After participants learned about the information their partner knew as the Sender
in the deception game, participants played a trust game with the Sender. We referred to
the trust game as “Exercise 2” in the experiment. We ran a pilot study with a nonoverlapping sample (N = 40) in order to generate real decisions with which to match the
decisions of participants in our main study.

10

Participants had to pass two comprehension checks, one for the deception game and one for the trust
game, in order to complete the entire study. Participants who failed a comprehension check had the
opportunity to reread the instructions for the exercise and retake the comprehension check. If any
participant failed a comprehension check twice, they were not allowed to complete the study. We followed
this procedure in every study.
A total of 89% of participants actually chose the outcome indicated in their partner’s message. Whether
or not participants chose the outcome indicated in the message did not influence our results. That is, our
results are not influenced by whether or not participants were successfully deceived.
11
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---Table 1 about here--The trust game. In our trust game, we assigned all participants to the role of
Player 1 and told them that they would be paired with the Sender with whom they had
just been paired with in Exercise 1 (the deception game). In our version of the trust game,
Player 1 was given $1 and could make one of two choices: “Keep $1” or “Pass $1.”
Choosing “Keep $1” led to a payout of $1 for Player 1 and $0 for his/her partner, Player
2. If Player 1 passed the $1, the money would grow to $3 and Player 2 could then either
choose to “Keep $3” or “Return $1.50.”
Dependent variables.
Trusting behavior. The choice to pass money in the trust game served as our
primary dependent variable. In addition, after making a decision, participants rated their
partner’s trustworthiness, benevolence, and deception. For all attitudinal measures, we
used 7-point Likert scales anchored at 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree”.
Attitudinal trust. We measured attitudinal trust with two items (r(121) = .89): “I
trust Player 2 to RETURN money,” and “I am confident that Player 2 will RETURN
money.”
Perceived benevolence. We measured perceived benevolence using three items (α
= .80): “This person is [kind, nice, and selfish (reverse-scored)].”
Perceived deception. We used three items to measure the extent to which our
manipulation was recognized as deception (α = .84): “This person sent an honest message
as a Sender in Exercise 1” (reverse-scored), “This person lied about the outcome of the
coin flip in Exercise 1,” and, “This person deceived his/her partner in Exercise 1.”
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After participants submitted their responses, we asked two multiple-choice recall
questions,12 collected demographic information, and asked participants what they thought
the purpose of the study was. Participants then received a bonus payment based upon
their decisions.
Results
We report results from the 121 adults (45% female; Mage = 32years, SD = 9.77)
who passed all comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 4 participants
failed a comprehension check at the start of the experiment and were automatically
eliminated from the study. We present the means and standard deviations of each of our
scales, as well as the inter-scale correlation matrix in Table 2.
---Table 2 about here--Trusting behavior. Supporting our thesis, participants were significantly more
likely to trust a partner who told them an altruistic lie (56%), than a partner who was
honest (32%), χ2 (1, N = 121) = 6.88, p < .01. Figure 1 depicts these results.
Attitudinal Trust. Our attitudinal trust measure parallels our behavioral trust
results. Participants reported that they trusted their partners more in the Altruistic Lie
condition (M = 3.77, SD = 1.91) than in the Selfish Honesty condition (M = 2.72, SD =
1.76), F(1, 119) = 9.85, p < .01. Our behavioral and attitudinal measures of trust were
highly correlated, r(121) = .89, p < .001, suggesting that passing decisions reflected trust
beliefs.
12

In every study, at least 80% of participants were able to recall the manipulation at the end of the study.
For each study, we report analyses for the entire sample, but our results are unchanged when we restrict our
sample to only those who answered the recall questions correctly.
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Perceived Benevolence. Participants also perceived their partners to be more
benevolent in the Altruistic Lie condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.55) than in the Selfish
Honesty condition (M = 3.45, SD = 1.32), F(1, 119) = 8.12, p < .01.
Perceived Deception. Consistent with our manipulation, participants also
perceived their partners to be more deceptive in the Altruistic Lie condition (M = 5.37,
SD = 1.35) than in the Selfish Honesty condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.34), F(1, 119) =
102.60, p < .001.
Discussion
Consistent with our thesis, individuals trusted altruistic liars more than honest
partners. Importantly, participants recognized that they had been deceived, but rated their
counterparts as more benevolent and thus, more trustworthy. Study 1a provides initial
evidence that deception can increase trust.
---Figure 1 about here--Study 1b
In Study 1a, participants who were deceived directly benefitted from the
deception. Their subsequent trust decisions may have been influenced by reciprocity. In
Study 1b, we rule out reciprocity as an alternative explanation. In Study 1b, participants
observe, rather than experience, deception. Individuals played a trust game with
counterparts who either had or had not told an altruistic lie to a different partner in a
previous interaction.
Method
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Participants. We recruited 261 participants from a city in the northeastern United
States to participate in a study in exchange for a $10 show-up fee.
Procedure and Materials. In this study, we randomly assigned participants to
one of two conditions in a between-subjects design. Participants observed an individual
who either told a prosocial lie or was selfishly honest and then played a trust game with
this person.
We seated participants in separate cubicles to complete this study on the
computer. The study was titled, “Partner Exercises.” We told participants that they would
complete two separate exercises with two separate partners. The first exercise, which we
called “Exercise 1,” was a deception game. Within the experiment, we called the second
exercise, the trust game, “Exercise 2.” Both games are similar to the games we used in
Study 1a. In Study 1b, however, we matched participants with two different partners.
Participants first completed the deception game and chose Heads or Tails. We paired
participants with a new partner for the trust game. Participants did not learn about their
own outcome in the deception game until they completed the entire study.
Manipulation of altruistic lies. We told participants that their partner in the trust
game (“Exercise 2”) had been matched with a different participant in the deception game
(“Exercise 1”) and had been assigned to the role of Sender. We then revealed the decision
the Sender had made and the information they had prior to making that decision. As in
Study 1a, by revealing the Sender’s decision and the payments associated with their
choice, participants learned that the Sender either told an altruistic lie or was selfishly
honest.
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The trust game. The trust game in Study 1b was similar to the trust game we used
in Study 1a. We assigned every participant to the role of Player 1 and we matched each
participant with a Player 2 who was the Sender in the first Exercise. In the trust game in
Study 1b, participants started with $2. If Player 1 chose to “Pass $2” the money grew to
$5. If Player 1 passed the money, Player 2 had the decision to either “Keep $5” or
“Return $2.50.” We used larger stakes in this study than those we used in Study 1a
because our participants were university students, rather than Mechanical Turk
participants.
Dependent variables. As in Study 1a, our main dependent variable was trusting
behavior, measured by the decision to pass money in the trust game. All of our other
dependent variables were identical to those we collected in Study 1a (r > .87; α’s > .80).
After participants submitted their responses, we asked two multiple-choice recall
questions, collected demographic information, and asked participants what they thought
the purpose of the study was. Participants then received bonus payment based on their
decisions.
Results
We report the results from 257 participants (60.3% female; Mage = 20 years, SD =
2.30) who passed all comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 4
participants failed a comprehension check at the start of the experiment and were
automatically eliminated from the study. We present the means and standard deviations
of each of our scales, as well as the inter-scale correlation matrix in Table 2.
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Trusting behavior. Consistent with our prediction, participants were more likely
to trust their partner when they learned that their partner had told someone else an
altruistic lie (39%), than when they learned that their partner had told someone else the
truth (21%), χ2 (1, N = 257) = 9.79, p < .01. We depict these results in Figure 1.
Attitudinal Trust. As in Study 1a, our behavioral and attitudinal measures of
trust followed the same pattern and were highly correlated, r(257) = .70, p < .001.
Participants reported trusting their partners more in the Altruistic Lie condition (M = 3.51,
SD = 1.71) than in the Selfish Honesty condition (M = 2.66, SD = 1.46), F(1, 255) =
18.04, p < .01.
Perceived Benevolence. Participants also perceived their partners to be more
benevolent in the Altruistic Lie condition (M = 4.14, SD = 1.39) than in the Selfish
Honesty condition (M = 3.75, SD = 1.07), F(1, 255) = 8.12, p = .01.
Perceived Deception. Consistent with our manipulation, participants also
perceived their partners to be more deceptive in the Altruistic Lie condition (M = 4.91,
SD = 1.45) than in the Selfish Honesty condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.64), F(1, 255) =
60.18, p < .001.
Discussion
As in Study 1a, our participants trusted altruistic liars more than people who were
selfishly honest. In this study, participants observed rather than experienced deception.
Results from this study rule out direct reciprocity as an alternative explanation for our
findings in Study 1a. Unlike Study 1a, participants in this study did not benefit from the
act of deception.
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Study 2
In Study 2, we extend our investigation by examining how different types of
prosocial lies influence trust. In Studies 1a and 1b, we investigated altruistic lies. Because
these lies were costly for the liar, it is possible that our findings reflect a desire to
compensate liars for their altruism. We rule out this explanation in Study 2.
In Study 2, we demonstrate that our findings extend to prosocial lies that are not
characterized by altruism. We explore how non-altruistic prosocial lies, lies that help the
deceived party and have no effect on the liar, and mutually beneficial lies, lies that
benefit the deceived party and the liar, influence trust.
Method
Participants. We recruited 300 adults to participate in an online study in
exchange for payment via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Procedure and Materials. As in Study 1b, participants learned about the
decisions an individual made as a Sender in a deception game and then played a trust
game with that individual. In this study, we randomly assigned participants to one of four
experimental conditions in a 2(Deception: Lie vs. Honesty) x 2(Type of lie: Prosocial vs.
Mutually beneficial) between-subjects design. That is, participants learned the following
about a Sender in the deception game: the Sender either lied or was honest; and lying
either had no effect on the Sender and benefited the Receiver (i.e. was prosocial) or
benefited both the Sender and the Receiver (i.e. was mutually beneficial).
In this study, participants first learned that they would play a trust game with a
partner. We referred to the trust game as “The Choice Game” in the experiment. After
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participants learned about the trust game, but before they made any decisions, we told
them that they would learn more information about their partner. Participants learned that
their partner in the trust game had completed the trust game, along with another exercise,
“The Coin Flip Game,” in a previous study. “The Coin Flip Game” was the same
deception game as the one we used in Studies 1a and 1b. Participants in this study,
however, observed but did not play the deception game. That is, our participants did not
have a chance to earn money before they played the trust game.
Manipulation of prosocial lies. We told participants that their partner in the trust
game had been matched with a different participant in the deception game (“The Coin
Flip Game”) and had been randomly assigned to the role of Sender. We then explained
the deception game and revealed the Sender’s decision in that game.
In Study 2, we manipulated both the decision to lie and the type of lie that was
told. In order to manipulate the type of lie, we manipulated the payments associated with
Outcome A (Honesty) and Outcome B (Lying). When lying was prosocial, Outcome A
yielded $2 for the Sender, $0 for the Receiver and Outcome B yielded $2 for the Sender,
$1 for the Receiver. That is, this lie was prosocial, but not altruistic. When lying was
mutually beneficial, Outcome A yielded $2 for the Sender, $0 for the Receiver and
Outcome B yielded $2.25 for the Sender, $1 for the Receiver. We summarize the
payments associated with each type of lie in Table 1.
Participants learned whether the Sender had been honest or had lied in the
deception game, and whether or not lying was prosocial or mutually beneficial. Then,
participants played the trust game with the Sender and rated the Sender.
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The trust game. We referred to the trust game as “The Choice Game” in the
experiment. The trust game we used in Study 2 was similar to the one we used in Study
1a and Study 1b. In this version of the trust game, however, participants played with
lottery tickets rather than monetary outcomes. Using lottery tickets allowed us to increase
the stakes on Mechanical Turk (a chance to win $25) and prevented participants from
directly comparing outcomes in the deception game and the trust game.
In this trust game, we assigned participants to the role of Player 1 and matched
them with the confederate Player 2 who had made decisions in “The Coin Flip Game.” In
the trust game, Player 1 started with 4 lottery tickets. If Player 1 chose to “Keep 4 lottery
tickets,” Player 1 earned 4 lottery tickets and Player 2 earned 0 lottery tickets. If Player 1
chose to “Pass 4 lottery tickets,” the number of tickets tripled to 12 tickets and Player 2
made the decision to either “Keep 12 lottery tickets” or “Return 6 lottery tickets.”
Participants knew that the more tickets they had, the more likely they were to win the $25
lottery at the end of the study.
Dependent variables. Our main dependent variable was trusting behavior,
measured by Player 1’s decision to pass the lottery tickets in the trust game. Our
measures of trusting attitudes and perceived deception were identical to those we
collected in Studies 1a and 1b (r > .93; α’s > .82). We modified our measure of perceived
benevolence to include new items that were more specific: “This person is benevolent”,
“This person would not purposefully hurt others”, “This person has good intentions” (α=
.86). We used a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 =
“Strongly agree.”
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After participants submitted their responses, we asked two multiple choice recall
questions, collected demographic information, and asked participants what they thought
the purpose of the study was. We then told participants the number of lottery tickets they
received as a result of their decision and their counterpart’s decision in the trust game.
We conducted the lottery the day the experiment ended.
Results
We report the results from 293 participants (39.9% female; Mage = 32 years, SD =
11.2) who passed the comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 7
participants failed a comprehension check at the start of the experiment and were
automatically eliminated from the study. We present the means and standard deviations
of each of our scales, as well as the inter-scale correlation matrix in Table 2.
Trusting behavior. We first conducted a logistic regression on trusting behavior,
using Deception, Type of Lie, and the Deception x Type of Lie interaction as independent
variables. We found a main effect of Deception (b = .557, p < .01), such that participants
were more trusting of individuals who told lies that helped others. Specifically, 63% of
participants trusted partners who had lied, whereas only 37% of participants trusted
partners who had been honest; χ2 (1, N = 293) = 20.23, p < .01.
We found no main effect of Type of Lie and we found no significant Deception x
Type of Lie interaction (ps > .32). Although lying had a directionally larger effect on trust
when the prosocial lie was not mutually beneficial, this difference was not significant. In
Figure 2, we display the percentage of participants who passed money in each of our four
experimental conditions.
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---Figure 2 about here--Attitudinal Trust. As in Studies 1a and 1b, our behavioral and attitudinal
measures of trust were highly correlated, r(293) = .73, p < .001 and follow the same
pattern. A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of Deception on attitudinal trust,
F(1,289) = 16.42, p < .001. Participants perceived their partner to be more trustworthy
when they lied (M = 3.83, SD = 1.88) than when they had told the truth (M = 2.95, SD =
1.91). We do not find a main effect of Type of Lie, F(1,289) = .13, p = .71, nor do we find
a significant Deception x Type of Lie interaction, F(1,289) = .34, p = .56.
Perceived Benevolence. A two-way ANOVA also revealed a main effect of
Deception on perceived benevolence, F(1,289) = 16.42, p < .001. Participants perceived
their partner to be more benevolent when they lied (M = 4.56, SD = 1.15) than when they
told the truth (M = 3.63, SD = 1.33).
We also found a marginally significant Deception x Type of Lie interaction,
F(1,289) = 3.28, p = .07. Lying had a greater effect on perceived benevolence when the
lie was prosocial (Mlie = 4.73, SDlie = 1.22 vs. Mhonesty = 3.51, SDhonesty = 1.37), t(138) =
5.77, p < .001; than when the lie was mutually beneficial (Mlie = 4.44, SDlie = 1.08 vs.
Mthonesty = 3.75, SDhonesty = 1.29), t(153) = 3.43, p < .001. We do not find a main effect of
Type of Lie, F(1,289) = .03, p = .86.
Perceived Deception. Consistent with our manipulation, participants perceived
their partners to be more deceptive when their partner had lied (M = 5.39, SD = 1.24)
than when they told the truth (M = 2.83, SD = 1.45), F(1,289) = 259.69, p < .001. We do
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not find a main effect of Type of Lie, F(1,289) = .01, p = .91, nor do we find a significant
Deception x Type of Lie interaction, F(1,289) = 1.29, p = .26.
Discussion
In Study 2, we demonstrate that altruism is not a necessary condition for
deception to increase trust. Prosocial lies that are not costly for the liar and prosocial lies
that benefit the liar both increase trust. These results suggest that trusting behavior does
not simply reflect a desire to compensate a liar for altruism. Rather, individuals trust
people who help others, even when that help is self-serving and involves deception.
Although mutually beneficial lies are a weaker signal of benevolence than
prosocial lies that do not benefit the deceiver, the self-serving nature of these lies did not
undermine trust. These results suggest that for trust, judgments of benevolence may be
more important than selflessness.
Study 3
Our initial studies demonstrate that prosocial lies can increase trust. In Studies 3a
and 3b, we extend our investigation by independently manipulating deception and
intentions (Study 3a) and by including two control conditions to disentangle the effects of
selfishness from prosociality (Study 3b).
Study 3a
Method
Participants. We recruited 337 participants from a city in the northeastern United
States to participate in a study in exchange for a $10 show-up fee.
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Procedure and Materials. We seated participants in separate cubicles to
complete the study on the computer. The study was titled, “Partner Exercise.” As in
Study 2, participants learned about the decision a Sender made in a deception game and
then played a trust game with that Sender. In Study 3a, we randomly assigned
participants to one of four experimental conditions in a 2(Deception: Lie vs. Honesty) x
2(Intentions: Altruistic vs. Selfish) between-subjects design. Specifically, participants
observed a Sender who either lied or sent an honest message in a deception game, and
whose choice was either altruistic or selfish. Participants then played a trust game with
this partner.
Manipulation of lies. The deception game in Study 3a was similar to the one we
used in our prior studies. In this game, however, we used a random number generator
rather than a coin flip to begin the game. The game was otherwise identical to the game
we used in Study 2. That is, the payoffs for each pair of participants (one Sender and one
Receiver) were determined by the outcome of a random number generator and the
choices made by the Sender and the Receiver. Senders knew the correct number was 4,
and could send an honest message (e.g., “The number is 4”) or a dishonest message (e.g.,
“The number is 5”). We used a random number generator rather than a coin flip so that
participants would be less likely to make strategic inferences about the message the
Sender sent (e.g., The Sender sent the message: “The coin landed on heads”, hoping their
partner would pick “tails”).
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Importantly, Senders in this experiment played The Number Game with one of
two possible payment structures. These payment structures enabled us to manipulate
whether deception or honesty was associated with selfish or altruistic intentions.
The first payment structure was identical to the one we used in Studies 1a and 1b.
This payment structure represented the choice between selfish honesty (Option A) and
altruistic lying (Option B). In the second payment structure, we reversed the payoffs. This
payment structure represented the choice between altruistic honesty and selfish lying.
After learning about the Sender’s choice in the deception game, participants
played a trust game with the Sender. We ran a pilot study with a non-overlapping sample
(N=41) to generate decisions with which to match the decisions participants made in
Study 3a.
The Trust game. We referred to the trust game as “The Choice Game” in the
experiment. “The Choice Game” was identical to the trust game we used in Study 1b.
Participants had the choice to either “Keep $2” or trust their partner and “Pass $2.”
Dependent variables.
As in Studies 1a, 1b, and 2, our main dependent variable was trusting behavior,
measured by the decision to pass money in the trust game. Our measures of attitudinal
trust and benevolence were identical to the measures we used in Study 2 (r’s > .86, α
=.91). We made a slight revision to our measure of perceived deception to fit the new
version of the deception game. Specifically, we asked participants to indicate their
agreement with the following statements: “This person sent an honest message about the
number chosen by the random number generator as a Sender in The Number Game,” and
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“This person lied about the number chosen by the random number generator in The
Number Game;” (r(312) = .86).
After participants submitted their responses, we asked them two recall questions,
collected demographic information and asked participants what they thought the purpose
of the study was. At the end of the study, we paid participants a bonus payment based
upon their decisions in the trust game.
Results
We report the results from 312 participants (62.8% female; Mage= 21 years, SD =
2.50) who passed all comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 25
participants failed a comprehension check at the start of the experiment and were
automatically eliminated from the study. We present the means and standard deviations
of each of our scales, as well as the inter-scale correlation matrix in Table 2.
Passing in the trust game. We first conducted a logistic regression on trusting
behavior, using Deception, Intentions, and the Deception x Intentions interaction as
independent variables. We found a main effect of Intentions (b = .498, p < .01), such that
participants were more trusting of individuals who made altruistic decisions. Specifically,
47% of participants trusted their partners in the Altruistic conditions, whereas only 25%
of participants trusted their partners in the Selfish conditions,χ2 (1, N = 312) = 16.70, p <
.01. We found no main effect of Deception and we found no significant Deception x
Intentions interaction (ps > .79). In Figure 3, we display the percentage of participants
who passed money in each of the four experimental conditions (Altruistic Lie, Selfish Lie,
Altruistic Honesty, and Selfish Honesty).
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---Figure 3 about here--Attitudinal Trust. As in our previous studies, our behavioral and attitudinal
measures of trust were highly correlated, r(312) = .72, p < .001. A two-way ANOVA
revealed a main effect of Intentions, F(1,308) = 78.74, p < .001, such that participants
trusted their partners more in the Altruistic conditions (M = 4.07, SD = 1.79) than they
did in the Selfish conditions (M = 2.43, SD = 1.49).
Although lying did not significantly influence behavioral trust, it did influence
attitudinal trust. We found a main effect of Deception, F(1,308) = 5.58, p = .02 on
attitudinal trust, such that participants trusted their partner more in the Honesty conditions
(M = 3.46, SD = 1.82) than in the Lie conditions (M = 3.05, SD = 1.85). We find no
significant interaction between Deception x Intentions, F(1,308) = .19, p = .66.
Perceived Benevolence. A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of
Intentions, F(1,308) = 108.70, p < .001, and Deception, F(1,308) = 18.90, p < .01, on
perceived benevolence. Participants perceived their partner to be more benevolent in the
Altruistic conditions (M = 4.82, SD = 1.22) than in the Selfish conditions (M = 3.42, SD =
1.21) and to be more benevolent in the Honesty conditions (M = 4.36, SD = 1.27) than in
the Lie conditions (M = 3.89, SD = 1.49). We find no significant interaction between
Deception x Intentions, F(1,308) = .76, p = .36.
Perceived Deception. Consistent with our manipulation, participants also
perceived their partner to be more deceptive in the Lie conditions (M = 6.06, SD = 1.30)
than in the Honesty conditions (M = 2.06, SD = 1.41), F(1,255) = 680.02, p < .001. We
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find no effect of Intentions, F(1,308) = 1.54, p = .22, and we find no significant
Deception x Intentions interaction, F(1,308) = .28, p = .59.
Mediation Analyses.
We conducted a moderated mediation analysis using the bootstrap procedure
(Hayes, 2013; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) to test the process by which lying and
intentions influence trusting behavior.
We predicted that altruistic (and selfish) intentions would influence trusting
behavior, regardless of whether the target lied, and that this would be mediated by
perceived benevolence. Our mediation model included Intentions as the independent
variable, Deception as the moderator variable, Perceived Benevolence and Perceived
Deception as the mediator variables, and Trusting Behavior as the dependent measure.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that Perceived Benevolence mediates in the
expected direction in both the Lie conditions (Indirect Effect = 1.14, SE = .25; 95% CI
[0.70, 1.67]), and the Honesty conditions (Indirect Effect = .97, SE = .23; 95% CI [0.58,
1.44]), and Perceived Deception does not mediate (both confidence intervals for the
indirect effect include zero). These results are unchanged when we use Attitudinal Trust,
rather than Trusting Behavior, as the dependent measure. Taken together, these results
indicate that perceived benevolence, and not perceived deception, influences trust. That
is, deception does not harm trust; selfishness does. We present additional regression
analyses in Table 3.
---Table 3 about here--Discussion
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In Study 3a, Altruistic individuals were trusted far more than selfish individuals,
and this was true whether or not the counterpart’s claims were honest or deceptive.
Controlling for intentions, we find no direct effect of lying on trusting behavior in either
study. This is true even though lying is perceived as deceptive. We use moderated
mediation analysis and confirm that perceived benevolence is the primary mechanism
linking prosocial lying with increased trust. Interestingly, trust built on perceived
benevolence is not diminished by dishonest acts.

Study 3b
In Study 3b, we extend our investigation by including two control conditions in
our experiment. By including control conditions, we can disentangle the beneficial effects
of altruistic behavior from the harmful effects of selfish behavior. In our control
conditions, participants did not learn about the Sender’s decision in the deception game.
Method
Participants. For our 12 cell design, we recruited 1000 participants to participate
in an online study in exchange for payment via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Procedure and Materials. Study 3b was similar to Study 3a, with three notable
changes. First, we added two control conditions to disentangle the effects of altruism in
increasing trust from the effects of selfishness in decreasing trust. In the control
conditions, participants did not learn about the Sender’s decision in the deception game.
Second, for simplicity and ease of comprehension we used the Coin Flip game
rather than the Number Game for our manipulation of deception. Third, we
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counterbalanced the order of our behavioral trust measure and our attitudinal trust
measure.
In Study 3b, we randomly assigned participants to one of twelve experimental
conditions in a 2(Payment Structure: Altruistic Lying-Selfish Honesty vs. Selfish LyingAltruistic Honesty) x 3(Intentions: Altruistic, Selfish, Control) x 2(Order of measures:
behavior first vs. attitudes first) between-subjects design. Participants learned that the
Coin Flip Game had one of two possible payment structures. As in Study 3a, these
payment structures enabled us to manipulate whether deception or honesty was
associated with selfish or altruistic intentions. We used the same payment structures in
this study as those we used in Study 3a. The first payment structure reflected the choice
between Altruistic Lying and Selfish Honesty, and the second payment structure reflected
the choice between Selfish Lying and Altruistic Honesty.
Therefore, participants learned that the Sender either made the Altruistic decision
(which was associated with Lying or Honesty), made the Selfish decision (which was
associated with Lying or Honesty), or participants did not learn the Sender’s decision (the
control conditions). Half of the participants in the control condition learned that the Coin
Flip Game reflected the choice between altruistic lying and selfish honesty (the first
payment structure) and half learned that the Coin Flip Game reflected the choice between
selfish lying and altruistic honesty (the second payment structure).
We refer to these six experimental conditions as Altruistic Lie, Selfish Lie,
Altruistic Honesty, Selfish Honesty, Control 1 (learned about the Altruistic Lie-Selfish
Honesty payment structure, but did not learn about the Sender’s choice), and Control 2
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(learned about the Selfish Lie-Altruistic Honesty payment structure, but did not learn
about the Sender’s choice).
After participants learned about the Coin Flip Game [and the Sender’s decision],
participants played a trust game with the Sender.
The Trust Game. We referred to the trust game as “The Choice Game” in this
experiment. “The Choice Game” was similar to the trust games we used in our previous
studies. Participants had the choice to either “Keep $1” or trust their partner and “Pass
$1” in the trust game. If participants passed $1, the amount grew to $2.50 and their
partner had the opportunity to keep $2.50 or return half ($1.25).
As in our previous studies, participants had to pass a comprehension check to
complete the study.
Dependent variables.
Our primary dependent variable was trusting behavior, measured by the decision
to pass money in the trust game. Our measures of attitudinal trust, benevolence, and
deception were identical to the measures we used in Study 3a (r = .93, α’s > .88).
However, we did not measure perceived deception in the control conditions because
participants did not have any information about whether or not the Sender had deceived
their partner.
After participants submitted their responses, we collected demographic
information and asked participants what they thought the purpose of the study was. We
paid participants a bonus payment based upon their outcome in the trust game before we
dismissed them.
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Results
We report the results from 974 participants (40.2% female; Mage= 31 years, SD =
10.36) who passed the comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 26
participants failed the comprehension check at the start of the experiment and were
automatically eliminated from the study. None of our main results are affected by
question order, and we present our analyses collapsed across this factor. We present the
means and standard deviations of each of our scales, as well as the inter-scale correlation
matrix in Table 2.
Passing in the trust game. We first conducted a logistic regression on trusting
behavior, using Payment Structure, Intentions, and the Payment Structure x Intentions
interaction as independent variables. In our logistic regression, we coded Intentions such
that -1 = Selfish, 0 = Control, 1 = Altruistic. We coded Payment Structure such that
Altruistic Lying-Selfish Honesty =1 and Selfish Lying- Altruistic Honesty = -1.
We found a main effect of Intentions, (b = .938, p < .001); participants were
significantly more likely to pass money in the trust game in the Altruistic conditions
(69%) than in the Control conditions (47%); χ2 (1, N = 654) = 32.10, p < .01, and in the
Selfish conditions (25%), χ2 (1, N = 650) = 121.43, p < .01. Participants were also
significantly more likely to trust their partner in the Control conditions than they were in
the Selfish conditions, χ2 (1, N = 644) = 32.53, p < .01.
We found no effects of Payment Structure, nor did we find a significant Intentions
x Payment Structure interaction (ps > .86). In Figure 4, we display the percentage of
participants who passed money in each of the six experimental conditions.
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---Figure 4 about here--Attitudinal Trust. As in our previous studies, behavioral and attitudinal measures
of trust were highly correlated, r(974) = .71, p < .001, and followed a similar pattern. A
two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Intentions, F(2,968) = 240.74, p <
.001, such that participants trusted their partners more in the Altruistic conditions (M =
4.70, SD = 1.61) than the Control conditions (M = 3.22, SD = 1.78), t(653) = 11.86, p <
.001; and the Selfish conditions (M = 1.96, SD = 1.37), t(649) = 21.94, p < .001.
Participants were also more trusting of their partner in the Control conditions than in the
Selfish conditions, t(643) = 10.00, p < .001.
We found no main effect of Payment Structure, F(1, 968) = 0.25, p = .62. There
was, however, a significant Intentions x Payment Structure interaction, F(2, 968) = 4.30,
p < .05. Participants trusted individuals who told selfish lies (M = 1.73, SD = 1.09)
significantly less than individuals who were selfishly honest (M = 2.18, SD = 1.56),
t(319) = 2.54, p = .01, but we found no difference in trust between individuals who told
altruistic lies (M = 4.68, SD = 1.64) and individuals who were altruistically honest (M =
4.71, SD = 1.58), t(329) = 0.17, p = .87. We also found no difference in trust between the
two control conditions (M = 3.08, SD = 1.66 vs. M = 3.35, SD = 1.89), t(323) = 1.53, p =
.13. These results suggest that deception in the service of altruism does not undermine
trust, but that deception in the service of selfishness does harm trust.
Perceived Benevolence. Perceived benevolence followed the same pattern as
attitudinal trust. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Intentions,
F(2,968) = 377.80, p < .001, such that participants perceived their partner to be more
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benevolent in the Altruistic conditions (M = 5.20, SD = 1.01) than they did in the Control
conditions (M 4.29, SD = 0.98), t(653) = 11.18, p < .001, and the Selfish conditions (M =
2.98, SD = 1.20), t(649) = 27.24, p < .001. Participants also rated their partners as more
benevolent in the Control conditions than they did in the Selfish conditions, t(643) =
16.20, p < .001.
We also found a main effect of Payment Structure, F(1, 968) = 20.01, p < .001;
partners who faced the opportunity to tell altruistic lies were perceived to be more
benevolent (M = 4.30, SD = 1.32) than were partners who faced the opportunity to tell
selfish lies (M = 4.04, SD = 1.47). This effect was qualified by a significant Intensions x
Payment Structure interaction, F(2, 968) = 17.03, p < .001. Participants rated partners
who told selfish lies (M = 2.54, SD = 1.02) to be significantly less benevolent than
partners who were selfishly honest (M = 3.39, SD = 1.22), t(319) = 7.28, p < .001, but we
found no difference in perceived benevolence between partners who told altruistic lies (M
= 5.25, SD = 1.07) and partners who were altruistically honest (M = 5.15, SD = 0.94),
t(329) = 0.91, p = .36. In other words, selfish deception was perceived to be particularly
malevolent. There was no difference in perceived benevolence between the two control
conditions (M = 4.27, SD = 0.92 vs. M = 4.32, SD = 1.04), t(323) = 0.46, p = .65.
Perceived Deception. Consistent with our manipulation, a two-way ANOVA
revealed a significant Intentions x Payment Structure interaction, F(1, 645) = 1611.15, p
< .001, such that altruistic lies were perceived to be more deceptive (M = 5.17, SD =
1.33) than selfish honesty (M = 2.77, SD = 1.53), t(324) = 18.46, p < .001, and selfish
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lying was perceived to be more deceptive (M = 6.47, SD = 0.88) than altruistic honesty
(M = 1.51, SD = 0.76), t(323) = 38.15, p = .001.
We also found a main effect of Intentions, F(1, 645) = 195.15, p < .001, such that
selfishness was perceived to be more deceptive (M = 4.57, SD = 1.07) than altruism (M =
3.29, SD = 2.13). In other words, the same lie was perceived to be more deceptive when it
was associated with selfish, rather than altruistic, intentions. We found no main effect of
Payment Structure, F(1, 645) = 0.08, p = .78.
Discussion
In Study 3a, we demonstrate that deception itself has no effect on benevolencebased trust. In Study 3b, we include control conditions and document both a penalty for
selfishness and a benefit for altruism. Selfish intentions, whether they were associated
with honesty or deception, harmed trust; altruistic intentions, whether they were
associated with honesty or deception, increased trust.
Although we find no differences between altruistic lies and altruistic honesty in
Study 3b, we do find that selfish lies are penalized relative to selfish honesty. Individuals
may perceive honesty as the default decision, whereas lying may reflect a willful
departure that is more diagnostic of intentionality. In this case, lying to reap selfish
benefits may convey a stronger signal of malevolent intentions than honesty that yields
the same outcome.
Study 4
Our studies demonstrate that prosocial lies can increase trust. In Studies 1a, 1b, 2,
3a, and 3b, we measure trust using the trust game, and we conceptualized trust as the
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willingness to be vulnerable to another person when there is an opportunity for
exploitation. In Study 3a we demonstrate that trust behavior and trust attitudes are
mediated by perceptions of benevolence and are largely unaffected by deception. Taken
together, our studies demonstrate that prosocial deception increases benevolence-based
trust.
Benevolence-based trust characterizes some of our most important trust decisions
(e.g., Kim et al., 2006). The decision to loan money or property to another person, the
decision to rely on someone for emotional support, and the decision to share sensitive
information with someone reflect benevolence-based trust (e.g., McAllister, 1995; Currall
& Judge, 1995; Glaeser et al., 2000; Levin & Cross, 2004). Some trust decisions,
however, reflect perceptions of integrity rather than benevolence.
Integrity-based trust reflects the belief that a trustee adheres to ethical principles,
such as honesty and truthfulness (Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Mayer et al., 1995; Kim et al.,
2004). Integrity-based trust characterizes trust decisions that reflect perceptions of
veracity. For example, the decision to rely upon another person’s advice or the
information they provide reflects integrity-based trust. In fact, it is exactly this type of
trust that Rotter reflects in his definition of trust (1971: p. 444): “a generalized
expectancy…that the word, promise, verbal, or written statement of another individual or
group can be relied on.” For these types of trust decisions, expectations of honesty and
integrity may matter more than benevolence. As a result, prosocial lies may decrease
integrity-based trust. We explore this proposition in Study 4.
The Rely-or-Verify game.
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We introduce a new trust game, the Rely-or-Verify game, to capture integritybased trust. We designed the Rely-or-Verify game to reflect the decision to trust a
counterpart’s claim. For example, employers routinely face the decision of whether or not
to trust a prospective employee’s claim about their prior work experience. An employer
could either trust the prospective employee’s claim or verify the claim, at a cost.
Similarly, negotiators, relational partners, and parents can either trust or verify the claims
their counterparts make.
The decision to rely on another person’s claim primarily reflects perceptions of
integrity. That is, the decision to either rely upon or very another person’s claim is
fundamentally a judgment about the veracity of the claim: Is the target telling the truth?
Perceptions of benevolence may also influence this judgment (e.g., judgments of why the
target might or might not tell the truth), but perceptions of benevolence are likely to be of
secondary import relative to perceptions of integrity.
The following features characterize the Rely-or-Verify game: First, the trustee
derives a benefit from successful deception (e.g., by over-stating prior work experience).
Second, the truster cannot distinguish deception from honesty without verifying a claim.
Third, for the truster, relying on the trustee’s claim is risky, and fourth, verifying a claim
is costly.
In Rely-or-Verify, Player 1 (the trustee) makes a claim that is either accurate or
inaccurate. Player 2 (the truster) observes the claim and decides to either Rely (trust) or
Verify (not trust) the claim. If Player 1’s claim is inaccurate and Player 2 relies on the
claim, Player 1 earns a1 and Player 2 earns a2. If Player 1’s claim is inaccurate and
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Player 2 verifies it, Player 1 earns b1 and Player 2 earns b2. If Player 1’s claim is
accurate and Player 2 relies on it, Player 1 earns c1 and Player 2 earns c2. If Player 1’s
claim is accurate and Player 2 verifies it, Player 1 earns d1 and Player 2 earns d2.
The payoffs for Player 1 are structured such that a1 > c1 ≥ d1 > b1. For Player 1,
deception is risky; for Player 1, deception yields the highest payoff if Player 2 relies on
the deceptive claim, but it yields the lowest payoff if Player 2 verifies the deceptive
claim.
The payoffs for Player 2 are structured such that c2 > d2 ≥ b2 > a2. In other words,
Player 2 earns the highest payoff for relying on accurate information and the lowest
payoff for relying on inaccurate information. Verification is costly, but minimizes risk.
By verifying information, Player 2 learns the truth. Thus, verification yields the same
outcome for Player 2, regardless of whether or not Player 1 told the truth.
In the Rely-or-Verify game, Player 2 is always at least weakly better off when
Player 1 sends accurate information. That is, sending accurate information is both honest
and benevolent. Sending accurate information is also less risky for Player 1.Therefore,
Player 1’s motive for sending an honest message may include preferences for honesty,
benevolence, and risk. We depict the general form of Rely-or-Verify in Figure 5.
---Figure 5 about here--Pilot Study
We report results from a pilot study to demonstrate that trust decisions in Rely-orVerify reflect perceptions of trustworthiness and integrity. In our study, we term Player 1
the “Red Player” and Player 2 the “Blue Player.” The Red Player sends a message to the
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Blue Player. In this case, the Red Player reports whether or not the amount of money in a
jar of coins is odd or even. The Blue Player (the truster) received this message and can
either Rely on the message or Verify the message. In our study, the payoffs for Player 1
(Red Player) were: a1 = $1.5, > c1 = $0.75 ≥ d1 = $0.5 > b1 = $0; the payoffs for Player 2
(Blue Player) were: c2 = $1.5 > d2 = $1 ≥ b2 = $1 > a2 = $0.
With this payoff structure for the Rely-or-Verify game, there is no pure strategy
equilibrium. However, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which Player 1 (Red
Player) provides accurate information with probability 1/3 and Player 2 (Blue Player)
relies on that information with probability 2/5. We use this equilibrium as a benchmark in
Study 4; if participants are perfectly rational and risk-neutral, they would choose Rely
40% of the time. We provide the full instructions and the exact game we used in
Appendix A; we include the solution for the game’s equilibrium in Appendix B.
Participants. We recruited 198 participants from a city in the northeastern United
States to participate in a pilot study of Rely-or-Verify in exchange for a $10 show-up fee.
Method. Participants in the pilot study read the full instructions of the Rely-orVerify game (see Appendix A) and were assigned to the role of the “Blue Player.”
Participants had to pass a comprehension check in order to complete the entire study.
Participants who failed the comprehension check twice were automatically removed from
the experiment.
Participants who passed the comprehension check received a message from a
confederate “Red Player,” informing them that the amount of money in the jar was either
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odd or even. The decision to Rely represents our behavioral measure of integrity-based
trust.
After participants made a decision to Rely or Verify, they rated how much they
trusted their partner, and they rated their partner’s benevolence and integrity. We
measured trusting attitudes using three items (α = .84): “I trust my partner,” “I am willing
to make myself vulnerable to my partner,” and “I am confident that my partner sent me
an accurate message;” 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree.” We measured
perceived benevolence using the same scale we used in Studies 3a and 3b (α = .78), and
we measured perceived integrity using three items (α = .66): “This person has a great deal
of integrity,” “I can trust this person’s word,” and “This person cares about honesty and
truth;” 1= “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree.”
After participants made Rely-or-Verify decisions and rated their partner, they
answered demographic questions, were paid, and dismissed.
Results. Nearly all of the participants (98%) passed the comprehension check and
completed the entire study. A total of 31.3% of participants chose Rely and trusted their
partner. This result suggests that without knowing any information about their
counterpart, participants in the pilot study were relatively distrusting. They chose Rely
less often than the mixed-strategy equilibrium would predict (40%). We did not identify
any gender differences in behavior.
Importantly, the decision to Rely was closely related to perceptions of
trustworthiness, r(194) = .71, p < .001. Trusting behavior in Rely-or-Verify was
correlated with both perceived benevolence, r(194) = .48, p < .001, and perceived
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integrity r(194) = .52, p < .001. In our main study, we demonstrate that integrity is the
primary driver of behavior in the Rely-or-Verify game.
Main Study
In our main study, participants learned about a counterpart who had either told
prosocial lies or who had been honest in a series of prior interactions. After learning this
information, participants played either the trust game or the Rely-or-Verify game with
their counterpart.
Method
Participants. We recruited 500 participants to participate in an online study in
exchange for payment via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Procedure and Materials. Participants in Study 4 learned about a series of
decisions a confederate counterpart made as a Sender in the Coin Flip Game. This was
the same Coin Flip Game we used in Studies 1a, 1b, 2, and 3b. Participants then played
either the trust game or the Rely-or-Verify game with this counterpart. We randomly
assigned participants to one of four cells from a 2(Deception: Prosocial lie vs. Honesty) x
2(Game: Trust game vs. Rely-or-Verify) between-subjects design.
In Study 4, participants learned that the Sender had played the Coin Flip Game
four times with four different partners. We altered the payoffs associated with deception
in each of the four rounds of the game so that we could include both altruistic and
mutually beneficial lies in a single manipulation. By using repeated behavior to
manipulate prosocial deception, we strengthened our manipulation. This manipulation
made it clear that the Sender was either committed to honesty (telling the truth even when
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it was costly for themselves) or to benevolence (helping the Receiver even when it was
costly for themselves). Specifically, participants learned about four decisions the Sender
had made in four rounds of The Coin Flip Game. In rounds 1 and 3, the Sender faced the
choice between an altruistic lie and selfish honesty. In rounds 2 and 4, the Sender faced
the choice between a mutually beneficial lie and mutually harmful honesty. Participants
learned that the Sender made one of the following two sets of decisions: Prosocial Lies
{Altruistic lie, mutually beneficial lie, altruistic lie, mutually beneficial lie} or Honesty
{Selfish truth, mutually harmful truth, selfish truth, mutually harmful truth}. We include
the payoffs associated with each choice in Table 4.
---Table 4 about here--After participants learned about the Sender’s four decisions, participants played
either the trust game or the Rely-or-Verify game with the Sender. The trust game we used
was identical to the version of the trust game we used in Study 3b. The version of the
Rely-or-Verify game we used was identical to the version we used in the pilot study.
Dependent variables.
Our main dependent variable was trusting behavior, measured by the decision to
pass money in the trust game (benevolence-based trust) or Rely in the Rely-or-Verify
game (integrity-based trust). Our measures of attitudinal trust for Rely-or-Verify were
identical to the measures we used in the pilot study. We adapted the wording of these
items to create a parallel measure of attitudinal trust for the trust game (α= .92). We
provide all of the items and anchors we used in this study in Appendix C.
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We measured perceived deception with the same measures we used in our prior
studies (α = .94). We measured perceived benevolence as we did before, but to be sure to
distinguish benevolence from integrity, we eliminated the item, “This person has good
intentions;” r(457) = .72, p < .001.
After participants submitted their responses, we asked a recall question, collected
demographic information, and asked participants what they thought the purpose of the
study was. The next day, we followed up with participants to pay them a bonus payment
based upon their decisions.
Results
We report results from 457 participants (31.6% female; Mage= 31 years, SD =
9.87) who passed all comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 43
participants failed the comprehension check and were automatically removed from the
study.13 We present the means and standard deviations of each of our scales, as well as
the inter-scale correlation matrix in Table 5.
---Table 5 about here--Trusting behavior. We first conducted a logistic regression on trusting behavior
using Deception, Game, and the Deception x Game interaction as independent variables.
We found no main effect of Deception or Game (ps > .73).
Importantly, we found a significant Deception x Game interaction; b = .37, p <
.01, such that prosocial lying increased benevolence-based trust and harmed integrity-

13

Participants dropped out of the experiment in the Rely-or-Verify game at a higher rate,
because the comprehension check was more difficult to pass. Although we randomly
assigned participants to condition, this resulted in uneven cell sizes.
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based trust. Specifically, consistent with our prior studies, participants were more likely
to pass money to their partners in the trust game in the Prosocial Lie condition (57%)
than they were in the Honesty condition (40%), χ2 (1, N = 262) = 7.41, p < .01.
Importantly, we find the opposite pattern of results for behavior in the Rely-or-Verify
game; participants were less likely to rely on their partners in the Prosocial Lie condition
(37%) than they were in the Honesty condition (57%); χ2 (1, N = 195) = 7.75, p < .01.
Notably, in the Rely-or-Verify game, participants in the Honesty condition were
significantly more likely to rely on their partners than the equilibrium would predict
(57% vs. 40%, one-sample test of proportion: p < .001) or than we observed in our pilot
study (57% vs. 31%, one-sample test of proportion: p < .001). In this case, a history of
honest behavior increased integrity-based trust. In contrast, behavior in the Rely-orVerify game in the Prosocial Lie condition did not differ from the equilibrium prediction
(37% vs. 40%, one-sample test of proportion: p = .59) or the behavior we observed in our
pilot study (37% vs. 31%, one-sample test of proportion: p = .17). We depict these results
in Figure 6.
--Figure 6 about here
--Attitudinal Trust. Results from our attitudinal trust measures parallel the results
from our behavioral measures. Trusting attitudes were highly correlated with trusting
behavior in both games, each r ≥ .80 (see Table 5).
A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant Deception x Game interaction,
F(1,453) = 17.57, p < .001, such that prosocial lying increased trusting attitudes in the
trust game, but decreased trusting attitudes in the Rely-or-Verify game.
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Specifically, participants trusted the prosocial liar more than the honest individual
in the Trust game conditions (M = 4.11, SD = 2.08 vs. M = 3.54, SD = 1.86), t(261) =
2.48, p = .014, but trusted the prosocial liar less than the honest individual in the Rely-orVerify conditions (M = 3.57, SD = 1.79 vs. M = 4.46, SD = 1.56), t(194) = 3.38, p < .01.
We did not find a significant main effect of Deception, F(1,453) = 1.21, p = .27, or
Game, F(1,453) = .89, p = .34.
Perceived Benevolence. Ratings of perceived benevolence followed a similar
pattern. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant Deception x Game interaction,
F(1,453) = 5.93, p = .015, but no main effect of Deception, F(1,453) = 1.89, p = .17, or
Game, F(1,453) = .15, p = .70. Specifically, participants judged the prosocial liar to be
more benevolent than the honest individual in the Trust game conditions (M = 4.72, SD =
1.74 vs. M = 4.16, SD = 1.53), t(261) = 2.92, p < .01, but there was no difference between
the prosocial liar condition and the honest condition in the Rely-or-Verify game (M =
4.30, SD = 1.51 vs. M = 4.46, SD = 1.32), t(194) = 0.70, p = .48. It is possible that
individuals did not rate the prosocial liar as more benevolent in the Rely-or-Verify game
because of the nature of the game. Decisions in the Rely-or-Verify game reflect both
benevolence and honesty, and playing the Rely-or-Verify game may have caused
participants to perceive honest individuals as more benevolent.
Perceived Deception. As expected, individuals who told prosocial lies were
perceived to be more deceptive (M = 5.81, SD = 1.17) than individuals who were honest
(M = 1.75, SD = 1.11), F(1, 453) = 1393.2, p < .001. We did not find a main effect of
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Game, F(1,453) = .60, p = .44, or a significant Deception x Game interaction, F(1,453) =
.04, p = .84.
Discussion
Results from this study demonstrate that prosocial lies differentially affect
benevolence-based and integrity-based trust. We find that relative to a history of honesty,
a history of prosocial deception increases trust rooted in benevolence, but harms trust
rooted in integrity.
The prevailing behavioral measure of trust, the trust game, reflects benevolencebased trust. To measure integrity-based trust, we introduce a new tool, the Rely-or-Verify
game. Although trustworthy behavior in the Rely-or-Verify game reflects perceptions of
both honesty and benevolence, the trust decisions we observed were significantly more
sensitive to signals of honesty than they were to signals of benevolence. We believe that
this finding reflects the nature of the trusting decision in the Rely-or-Verify game; in this
game, the decision to trust reflects beliefs about the veracity of the claim.
It is possible, however, that with different payoffs or different signals of
benevolence and integrity, perceptions of benevolence could play a more significant role
in trust behavior. Future research should explore how decisions in the Rely-or-Verify
game change as a function of prior behavior, incentives, and perceptions of benevolence.
General Discussion
Across our studies, we demonstrate that lying can increase trust. In particular, we
find that prosocial lies, false statements told with the intention of benefitting others,
increase benevolence-based trust. In Study 1a, participants trusted counterparts more
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when the counterpart told them an altruistic lie than when the counterpart told the truth.
In Study 1b, we replicate this result and rule out direct reciprocity as an alternative
mechanism. In Study 1b, participants observed, rather than experienced deception.
In Studies 2, 3a, and 3b, we examine different types of lies. We find that
participants trusted individuals who told non-altruistic, prosocial lies and mutually
beneficial lies more than individuals who told truths that harmed others. Our findings
reveal that benevolence, demonstrating concern for others, can be far more important for
fostering trust than either honesty or selflessness. In fact, we find that deception per se,
does surprisingly little to undermine trust behavior in the trust game.
In Study 4, we investigate how prosocial lying influences distinct types of trust.
We introduce a new game, the Rely-or-Verify game to capture integrity-based trust. We
demonstrate that the same actions can have divergent effects on benevolence-based and
integrity-based trust. Specifically, we find that relative to honesty, prosocial lying
increases benevolence-based trust, but harms integrity-based trust.
Contributions and Implications
In prior trust research, scholars have singled out deception as particularly harmful
for trust. This work, however, has conflated deception with self-serving intentions. We
find that although deception can exacerbate the negative inferences associated with
selfish actions, deception does not undermine the positive inferences associated with
prosocial actions. Our findings demonstrate that the relationship between deception and
trust is far more complicated than prior work has assumed. Lying, per se, does not always
harm trust.
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Our research contributes to the deception and trust literatures in three ways. First,
we highlight the importance of studying a broader range of deceptive behaviors.
Prosocial lying is pervasive, but we know surprisingly little about the interpersonal
consequences of prosocial lies. Although most research assumes that deception is
harmful, we document potential benefits of deception. By signaling benevolence,
prosocial lies can increase trust and may also afford other inter-personal benefits.
Second, we provide insight into the antecedents of trust. Trust scholars have
assumed that both integrity and benevolence are antecedents of trust, yet little research
has investigated when each of these values matters. Our research suggests that
benevolence may be the primary concern for many—but not all— trust decisions. We are
the first to independently manipulate benevolence and honesty and draw causal
inferences about how they each impact trust.
Third, we demonstrate that identical actions can have divergent effects on
different trust decisions. Scholars have used the term “trust” to refer to a broad range of
behaviors. For example, trust has been used to describe the willingness to hire someone
(Kim et al., 2004), to give someone responsibility without oversight (Kim et al., 2004;
Mayer & Davis, 1999), to rely on someone’s word (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982;
Rotter, 1971), and to expose oneself to financial risk (Berg et al., 1995; Pillutla et al.,
2003; Schweitzer et al., 2006; McCabe et al., 2003; Glaeser et al., 2000; Malhotra &
Murninghan, 2002; Malhotra, 2004). Our findings suggest that different types of trust
may guide these decisions, and that the same background information may influence
these decisions in very different ways.
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Our research has both methodological and managerial implications.
Methodologically, we introduce a new tool to measure trust. Prior research has relied on
the trust game, a tool that measures benevolence-based trust. Although benevolencebased trust underscores many trust decisions, in some trust decisions perceptions of
integrity may be more important than benevolence. The Rely-or-Verify game provides
scholars with a tool to measure integrity-based trust and offers several distinct advantages
over the traditional trust game. For example, in contrast with the trust game in which the
truster moves first, the truster in the Rely-or-Verify game moves second. By moving
second, the Rely-or-Verify game eliminates alternative motivations for engaging in what
might appear to be trusting behavior. For example, by moving first, trusters in the trust
game may pass money for strategic reasons, such as to engender reciprocity (Chou,
Halevy, & Murnighan, 2011), or for social preferences reasons, such as to promote
fairness or altruism (e.g., Ashraf et al., 2006).
Prescriptively, our findings suggest that we should reconsider how we
characterize deception. Parents, leaders and politicians often publicly and emphatically
denounce lying—even though they often engage in it (Nyberg, 1993; Heyman, Luu, Lee,
2009; Grover, 2005). Acknowledging the benefits of prosocial lies could free individuals
of (at least some of) this hypocrisy. In fact, authority figures could explicitly embrace
certain types of deception and teach others when and how to lie. This would reflect a
stark contrast to the current practice of asserting that lying is universally wrong, while
modeling that it is often right.
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Managers should also consider if honesty is always the best policy. Honesty,
although often considered a virtue, in some cases may be selfish and mean-spirited. In
many conversations, individuals make a trade-off between being honest and being kind.
In order to engender trust, sometimes benevolence may be far more important than
honesty.
Limitations and Future Directions
In our studies, we experimentally manipulated behavior in the deception game,
which afforded us experimental control. By altering the monetary payoffs associated with
honesty and lies, we were able to send unambiguous signals about the intentions
associated with each lie. This enables us to draw causal inferences about how prosocial
intentions and deception differentially influence distinct forms of trust. Consistent with
prior research (e.g. Bracht & Feltovich, 2009), we find that information about a potential
trustee’s past behavior dramatically influences trust.
However, many prosocial lies are characterized by features that we did not
capture in our experiments. For example, we study lies that generated monetary gains.
Although some lies generate monetary outcomes, many lies, and prosocial lies in
particular, are motivated by the desire to protect people’s feelings (DePaulo, 1992).
These lies may be perceived to be more innocuous and be more likely to foster emotional
security, an important component of trust in close relationships (Rempel et al., 1985).
Furthermore, lies told to avoid losses may be perceived to be more benevolent than lies
told to accrue gains. Avoiding a loss is often much more psychologically powerful than
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generating a gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and thus, deceived parties may be
particularly grateful to be the beneficiaries of these types of lies.
In our studies, the motives and outcomes associated with deception were clear. In
practice, however, both motives and the link between acts and outcomes may be difficult
to gauge. In some cases, people may even attribute selfish motives to prosocial acts
(Critcher & Dunning, 2011; Fein, 1996; Newman & Cain, 2014; Miller, 1999; Lin-Healy
& Small, 2013). For example, Wang and Murnighan (2013) found that some lies told to
help others, such as a lie told to a medical patient, can be perceived to be low in
benevolence and can harm trust, even when the intentions were prosocial.
Our experiments were also free of social context. Although this feature of our
investigation enables us to draw clear casual inferences, future work should explore
prosocial lies within richer social contexts. It is possible that the effects we observe will
be moderated by situational norms, existing relationships, and prior experience. Another
critical factor that is likely to influence perceptions of prosocial lies is the target’s ability
to change and adapt following critical feedback. For example, a husband who tells his
wife that she looks great in an unflattering dress may appear benevolent when his wife
has no alternative dresses to wear (e.g., out on vacation). However, if the husband is
merely impatient and the wife could easy change clothes, this same lie may appear far
less benevolent. Importantly, targets, observers, and deceivers may judge the benevolence
of the same lie very differently.
The relative importance of benevolence and honesty may also change over time.
For example, in early stages of relationship development, emotional security may be a
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primary concern, and prosocial lying may be particularly beneficial. In late stages of
relationships, honesty may be a stronger signal of intimacy than kindness. Perhaps as
relationships develop, the role of prosocial lying will change. It is also possible that
prosocial lies have detrimental long-term consequences. If an individual develops a
reputation for dishonesty, prosocial lies may become less credible. We call for future
work to explore the dynamic interplay between trust and prosocial lies.
It is possible that our attitudes towards deception do not reflect intrinsic
preferences for honesty and truth, but instead reflect our expectations of different
relational partners. We may expect people in some roles to support and help us, but
expect others to be objective and provide us with accurate information. Understanding
how the nature of prosocial deception and trust differs across relationships is an
important next step for trust research.
Gender and power may also influence our preferences for honesty and kindness.
For example, women tell more prosocial lies than men (Erat & Gneezy, 2012) and are
generally expected to be more polite than men (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Although we
identified no gender differences in our studies, there may be circumstances in which
women suffer greater backlash for impolite honesty than men. This may also be the case
for low-power individuals who are expected to conform to politeness norms (Brown &
Levinson, 1987). Sanctions for impolite honesty may have detrimental consequences in
organizations by curbing the flow of information and curtailing employee voice.
Conclusion
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We challenge the assumption that deception harms trust. Prior studies of
deception have confounded lying with selfish intentions. By disentangling the effects of
intentions from deception, we demonstrate that the relationship between deception and
trust is far more complicated than prior work has assumed. Although prosocial lies harm
integrity-based trust, prosocial lies increase benevolence-based trust. In many cases,
intentions matter far more than veracity.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A. Materials for Rely-or-Verify (Study 4)
Instructions to participants in Study 4:
As BLUE Player, you will report whether the amount of money in the jar of coins below
is ODD or EVEN:

If you correctly report whether the amount of money in the jar is ODD or EVEN, you
will earn $1.50. If you inaccurately report if the amount of money in the jar is ODD or
EVEN, you will earn $0.
Your partner is RED Player. RED Player's bonus payment also depends on your
choice.
[page break]
You will be asked to report whether the amount of money in this jar of coins is ODD or
EVEN.
1. Before you do, you will receive a message from RED Player.
 RED Player knows the amount of money in the jar.
 RED Player will send you one of the following two messages: "The amount of
money in the jar is ODD." or "The amount of money in the jar is EVEN."
 The message that RED Player sends could be accurate or inaccurate.
 You will not know whether or not the message is accurate or inaccurate when you
make the choice to RELY on the message or VERIFY the message.
2. Once you've received the message from RED Player, you can choose
to RELY on RED Player's message, or you can VERIFY the message.
3. If you choose RELY, you will be paid based on whether or not RED Player gave
you accurate or inaccurate information.
 If RED Player gave you accurate information and you RELY on it, you will
correctly report whether the amount of money in the jar is ODD or EVEN,
and you will earn $1.50. RED Player will earn $0.75.
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If RED Player gave you inaccurate information and you RELY on it, you will
incorrectly report whether the amount of money in the jar is ODD or EVEN,
and you will earn $0. RED Player will earn $1.50.

4. If you choose VERIFY, $0.50 will be subtracted from your total earnings and you will
learn the correct amount of money in the jar.
 If RED Player gave you accurate information and you VERIFY it, you will earn
$1 ($1.50 for the correct answer - $0.50 cost of verification) and RED Player will
earn $0.50.
 If RED Player gave you inaccurate information and you VERIFY it, you will
earn $1 ($1.50 for the correct answer - $0.50 cost of verification) and RED
Player will earn $0.
Your decisions are represented in the figure below.

Comprehension check questions for Rely-or-Verify:
1. Suppose RED Player sends you an accurate message. Will you earn more if you
RELY or VERIFY?
2. Suppose RED Player sends you an inaccurate message. Will you earn more if you
RELY or VERIFY?
3. How much does it cost to VERIFY?
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4. If you RELY on RED Player's message, would RED Player earn more if s/he had
sent a message that was accurate or inaccurate?
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Appendix B. Solution to Mixed Strategy Equilibrium for Rely-or-Verify


The Rely-or-Verify game took the following form in our studies:
Blue Player
(Participant)
R
A
Red Player
(Confederate)




I

.75, 1.5

.5, 1

1.5, 0

0, 1

Let p be the probability the Red Player (the confederate) chooses to send an
accurate message (A); 1-p is the probability that s/he sends an inaccurate message
(I)
Let q be the probability that the Blue Player (the participant) chooses to rely on
the message (R); 1-q is the probability that s/he verifies the message (V)

p
1-p



V

A
I

q

1-q

R

V

.75, 1.5

.5, 1

1.5, 0

0, 1

Solving for mixed strategy equilibrium:
𝑝(1.5) + (1 − 𝑝)(0) = 𝑝(1) + (1 − 𝑝)(1)
𝑝 = 2/3
𝑞(. 75) + (1 − 𝑞)(. 5) = 𝑞(1.5) + (1 − 𝑞)(0)
𝑞 = 2/5



Red Player will send an Accurate message with probability 2/3 and send an
Inaccurate message with probability 1/3
215



Blue Player will Rely with probability 2/5 and Verify with probability 3/5

Appendix C. Items used to measure attitudinal trust in Trust game and Rely-or-Verify
(Study 4)




I trust my partner. [Rely-or-Verify uses identical measure].
I am willing to make myself vulnerable to my partner. [Rely-or-Verify uses
identical measure].
I am confident that my partner will return half the money. [I am confident that my
partner sent me an accurate message.]

Note. All items were anchored at 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree.”
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Tables
Table 1. Payoffs associated with lying and honesty in Studies 1a, 1b, 2, 3a, and 3b

Study 1a

Experienced or
Observed
Deception

Deception
Game

Experienced

Coin Flip

Payoffs
associated
with Truth
(Option A)

Payoffs
associated
with Lie
(Option B)

Sender

$2.00

$1.75

Receiver

$0.00

$1.00

Sender

$2.00

$1.75

Receiver

$0.00

$1.00

Sender

$2.00

$2.00

Receiver

$0.00

$1.00

Mutually
beneficial
Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$2.25
$1.00

Altruistic
Lie

Sender

$2.00

$1.75

Receiver

$0.00

$1.00

Sender
Receiver

$1.75
$1.00

$2.00
$0.00

Type of Lie
Altruistic
Lie

Game

Study 1b

Observed

Coin Flip

Altruistic
Lie

Game
Study 2

Observed

Coin Flip

Prosocial
Lie

Game

Studies
3a and 3ba

Observed

Number
Game (3a)
Coin Flip
Game (3b)

Selfish Lie

Note. a Study 3b also included two control conditions. In control condition 1, the Sender
faced the Altruistic Lie choice set, and in control condition 2, the Sender faced the Selfish
Lie choice set. However, in both control conditions, the Sender’s decision was unknown.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations for measures in Studies 1, 2, and 3
Study 1a
Scale

M(SD)

1. Trusting behavior

43.8%a

2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

1

2

3

3.23 (1.91)
3.82 (1.48)
4.10 (1.84)

0.88**
0.51**
0.09

0.64**
0.08

-0.08

Study 1b
Scale

M(SD)

1

2

3

1. Trusting behavior

29.6%a

2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

3.08(1.65)
3.95 (1.25)
4.15 (1.72)

0.70**
0.47**
-0.11+

0.61**
-0.13*

-0.29**

Study 2
Scale

M(SD)

1

2

3

1. Trusting behavior

50.2%a

2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

3.41(1.88)
4.10 (1.33)
4.13 (1.86)

0.73**
0.49**
0.08

0.63**
0.01

0.05

Study 3a
Scale

M(SD)

1

2

3

a

1. Trusting behavior

36.2%

2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

3.25(1.84)
4.12 (1.40)
4.09 (2.42)

0.72**
0.41**
-0.12*

0.67**
-0.25**

-0.34**

Study 3b
Scale

M(SD)

1

2

3

1. Trusting behavior

47.2%a

2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

3.31(1.95)
4.16 (1.40)
3.92 (2.27)

0.72**
0.68**
-0.26**

0.68**
-0.26**

-0.38**

Notes. a This number represents the percent of participants who chose to pass money in
the trust game. ** p < .001, *p < .05, +p < .10.
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Table 3. Supplemental regressions for Study 3a
Logistic regression on Trusting Behavior
(1)
(2)
Intentions,
Intentions,
Deception,
Deception,
Intentions
Intentions x
x
Deception,
Deception
Perceived
Benevolence

(3)
Intentions,
Deception,
Intentions
x
Deception,
Perceived
Deception

(4)
Intentions,
Deception,
Intentions x
Deception,
Perceived
Benevolence
Perceived
Deception

Constant

-.601**
(0.122)

-3.887**
(0.601)

0.766+
(0.411)

-2.973***
(0.839)

Intentions

0.498**
(0.122)

0.019
(0.151)

0.482**
(0.125)

0.042
(0.153)

Deception

-0.002
(0.122)

0.177
(0.134)

.697**
(0.244)

.506+
(0.261)

0.032
(0.122)

-0.005
(0.131)

0.025
(0.125)

-0.005
(0.132)

Intentions x
Deception

Perceived
Benevolence

0.769**
(0.133)

Perceived
Deception

R-Squared

0.054

0.165

0.709***
(0.139)

-0.343**
(0.100)

-0.166
(0.111)

0.093

0.181

Notes. ** p ≤ .01,* p <. 05. +p < .10. Standard errors are in parentheses. Independent
variables used in each regression are listed in the top row. Deception was contrast-coded:
-1 = Honest, 1 = Lie. Intentions was contrast-coded: -1 = Selfish, 1 = Prosocial.
Table 4. The payoffs associated with prosocial lying in Study 4
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Table 4. The payoffs associated with prosocial lying in Study 4

Type of Lie

Payoffs associated
with Truth

Payoffs associated
with Lie

Round 1

Altruistic Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.25

$1.50
$1.00

Round 2

Mutuallybeneficial Lie

Sender
Receiver

$1.50
$0.25

$2.00
$1.00

Round 3

Altruistic Lie

Sender
Receiver

$1.25
$0.25

$1.00
$1.00

Round 4

Mutuallybeneficial Lie

Sender
Receiver

$1.00
$0.25

$1.25
$1.00
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics and correlations for measures in Study 4

Trust game
Scale

M(SD)

1

2

3

a

1. Trusting behavior
2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

48.50%
3.82 (1.99) 0.84**
4.44 (1.55) 0.49**
3.83 (2.34) 0.07

0.70**
0.03

0.06

Rely-or-Verify
Scale

M(SD)

2

3

1. Trusting behavior
2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

47.20% b
4.01 (1.73) 0.80**
4.38 (1.42) 0.41**
3.76 (2.31) -0.25**

0.65**
-0.39**

-0.21**

1

Notes. **p < .001.
This number represents the percent of participants who chose to pass money in the trust
game.
b
This number represents the percent of participants who chose Rely in Rely-or-Verify.
a
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Figures
Figure 1. The effect of altruistic lying on trusting behavior (Studies 1a and 1b).

Trusting Behavior

(% of participants who passed in the trust game)

Honesty

Altruistic Lie

56%

39%
32%

21%

Study 1a - Experienced Deception

Study 1b - Observed Deception

Note. Main effect of altruistic lying in both studies: ps < .01.
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Figure 2. The effect of prosocial and mutually beneficial lying on trusting behavior
(Study 2)

Trusting Behavior

(% of participants who passed in the trust game)

Honesty

Lie

69%

59%

37%

36%

Mutually Beneficial Lie

Prosocial Lie

Note. Effect of lying for mutually-beneficial and prosocial lies: each p < .01.
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Figure 3. Trusting behavior (Study 3a).

Trusting Behavior

(% of participants who passed in the trust game)

Honesty

Lie

47%

26%

48%

24%

Selfish Intentions

Altruistic Intentions

Note. Main effect of intentions: p < .01. Main effect of lying: ns.
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Figure 4. Trusting behavior (Study 3b).
Payment Structure:
Altruistic Lie-Selfish Honesty

Altruistic Honesty-Selfish Lie

Trusting Behavior

(% of participants who passed in the trust game)

71%
66%

49%
44%

28%
22%
Selfish
Honesty

Selfish
Lie

Selfish Intentions

Control 1 Control 2

Altruistic Altruistic
Honesty
Lie

Control (No Information)

Altruistic Intensions

Note. Main effect of decision (Selfish, Control, Altruistic): p < .01. Main effect of
payment structure: ns.
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Figure 5. The Rely-or-Verify game (Study 4)

Note. This depicts the general form of Rely-or-Verify. The exact game we used in Study 4
is depicted in Appendix A. In Rely-or-Verify, the payoffs for Player 1 are structured such
that a1 > c1 ≥ d1 > b1. The payoffs for Player 2 are structured such that c2 > d2 ≥ b2 > a2.
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Figure 6. Trusting behavior (Study 4).

Trusting Behavior

(% of participants who chose "Pass" or "Rely")

Honesty

Prosocial Lies
57%

57%

40%

37%

Trust Game

Rely-or-Verify Game

Note. Deception x Game interaction: p < .01. Main effects of deception and game: ns.
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CHAPTER 4

YOU CAN HANDLE (SPEAKING) THE TRUTH:
MISPREDICTING THE INTRAPERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF HONESTY AND
KINDNESS

Emma E. Levine
Taya R. Cohen
ABSTRACT

Many of our most difficult conversations involve navigating the tension between
honesty and kindness. In the present research, we explore the intrapersonal consequences
of communicating honestly and kindly by randomly assigning individuals to be honest,
kind, or conscious of their communication (our control condition) in every conversation
with every person in their life for three days. We examine the impact of our interventions
on predicted and actual hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. We document three main
results. First, individuals predict that being honest will be far less enjoyable (i.e., less
hedonically rewarding) than being kind, causing individuals to avoid communicating
honestly. Second, this prediction is incorrect: the experience of being honest is more
enjoyable than individuals expect. Although honesty is less enjoyable than kindness, this
difference is significantly smaller than individuals expect. Third, being honest yields
greater meaning (i.e., eudaimonic well-being) and has greater long-term impact on
individuals’ lives than being kind or conscious of one’s communication. This research
sheds new light on the relationships among communication, morality, and well-being.
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YOU CAN HANDLE (SPEAKING) THE TRUTH:
MISPREDICTING THE INTRAPERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF HONESTY AND
KINDNESS

Honesty and kindness are two of the most fundamental moral values in human
life. Honesty and kindness are among the most important traits for interpersonal
judgment (Anderson, 1968) and they dominate philosophical and religious teaching
across time and cultures. For example, the Judeo-Christian Bible contains statements both
prohibiting lies (e.g., “Thou shalt not bear false witness,” Exodus 20:16; “Thou shalt not
lie to one another,” Leviticus 19:11) and mandating kindness (“Be kind and
compassionate to one another,” Ephesians 4:32).
Despite the theoretical importance of these two values, we know very little about
the consequences of honesty or kindness in everyday life. This reflects a significant gap
between normative and behavioral ethics. For centuries, ethicists have touted the moral
significance of different virtuous behaviors, and only recently have psychologists
examined the experience and consequences of enacting or violating these virtues (Dunn,
Aknin, Norton, 2008; Emmons & McCullough, 2003; Gino, Kouchaki, & Galinsky,
2015; Lyubomirsky, Shelden, & Schkade, 2005). And although the field of behavioral
ethics has made enormous contributions to our understanding of human behavior over the
past several decades, this research has not been able to offer insight into how individuals
should balance competing moral values to improve their own well-being (Barry & Rehel,
2014). Instead, the vast majority of behavioral ethics research examines when and why
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people behave unethically (see Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006; Bazerman & Gino,
2012 for reviews).
The present research departs from prior work on behavioral ethics by examining
the psychological consequences of enacting distinct moral values. We examine the
consequences of honesty and kindness not only because they are two of the most
important and salient moral values, but also because they frequently collide in routine
human communication (Goffman, 1967; Brown & Levison, 1987). Whenever individuals
are faced with opportunities to communicate unpleasant information to others, they
implicitly face tradeoffs between being completely honest and being kind. People
routinely face this conflict in their personal lives when deciding how to communicate
with friends and family members, and in their professional lives when deciding how to
deliver negative news and critical feedback. Though this tension is part of everyday life,
navigating it can elicit distress and anxiety (e.g., Molinsky & Margolis, 2005). As a
result, individuals often avoid engaging in conversations in which honesty and kindness
appear to conflict (e.g., Rosen & Tesser, 1970). In this research, we primarily focus on
this conflict and compare the consequences of honesty to the consequences of kindness.
Although we recognize that these values need not always be in conflict, one goal of this
research is to understand whether focusing on either honesty or kindness is more
effective for promoting well-being during difficult conversations.
In a large-scale field experiment, we examine the predicted and actual effects of
honesty and kindness on psychological well-being. We examine two types of well-being:
hedonic well-being and eudaimonic well-being. Hedonic well-being is characterized by
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pleasure, enjoyment, and happiness. In the hedonic view, well-being consists of the
presence of pleasure and the absence of pain (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Eudaimonic wellbeing is characterized by meaning, fulfillment, and individual autonomy. In the
eudaimonic view, well-being consists of the actualization of human potentials, rather than
pleasure (Waterman, 1990, 1993). To our knowledge, this is the first research to examine
how different moral principles and styles of communication influence these two
fundamental forms of well-being.
This research deepens our understanding of communication, morality and wellbeing. First, we document the psychological forces that (erroneously) push people away
from communicating honestly. Second, we demonstrate that different moral proclivities
can have very different influences on different forms of well-being. Philosophers,
psychologists, public figures, and practitioners have long been motivated to make links
between ethical decisions and well-being (e.g., Bentham, 1843/1948; Harris, 2011;
Person & Seligman, 2004; Plato, 1976). Some philosophers argue that the entire purpose
of morality is to promote well-being (Bentham, 1843/1948; Harris, 2011), and yet, we
know very little about the relationship between different - and often competing - moral
principles and well-being. This is particularly problematic given the frequency with
which practitioners make untested promises about the relationship between honesty and
positive life outcomes (e.g., Blanton, 1996; Dalio, 2011; Gaffney, 2002; Newton, 2014).
For example, Brad Blanton, a psychotherapist and founder of the cult “Radical Honesty”
has promised his thousands of followers that complete honesty is the route to happiness
and well-being (Blanton, 1996). The present research explores the validity of these ideas,
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demonstrating when and why honesty – and kindness – helps and hinders different forms
of well-being.
Hypotheses
We make three central predictions regarding the hedonic and eudaimonic
consequences of honesty and kindness. First, we hypothesize that individuals expect
communicating honestly to be less pleasant (i.e., less hedonically rewarding) than
communicating kindly (H1). Consistent with this proposition, past research demonstrates
that many individuals choose kindness over honesty when these two values appear to
conflict (Lee, 1993; Rosen & Tesser, 1970; Tesser, Rosen, & Rosen, 1971). For example,
when delivering difficult news, many individuals naturally focus on being kind and
“softening the blow” by using polite and evasive language (Lee, 1993). Many individuals
also avoid delivering difficult news altogether (Rosen & Tesser, 1970; Tesser, Rosen, &
Rosen, 1971). Individuals avoid honestly sharing unpleasant information or criticisms
with others because they worry about others’ emotional reactions to the news, and expect
the conversation to elicit personal feelings of guilt and distress (e.g., Tesser & Rosen,
1972). Individuals also avoid honestly sharing personal information because they worry
about others’ judgment and hurt feelings (Rosenfeld, 1979). Individuals’ concerns
regarding the consequences of honesty pertain primarily to its hedonic, or affective, costs.
We have reason to believe, however, that these concerns are overstated. Although
honesty may indeed be unpleasant, we hypothesize that it is less unpleasant than
individuals expect (H2). Past research on the experience of performing “necessary evils”
such as delivering terminal prognoses or critical performance feedback sheds light on this
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possibility. Although individuals who candidly communicate unpleasant information do
experience psychological duress, many are able to maintain psychological engagement
during the process, despite prior assumptions that the discomfort associated with these
conversations causes individuals to disengage (Margolis & Molinsky, 2008; Molinsky &
Margolis, 2005). This finding suggests that being honest with others may not be as
unpleasant as it seems. Furthermore, being honest with oneself by openly sharing one’s
thoughts and emotions can be quite rewarding. For example, individuals who honestly
express their emotions experience lower stress and blood pressure, and develop higher
levels of intimacy than individuals who regulate or hide their emotions (Butler et al.,
2003; Srivastava et al., 2009).
In other words, we predict an affective forecasting failure (e.g., Gilbert, Pinel,
Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005) with respect to the
hedonic consequences of honesty. Just as individuals overestimate the affective costs of
unfortunate events, such as a breakup or the denial of tenure (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,
Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998), we expect individuals to overestimate the affective costs
of honesty. Individuals are particularly likely to mispredict the affective consequences of
honesty because individuals avoid engaging in the conversations that would provide them
with accurate feedback about these consequences.
Third, we hypothesize that honesty is more meaningful than kindness (H3). That
is, we expect honesty to increases eudaimonic well-being. To communicate honestly,
individuals must look inwards and consult their personal feelings and opinions. This
process may increase self-actualization and produce feelings of personal control and
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autonomy, key components of eudaimonia (Deci & Ryan, 2008). Recent research on the
experience of inauthenticity is also consistent with this proposition. Behaving
inauthentically – by misrepresenting one’s emotions or by conforming to social norms
that are inconsistent with one’s personal beliefs, for example – lowers individual’s moral
self-regard and sense of moral purity (Gino, Kouchaki, & Galinsky, 2015). Moral identity
is closely linked to sense of self (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Thus, decrements in moral
identity may undermine meaning and purpose.
In addition to testing these three hypotheses, we also explore the social and longterm consequences of honesty and kindness in the present research.
Overview of Study
We conducted an experiment in which we randomly assigned participants to be
completely honest, kind, or conscious of their communication in every interaction for
three days. Our study involved two separate samples: Experiencers (Study 1a) and
Forecasters (Study 1b). In Study 1a, laboratory participants were randomly assigned to
communicate honestly, kindly, or consciously (our control condition).
Although we focus our hypotheses on the differential effects of honesty and
kindness, we also include a control condition in our experiment. The control condition
serves two purposes. First, it allows us to examine how honesty and kindness each
influence well-being above and beyond the experience of the study itself. Second, it
allows us to examine the nature of the differences between honesty and kindness. For
example, by including a control condition, we can assess whether focusing on kindness
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increases (predicted) hedonic well-being, or whether focusing on honesty harms
(predicted) well-being.
Participants in Study 1a (Experiencers) made forecasts about the three-day
experience, provided judgments of the experience every day during the study, and then
reflected on their experience during the study two weeks later. We conducted a two-week
follow up survey in order to gain greater insight into the long-term impact of honesty and
kindness and to examine if individuals’ perceptions of the experience changed over time.
Participants in Study 1b (Forecasters) did not participate in the main study; they simply
learned about the conditions of Study 1a and made forecasts about the experience.
Study 1a: Experiencers
Procedure and Materials. Study 1a consisted of five stages: 1) participants were
recruited and took an intake survey, 2) participants were assigned to condition, 3)
participants made forecasts of their experience in the study, 4) participants completed the
study over three days and completed nightly surveys on their experiences, and 5)
participants completed a follow-up survey and reflected on their experiences two weeks
later.
Recruitment and intake survey. One-hundred twenty-eight adults (55% female,
mean age = 26) agreed to participate in this study. Community members and students
were recruited in groups of 10-20 to a United States university laboratory to complete an
hour long study in exchange for a $10 show-up fee. For the first thirty minutes of this
hour long session, participants completed surveys that were unrelated to the present
research.
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Thirty minutes into the session, when all participants had completed their surveys,
a research assistant who was blind to our hypotheses made an announcement about an
optional additional study, called “The Challenging Exercise” study. The experimenter
explained that participants could participate in an optional 3-day experiment that would
challenge the way they communicate with others. In exchange for their participation,
participants would earn $20 and the chance to win an iPad mini. Participants were
informed of the time commitment of the study and the potential distress that could be
caused by participating. However, they were not provided any information about the
experimental conditions at this time. Participants were free to leave if they did not want
to participate in the study. We include the exact recruitment announcement in Appendix
A.
Participants who chose to participate in “The Challenging Exercise” then
completed a link on the computer containing a consent form and an intake survey. The
intake survey contained personality measures and other exploratory variables.14
Assignment to condition. After participants completed the intake survey, they
were assigned to one of three experimental conditions: honesty, kindness, or
communication-consciousness (our control condition). We randomized condition at the
session-level. That is, each session of participants (i.e., the group of participants that
arrived at the lab during the same time) was assigned to the same condition. Participants
learned about the experimental condition verbally, and had the opportunity to ask

14

We also measured satisfaction with life, positive and negative affect, the HEXACO, and general social
connection. We report all specific measures and results in our online supplemental materials.
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questions. Thus, it was necessary to have each session of participants assigned to a single
condition.
The research assistant first provided some basic information about the study.
Then, the research assistant instructed participants how to behave for the next three days,
according to their experimental condition. Specifically, the research assistant announced:
In this study, you will be asked to reflect upon your social communication. Often,
speaking with others requires balancing honesty and kindness. Being completely open
and honest about our thoughts, feelings, and opinions, can sometimes upset others and be
unkind. Alternatively, being kind, considerate, and helpful towards others sometimes
means not being 100% honest.
[Honesty condition]
Throughout the next three days – that means today, tomorrow, and the following day please strive to be absolutely honest in every conversation you have with every person
you talk to. Really try to be completely candid and open when you are sharing your
thoughts, feelings, and opinions with others. You should be honest in every conversation
you have, in every interaction, with every person in your life. Even though this may be
difficult, you should do your absolute best to be honest.

[Kindness condition]
Throughout the next three days – that means today, tomorrow, and the following day please strive to be kind in every conversation you have with every person you talk to.
Really try to be caring and considerate when you are sharing your thoughts, feelings, and
opinions. You should be kind in every conversation you have, in every interaction, with
every person in your life. Even though this may be difficult, you should do your absolute
best to be kind.
[Communication-consciousness– Control condition]
Throughout the next three days – that means today, tomorrow, and the following day please be conscious of the way you communicate with others. Please act as you normally
would throughout the length of this study. You should not change your behavior, but you
should be conscious of it.
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Note that the research assistant explicitly mentioned the potential conflict between
honesty and kindness in every condition. Thus, all participants were primed to consider
this difficult tradeoff before engaging in the experiment.
After making this announcement, the research assistant explained the conditions
in greater detail and invited questions from participants. Participants were instructed not
to tell anyone about the experiment, including their relational and conversational
partners. We include the full script for each condition in Appendix B.
Participants were then directed to a link on their computer. They first read the
instructions associated with their condition. These instructions were nearly identical to
the verbal script read by the research assistant, except they included an additional
statement, which said, “Do your best to comply with these instructions, but do not do
anything you are not comfortable with. When reflecting on your experience, you should
answer all surveys accurately and thoughtfully, even if you did not completely comply
with the instructions.”
Participants then responded to a one-item comprehension check, asking them
what their goal in the study was (response-options: “To be honest in all of my
communication”, “To be kind in all my communication,” or “To communicate as I
normally do, but be conscious of my communication.”) Participants had to answer the
comprehension check correctly to proceed with the study.
Next, participants provided their email address to indicate their continued consent,
and to allow us to contact them with their nightly surveys. At this point, participants were
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told that they should let the laboratory staff know if they no longer wished to participate.
All participants in our sample continued with the study at this time.
Forecasting the experience. Participants were then directed to the forecasting
task, which was on the next page of their survey. Participants rated the extent to which
they expected their experience in the study to be: easy, pleasant, meaningful, liberating,
fulfilling, and socially connecting. We measured these dimensions using five-point
bipolar rating scales with the following anchors: difficult-easy, unpleasant-pleasant,
meaningless-meaningful, constraining-liberating, unfulfilling-fulfilling, and socially
isolating-socially connecting.
Based on our theoretical assumptions, we combined the first two items into a
single measure of Enjoyment (rs > .56), and we combined the middle three items
(meaningful, liberating, fulfilling) into a single measure of Meaning (αs > .78).
Enjoyment is our measure of hedonic well-being; Meaning is our measure of eudaimonic
well-being. We examine Social Connection as a separate construct because social
connection could be theoretically conceptualized as either a source of pleasure (hedonic
well-being) or meaning (eudaimonic well-being).
Finally, participants were asked to confirm their commitment to the study by
typing the following statement into the survey, “For the next three days, I will
[communicate honestly, communicate kindly, be conscious of my communication].” 15

15

We did not include this instruction during the first hour we ran the study. Thus, there
are 12 participants (all in the Kindness condition) who did not have to write out their
commitment before the study began.
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Before leaving the laboratory, participants were reminded of their study condition
and instructed to begin the study immediately. Participants were told that they would
receive their first nightly survey that evening at 6pm. Participants had to say aloud, “I
agree to participate” upon exiting the laboratory.
Nightly surveys. Consistent with past research (e.g., Sonnentag, 2003; Sonnentag,
Binnewies, & Mojza, 2008), we tracked behavior over three consecutive days. We
emailed participants a nightly survey for three nights at 6pm. We instructed participants
to complete the survey as late as possible, but before they were too tired to concentrate.
When completing the nightly survey, participants first completed a
communication audit to ensure their commitment to the experiment. We asked
participants to recall their longest conversation. Participants reported who they had the
conversation with (e.g., friend, spouse, roommate), they described their conversation
(free response), and they explained how they [communicated honestly, communicated
kindly, or were conscious of their communication] in the conversation (free response).
Then, we asked participants if they said anything untrue (yes, no, and explain your
answer) and if they said anything unkind (yes, no, and explain your answer) during their
conversation.
After participants completed their communication audit, they responded to our
focal measures: experiences of Enjoyment (ease, pleasure), Meaning (meaning,
liberation, fulfillment), and Social Connection. Participants used the same bipolar scales
we administered as a part of the forecasting survey. Next, participants rated their
agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) with two manipulation check items:
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“I was completely honest and candid in every conversation I had today” and “I was kind
and compassionate during every conversation I had today.” 16
Finally, we asked participants to reflect on their experience that day and to
explain how they either did or did not comply with the experiment. We also asked them
to write about any challenges they faced and how it felt to focus on [honesty, kindness,
their communication]. Participants were given the lead experimenter’s email address and
invited to reach out to her with questions or concerns at any time.
Reflection survey. Two weeks after participants completed the third and final day
of the experiment, they were emailed a final reflection survey. Participants first
responded to several open-ended questions, asking them what they learned, how their
behavior and communication had changed, what difficulties they had, any surprises they
faced, and how their relationships changed.
Second, participants indicated their agreement with five statements about the
degree to which their participation had long-term impact on their lives (1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree): “As a result of participating in this study [I am more
conscious of my communication, I am more thoughtful when speaking to others, I have
reconsidered the way I communicate, I have become a better person, I am happier.]” We
combined them into a single measure of Long-term Improvement (α = .90).

16

We also collected measures of general social connection (as in the intake survey),
authenticity and self/other focus. We collected these measures during the nightly surveys
and during the two-week follow-up. We report the specific measures and results in the
online supplementary materials.
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Participants also indicated their agreement with four statements about their
specific communication (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree): “As a result of
participating in this study [I am more honest, I communicate more directly, I am more
kind, I engage in more conflict].” We combined the first two items into a single measure
of Long-term Honesty (r = .72). We examine the latter two items separately and
conceptualize them as measures of Long-term Kindness and Long-term Conflict.
Then, participants responded to our hedonic and eudaimonic well-being measures.
Participants reflected on their experience and rated the extent to which their experience
had provided them with Enjoyment, Meaning, and Social Connection, using the same
items we used in the forecasting survey and nightly surveys.
Next, participants answered questions about the degree to which the experiment
influenced their relationships. Specifically, we collected a three item measure of
Relational Improvement which captured the degree to which participants believed their
relationships became better or worse as a result of completing our study (anchored at 1 =
much worse and 7 = much better, α = .86): “Do you feel that the people around you know
you better or worse than they knew you before this study?”, “Do you feel that the people
around you understand you better or worse than they understood you before this study?”,
and “Do you feel that the quality of your relationships are better or worse as a result of
this study?”17

17

At the two-week follow-up, we also collected two items about whether participants saw
themselves as honest [kind] people. We report the specific measures and results in the
online supplementary materials.
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Before exiting the survey, participants indicated whether they would prefer their
$20 payment via paypal or by receiving an amazon.com giftcard. We randomly selected
one participant to win the iPad mini and we compensated all participants within one
week.
Analytical approach.
First, we created daily average variables by taking the average of all dependent
variables that we collected during the nightly surveys. For example, we averaged
perceptions of how enjoyable the experience was on Day 1, Day 2, and Day 3 to create a
daily average Enjoyment variable.
We conducted four sets of analyses to examine the consequences of honesty and
kindness. First, we analyzed our manipulation check measures at the daily average level
to examine compliance with the experiment. Second, we conducted our focal analyses:
we compare forecasts, experiences, and reflections of Enjoyment, Meaning, and Social
Connection. Finally, we conducted a set of analyses to examine the long-term impact of
our experiment.
Results. One-hundred twenty-eight adults (55% female, mean age = 26) agreed to
participate in the Challenging Exercise and were included in our final data set. We
conduct analyses using all participants who responded to each measure. Thus, the degrees
of freedom for each analysis may differ slightly. We did not see differential attrition
across our experimental conditions throughout the three-day experiment. However, we
see slightly greater attrition in the kindness and control conditions, relative to the honesty
conditions, at the two-week follow-up. Table 1 depicts the number and percentage of
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participants who began and completed each stage of the experiment across out
conditions.
Manipulation checks. Consistent with the intent of the experiment, a one-way
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Condition on participants’ average daily honesty,
F(2, 98) = 8.28, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .15. Participants reported being more honest in the
Honesty condition (M = 5.66, SD = 1.10), than in the Kindness (M = 4.67, SD = 1.14) or
Control (M = 4.80, SD = 1.08) conditions, ps < .01. There was no difference between the
Kindness and Control conditions (p =.64).
A one-way ANOVA also revealed a significant effect of Condition on
participants’ average daily kindness, F(2, 98) = 4.78, p = .01, η2𝑝 = .09. Participants
reported being kinder in the Kindness condition (M = 5.45, SD = 0.93), than in the
Honesty (M = 4.77, SD = 1.21) or Control (M = 4.71, SD = 1.04) conditions, ps < .01.
There was no difference between the Honesty and Control conditions (p =.80).
Forecast, Experience, and Reflections. We conducted repeated measure
ANOVAs on our measures of enjoyment (i.e., hedonic well-being), meaning (i.e.,
eudaimonic well-being), and social connection using experimental condition (Honesty,
Kindness, Control) as the between-subjects factor, and time-point (Forecast, Experience,
Reflection) as the within-subjects factor.
Enjoyment. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of
Condition, F(2,87) = 6.94, p < .01, η2𝑝 = .14; participants rated the Honesty condition (M
= 3.11, SD = 0.73), as less enjoyable than the Kindness (M = 3.76, SD = 0.73) and
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Control conditions (M = 3.58, SD = 0.73), ps < .01. There was no difference between the
Kindness and Control conditions (p =.37).
There was also a significant effect of Time-point, F(2,87) = 6.03, p < .01, η2𝑝 =
.07; participants forecasted lower enjoyment (M = 3.22, SD = 1.08) than they actually
experienced over the three-day experiment (M = 3.58, SD = 0.82) or remembered twoweeks after the experience (M = 3.52, SD = 0.90), ps < .01. There was no difference
between actual and remembered enjoyment (p =.50).
Importantly, these effects were qualified by a significant Condition x Time-point
interaction, F(4,87) = 10.07, p < .01, η2𝑝 = .19. Honesty was the only condition in which
participants had misforecasted their enjoyment, consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2.
Specifically, participants expected the Honesty condition (M = 2.52, SD = 1.05), to yield
less enjoyment than the Kindness (M = 3.72, SD = 0.85) and Control conditions (M =
3.68, SD = 0.78), ps < .01. During the three-day experience, however, Honesty (M =
3.47, SD = 1.00) was only slightly less enjoyable than the Kindness condition (M = 3.89,
SD = 0.57), p < .05, and was no different from the Control condition (M = 3.43, SD =
0.66), p = .83. The nature of this interaction demonstrates that Honesty was more
enjoyable than individuals expected, but Kindness and Control did not differ from
expectations. There were no differences in remembered enjoyment across any of the three
conditions two-weeks later, ps > .12. We depict these results in Figure 1.
Meaning. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a marginal effect of Condition,
F(2,87) = 2.44, p = .09, η2𝑝 = .05; participants found greater meaning in the Honesty
condition (M = 3.78, SD = 0.63), than in the Kindness condition (M = 3.45, SD = 0.63), p
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< .05, and directionally greater meaning in the Honesty condition than in the Control
condition (M = 3.53, SD = 0.63), p = .10 . There was no difference between the Kindness
and Control conditions (p =.67). We found no main effect of Time-point, F(2,87) = 0.85,
p = .43, η2𝑝 = .01, nor did we find a Condition x Time-point interaction, F(4,87) = 0.34, p
= .85, η2𝑝 < .01. We depict these results in Figure 2.
Social connection. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of
Time-point, F(2,87) = 3.65, p = .03, η2𝑝 = .04; participants experienced lower social
connection during the 3-day experience itself (M = 3.55, SD = 0.77) than they forecasted
before the experience (M = 3.77, SD = 0.90), p = .01, or remembered two-weeks after
the experience (M = 3.72, SD = 0.89), p = .03. Although this effect appears to be driven
by the Kindness condition (directionally, participants expected kindness to be more
socially connecting than it was), we found no main effect of Condition, F(2,87) = 1.29, p
= .28, η2𝑝 = .03, nor did we find a significant Condition x Time-point interaction, F(4,87)
= 1.39, p = .24, η2𝑝 = .03. We depict these results in Figure 3.
Long-term impact. To assess long-term impact, we conducted one-way
ANOVAs on our follow-up measures of Long-term Honesty, Long-term Kindness, Longterm Conflict, Long-term Improvement, and Relational Improvement using experimental
condition (Honesty, Kindness, Control) as the between-subjects factor. We display the
means and standard deviations of all Long-term impact measures in Table 2.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Condition on Long-term
Honesty, F(2,97) = 5.93, p < .01, η2𝑝 = .11, such that participants became more honest in
the Honesty condition than in the Kindness and Control conditions (ps < .05). There was
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no difference between the Kindness and Control conditions (p =.21). We also found a
significant effect of Condition on Long-term Improvement, F(2,97) = 3.71, p = .03, η2𝑝 =
.07, such that participants believed that had become better people in the Honesty
condition, relative to the Control condition (p < .01). Participants also believed they
became marginally better people in the Kindness condition, relative to the Control
condition (p = .08), but there was not a significant difference between the Honesty and
Control conditions (p = .45). We find no effects of our experimental conditions on Longterm Kindness, F(2,97) = .51, p = .60, η2𝑝 = .01, Long-term conflict, F(2,97) = 1.17, p =
.31, η2𝑝 = .03, or Relational Improvement, F(2,97) = 1.82, p = .17, η2𝑝 = .03.
These results demonstrate that honesty had a longer-lasting inpact on behavior.
Individuals in the Honesty condition had become more honest, but no less kind.
Individuals in the Kindness condition had not changed their levels of honesty or kindness.
--Table 2 here –
To provide greater insight into the impact of our interventions, we examined
participants’ free responses. We provide example quotes in Table 3 to better illustrate the
consequences of honesty, kindness, and communication-consciousness.
---Table 3 about here--Discussion
The results of Study 1a support our hypotheses. First, consistent with H1 and H2,
individuals misforecast the hedonic consequences of honesty; although honesty does
yield less pleasure than kindness, individuals expect this gap to be much larger than it
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actually is. Second, consistent with H3, individuals derive greater meaning from honesty
than kindness.
In addition, we find that the experience of being honest with others has longerlasting consequences than being kind. Although the experience of being honest and the
experience of being kind both caused individuals to believe they had become better,
happier, and more thoughtful individuals, only individuals who had been honest
continued to communicate this way two-weeks later. Interestingly, honesty and kindness
did not have differential effects on self-reported social connection or long-term kindness.
We build on these findings in Study 1b by examining forecasts and choices made
by individuals who were not involved in Study 1a. This allows us to do a cleaner
comparison of forecasters to experiences, and to examine whether individuals’
communication choices favor hedonic outcomes (kindness) or eudaimonic outcomes
(honesty).
Study 1b: Forecasters
Method. We recruited one-hundred nine adults (50.5% female, mean age = 25)
from a city in the northeastern United States to participate in a study in exchange for a
$10 show-up fee.18 Participants in Study 1b were drawn from the same subject pool as
participants in Study 1a.
Participants learned about an experiment that was taking place, called “the
Challenging Exercise” Study. We described the protocol of the Challenging Exercise

18

We ran Study 1b after running Study 1a. Six participants in Study 1b had previously
participated in Study 1a. We removed these participants from the sample before any
analyses were performed.
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(Study 1a) as closely as possible. Participants learned that individuals who enrolled in the
Challenging Exercise would have to make modifications to their communication for three
days and complete nightly surveys, and that the experience might cause discomfort.
Then, all participants learned about all three conditions of the study – honesty, kindness,
and consciousness - and read the exact instructions that participants in the Challenging
Exercise (Study 1a) actually received.
Following the procedure of Epley & Schroeder, 2014, we included the same
conditions in the forecasting study (1b) as we included in the experience study (1a), but
we manipulated the conditions within, rather than between, subjects.
After reading about each of the conditions, participants were asked to imagine
participating in the study and to imagine being honest [being kind, being conscious of
their communication] for three days. Participants forecasted their level of Enjoyment,
Meaning, and Social Connection in each of the experimental conditions using the same
items we used in Study 1a.
Then, we asked participants to imagine they actually had to participate in one
condition in the study. Participants selected the one condition they would want to
participate in. As an exploratory measure, we also asked participants to imagine that they
had to participate in the study for an entire year. Participants selected the one condition
they would want to participate in for one year. After participants made their choices, they
answered demographic questions and were dismissed.
Results
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Forecasts. We analyzed the forecasts using a repeated measures ANOVA, in
which condition was the within-subjects factor. We find a main effect of Condition on
expected Enjoyment, F(1, 108) = 29.53, p < .01, ηp2 = .21, such that participants
expected the Honesty condition (M = 2.75, SD = 1.09) to be less enjoyable than both the
Kindness (M = 3.61, SD = 1.06) and Control conditions (M = 3.43, SD = 1.03), ps < .02.
We find no difference in expected Enjoyment between the Kindness and Control
conditions (p = .14). We depict these results in Figure 1.
There was a main effect of Condition on expected Meaning, F(1, 108) = 6.18, p
=.02, ηp2 = .05, such that participants expected the Control condition (M = 3.44, SD =
0.90) to be less meaningful than the Honesty (M = 3.66, SD = 0.93) and Kindness
conditions (M = 3.68, SD = 0.90), ps < .02. We find no difference in expected meaning
between the Honesty and Kindness conditions (p =.83). We depict these results in Figure
2.
There was a main effect of Condition on expected Social Connection, F(1, 108) =
18.71, p < .01, ηp2 = .15, such that participants expected the Honesty condition (M = 3.04,
SD = 1.11) to be less socially connecting than the Kindness (M = 4.03, SD = 1.02)
Control conditions (M = 3.51, SD = 0.93), ps < .01. Participants also expected the
Control condition to be less socially connecting than the Kindness condition (p < .01).
We depict these results in Figure 3.
Choice. We conducted a chi-square goodness of fit test against the null hypothesis
that there were no differences in preferences across the three conditions (i.e., expected
proportion of 33.3% for each of the three conditions). Participants were significantly less
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likely to choose to participate in the Honesty condition (21.1%) compared to the Kindness
(37.6%) and Control conditions (41.3%) for the three-day study, χ2(1) = 7.56, p = .02.
Participants’ preferences became more extreme when choosing how to
communicate for one year; participants were significantly less likely to choose Honesty
(9.2%) compared to both Kindness (33.9%) and the Control condition (56.9%) for a oneyear experience, χ2(1) = 37.23, p < .01.
Comparison between Study 1a and 1b
We conducted t-tests between predicted Enjoyment, Meaning, and Social
Connection in Study 1b to the daily-average levels of Enjoyment, Meaning, and Social
Connection in Study 1a to further test our hypotheses. These results provide convergent
evidence that individuals significantly overestimate the hedonic costs of honesty.
Specifically, participants in Study 1b expected honesty to be much less pleasant (M =
2.75, SD = 1.09) than participants in Study 1a actually experienced it to be (M = 3.47, SD
= 0.63), p < .001. However, individuals do not seem to mispredict the eudaimonic
consequences honesty. Participants in Study 1b did not expect honesty to be more or less
meaningful (M = 3.66, SD = 0.93) than participants in Study 1a experienced it to be (M =
3.79, SD = 0.67), p = .44. Interestingly, Study 1b suggests that individuals may also
underestimate the social benefits of honesty. Specifically, participants in Study 1b
expected honesty to be less socially connecting (M = 3.04, SD = 1.11) than participants
Study 1a experienced it to be (M = 3.49, SD = 0.80), p < .02. Although we did not find
this pattern in Study 1a, it is possible that individuals who were more removed from the
experience expected honesty to be more isolating than those who deeply considered what
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the impending experience would be like. Importantly, Study 1b suggests that individuals’
misprediction of the hedonic and social consequences lead them to avoid being honest.
Discussion
In this study, we break new ground by exploring how honesty and kindness, two
of the most basic moral principles and facets of human communication, influence
psychological well-being. We conducted an intensive three-day field experiment in which
individuals had to be honest or kind in all of their social interactions. Our findings make
three central contributions to our understanding of human communication, morality, wellbeing, and affective-forecasting. First, we provide insight into why people avoid being
honest with others. Our results suggest that individuals’ aversion towards honesty is
driven by an affective forecasting failure. Individuals expect honesty to be less pleasant
than it is.
Second, we demonstrate that focusing on different moral principles during social
communication differentially impacts hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Focusing on
kindness yields greater positive affect and interpersonal engagement, thereby promoting
hedonia. Focusing on honesty yields greater self-expression and liberation, thereby
promoting eudaimonia. Although the present research focuses exclusively on social
communication, these findings likely apply to the broader distinction between justice and
care (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014). Individuals who focus on impartial moral principles
may experience greater meaning in life, whereas individuals who focus on care towards
others may experience greater pleasure. Scholars have long claimed that morality
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promotes well-being, but to our knowledge, this is the first research to explore how
different foundations of morality promote different types of well-being.
Finally, this research provides novel insights into individuals’ ability to forecast
experiences. Past research has focused solely on affective forecasting, concluding that
individuals rarely have insight into the affective – or hedonic - consequences of future
experiences (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). Our findings are
consistent with this body of research. However, we also find that individuals do not lack
insight into the eudaimonic consequences of future experiences; individuals were much
less inaccurate when predicting the meaning associated with our interventions. The
forecasting literature has not explored this possibility. Perhaps individuals who
experience human suffering – through breakups, death, and defeat (Gilbert, et al., 1998) –
do recognize that with hardship comes meaning. Furthermore, perhaps this sense of
meaning influences affect over time, which could contribute to adaptation. Our findings
pave the way for future research to explore the interplay between forecasted and
experienced hedonia and eudaimonia.
Practically, this research also highlights the promise of using short interventions
to produce meaningful behavioral and psychological changes. These interventions may
be particularly useful in organizations in which employees routinely struggle with the
conflict between honesty and kindness. For example, coaches or managers who have to
deliver negative feedback may improve their candor and find greater meaning in their
work after engaging in short honesty interventions.
Limitations and future directions
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Our initial study has a number of limitations that will be addressed in future
experiments. First, this study was somewhat exploratory in nature. Although we made apriori predictions regarding the hedonic and eudaimonic experiences of honesty and
kindness, we collected many exploratory measures (see footnotes 14-17). Additionally,
we had not conducted power analyses prior to running the experiment because we did not
yet have a reasonable estimate of the effect size. As a result, our study was underpowered
and some of our key results are of marginal significance. Furthermore, having individuals
in Study 1a forecast the experience before engaging in our study may have influenced
their reports of the experience. Our next study will address these limitations.
Specifically, in our ongoing research, we are only measuring hedonic and
eudaimonic well-being and social connection. We are expanding our scales to be
consistent with existing literature (Huta & Ryan, 2010; Hughes, Waite, Hawkley, &
Cacioppo, 2004; Steger, Kashdan, & Oishi, 2008, Urry, et al., 2004), and we will not
include superfluous measures. We are also increasing our sample size. We performed a
sample-size calculation with the goal of achieving 80% power for the critical contrast
between honesty and kindness on daily eudaimonic well-being. Estimating the effect size
to be d = .62 based on the results of Study 1a, we will require 42 participants per cell. We
intend to meet or exceed this sample size in the next study. Finally, we will not have
experiencers forecast the experience, consistent with existing literature (e.g., Epley &
Schroeder, 2015). In addition to addressing these limitations, we will expand our
retrospective measures to better understand the long-term hedonic and eudaimonic
consequences of our interventions and individuals’ desire to repeat them.
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The purpose of our second study will be to document the robustness of our initial
results. However, we have additional studies planned to address several important
questions regarding the mechanisms underlying our effects. Although our 3-day
intervention allowed us to examine the consequences of communication in everyday life,
we do not have the level of control and precision necessary to make claims about the
types of conversations that generated pleasure and meaning. It is possible, for example,
that one or two significant self-disclosures generated high levels of meaning and that the
remainder of the honest conversations were simply uncomfortable. Or it is possible that
individuals only focused on self-disclosure, honestly sharing information about the self,
rather than other-disclosure, honestly sharing evaluations of others. To explore this more
deeply, we intend to manipulate whether individuals are directed to be honest about
themselves or others in future studies.
Furthermore, we cannot yet identify the specific processes that led to an affective
forecasting failure. It is possible that individuals misforecast others’ reaction to their
honesty, that individuals misforecast how others’ reactions to honesty will impact them,
or that individuals misforecast the very experience of self-expression. We may able to
disentangle these mechanisms with future studies in which participants and their
conversational partners provide judgments about these three processes.
It is also possible that individuals misforecast the experience of honesty because
they imagine engaging in conversations that never occur during their three-day
experience. For example, perhaps when considering the consequences of honesty,
individuals imagine being asked difficult personal questions by threatening relational
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partners, or they imagine that they have the courage to confront individuals with their
most ardent criticisms. But perhaps opportunities to engage in these conversations do not
actually arise in the three-day experiment, or individuals actively avoid them. Indeed,
some participants in our study did mention avoiding interpersonal interaction that might
entail extremely negative honest conversations. To explore differences between
participants’ predicted and actual behaviors, we plan to ask future participants to generate
a list of honest conversations they imagine engaging in, and then track whether or not the
actual conversations arise during the study.
We also cannot be sure that every participant fully committed to the intervention
and significantly altered their communication for three days. Although we took every
effort to ensure commitment to the intervention and participants’ free responses suggest
that they took the intervention very seriously (see Table 3), it is difficult to confirm this
without directly observing behavior. Future studies using controlled or video-taped
interactions may be able to provide greater insight into the experience of honesty and
kindness. Laboratory experiments may also help us overcome attrition and self-selection
issues associated with our current recruitment procedure.
Our results also beg important questions for future research. In particular, it will
be important to examine how honesty and kindness influence communicators’ relational
partners. Although the present research suggests that communicating honestly creates
meaning for communicators, it is not clear that the targets of this communication
appreciate it. In fact, recent research demonstrates that relational partners often resent
painful honesty (Levine & Schweitzer, 2015). If one’s goal in considering ethical
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behavior is to promote overall well-being, as many philosophers have argued it should be
(e.g., Bentham, 1843/1948), it is essential to examine the consequences of one’s behavior
not only for the self, but also for others.
One factor that might influence whether honesty is well-received is whether
relational partners are jointly committed to the goal of honesty. Shared honesty may
promote intimacy and growth, but simply receiving honesty may be quite unpleasant. The
type of relationship may also matter. Close friends may be able to withstand and benefit
from difficult honest conversations, but professional or distant relationships may not.
Power differences between relational partners may also matter. We may be able to gain
initial insight into this question by coding the open-ended reflections during participants’
nightly communication audits.
Finally, it is worth noting that honesty and kindness need not be in conflict. Our
initial results confirm this, demonstrating that focusing on honesty does not necessarily
decrease kindness. We compare and contrast honesty and kindness in the present research
as a first step in exploring the relationships among different ethical principles,
communication styles, and well-being. However, future research should examine the
possibility and consequences of integrating honesty and kindness by instructing
individuals to be honest, kindly.
Conclusion
Individuals often shy away from sharing difficult truths, fearing the hedonic costs
of honesty. Our findings suggest this may be a mistake. Honesty is not as unpleasant as it
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seems, and in fact, can promote meaning and long-term growth. In other words, people
can handle (speaking) the truth.
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Appendix A. Verbal Instructions in Study 1a - Recruitment
Please listen carefully.
This next study is optional and will occur outside of this lab session.
The study is about communication in everyday life. In this study, you will be asked to be
very conscious of your interpersonal communication. We expect that as a result of
participating in this study, you will learn about the way they communicate with and relate
to others. However, you may be asked to communicate in ways that could cause
discomfort. You should only participate if you are truly willing to be thoughtful about
your communication and are open to communicating in different ways.
To participate, you will take an initial survey in this laboratory, which will take roughly
10 minutes. Then, you will learn more about the study. In order to participate, you will
have to take nightly online surveys about your emotions, well-being, and relationships,
which will each take about five minutes. This will last for three days. You will receive a
survey each night, via email. Lastly, you will have to complete a final reflection survey,
which will be emailed to you two weeks after the study ends.
This study will take place outside of this lab session and is in addition to the session you
signed up for. You will be paid the $10 show-up fee for this session regardless of whether
or not you enroll in this additional study.
However, in exchange for participating in this additional study, you will earn $20 and the
chance to win an iPad mini. You will be paid $20 for your completion of the entire study
– that means three nightly surveys, plus the two-week follow-up survey. Your $20
payment will be paid either directly to you by the experimenter, through paypal, or you
can choose to receive a $20 amazon e-gift card instead.
In addition to the payment of $20, we will run a lottery for an iPad mini. Thus, you will
also have a chance to win an iPad mini in exchange for your participation.
You cannot miss any surveys during this entire study. If you fail to complete a survey,
you will not receive payment for this study.
Again, you should only join this study if you are willing to participate in a challenging 3day study that will require daily surveys and may ask you to communicate with others in
certain ways.
If you do not want to join this study, you can check out of the lab at this time.
Please take a moment to think about your decision. You are in no way obligated to
participate in this research and you can choose to leave the study at any time. You can
head to check out if you do not want to participate.
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Appendix A. Verbal Instructions in Study 1a – Assignment to condition
All conditions
In this study, you will be asked to reflect upon your social communication. Often,
speaking with others requires balancing honesty and kindness. Being completely open
and honest about our thoughts, feelings, and opinions, can sometimes upset others and be
unkind. Alternatively, being kind, considerate, and helpful towards others sometimes
means not being 100% honest.
Control:
Throughout the next three days – that means today, tomorrow, and the following day please be conscious of the way you communicate with others. Please act as you normally
would throughout the length of this study. You should not change your behavior, but you
should be conscious of it.
You should act as you normally would with your closest relational partners. However,
you should NOT tell them, or anyone else, any specific information about this study.
They can only know that you were asked to pay special attention to your interpersonal
communication. After the study has ended, you can share any information you’d like
about this study.
Please think about what it means to be conscious of your communication. Feel free to
raise your hand if you have questions. [field questions, wait for a moment] Is everyone
ready to continue? If so, you can complete the next link on your computer.
Honesty:
Throughout the next three days – that means today, tomorrow, and the following day - be
honest in every conversation you have with every person you talk to. Really try to be
completely candid and open when you are sharing your thoughts, feelings, and opinions
with others. You should be honest in every conversation you have, in every interaction,
with every person in your life. Even though this may be difficult, try your best to be
honest.
Being authentic, honest, and true to oneself are important virtues. Embrace these virtues
every day for the next three days. When someone asks you how you feel, tell them the
truth. That means saying you feel happy only when you feel happy and saying you feel
sad when you feel sad. When you are giving your opinion, be completely honest. You
should provide positive opinions only when you truly feel positive, and you should
provide negative opinions when you feel negative.
You should be particularly honest with your closest relational partners. However, you
should NOT tell them, or anyone else, any specific information about these instructions.
They can only know that you were asked to pay special attention to your interpersonal
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communication. After the study has ended, you can share any information you’d like
about this study.
Please think about what it means to be completely honest. Feel free to raise your hand if
you have questions. [field questions, wait for a moment] Is everyone ready to continue? If
so, you can complete the next link on your computer.
Kindness:
Throughout the next three days – that means today, tomorrow, and the following day
- please strive to be kind in every conversation you have with every person you talk to.
Really try to be caring and considerate when you are sharing your thoughts, feelings, and
opinions. You should be kind in every conversation you have, in every interaction, with
every person in your life. Even though this may be difficult, you should do your absolute
best to be kind.
Being kind and helpful, and avoiding harming others are important virtues. Embrace
these virtues every day for the next three days. When someone asks you how you feel,
give a kind answer. That means taking their feelings and state of mind into consideration.
When you are giving your opinion, be kind. You should provide opinions kindly and
focus on the needs and feelings of those around you.
You should be particularly honest with your closest relational partners. However, you
should NOT tell them, or anyone else, any specific information about these instructions.
They can only know that you were asked to pay special attention to your interpersonal
communication. After the study has ended, you can share any information you’d like
about this study.
Please think about what it means to be kind. Feel free to raise your hand if you have
questions. [field questions, wait for a moment] Is everyone ready to continue? If so, you
can complete the next link on your computer.
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Tables

Table 1. Enrollment and attrition across conditions

Honesty

Assignment
to condition
44

Kindness

35

Control

38

Day 1
42
95.5%
30
85.7%
37
97.4%

Day 2
41
93.2%
31
88.6%
33
86.8%

Day 3
39
88.6%
30
85.7%
34
89.5%

Follow
Up
40
90.9%
27
77.1%
30
78.9%

Note. Percentages reflect the proportion of individuals assigned to condition that
completed surveys at each subsequent time-point.

Table 2. The effects of honesty and kindness on long-term behavioral change

Honesty

M

Longterm
honesty
4.81a

Longterm
kindness
4.33a

Longterm
conflict
3.025a

SD

1.16

1.31

1.42

1.04

0.81

3.80

b

4.37

a

2.52

a

4.67

a

4.43a

SD

1.15

1.64

1.05

1.12

0.69

M

4.20b

4.03a

2.90a

4.20b

4.23a

SD

1.34

1.33

1.47

1.08

0.58

Kindness M
Control

Long-term
Relational
improvement improvement
4.90a
4.62a

Note. Letters within each column indicate significant differences at p < .05.
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Table 3. Illustrative Quotes about the Experience of Honesty, Kindness, and
Communication-Consciousness
Honesty

Kindness

 It was difficult but exciting. I
felt uncomfortable at first
communicating honestly with
my coworkers.

 Communicating kindly helped
me to think positively, see
positively, and feel all around
positive.

 It felt weird being so blunt.
I'm generally a nice person
and always consider others
feelings even before my own.
This was such a huge change.
It took adjusting because I
have a passive personality.

 Ordinarily, I am a very
sarcastic person with a dry
sense of humor. The things I
say...are snarky. I tried pretty
hard to tone that down today.
This was somewhat
challenging at times to
remember to do.
 It was not difficult to be kind
to others because I work in a
service profession and try to
think of others' feelings
almost every day
 I found that during the days
where I explicitly tried to be
only kind, I regretted fewer
things I said or how I acted in
certain situations.

 It felt good to be honest,
though the conversion itself
was quite unpleasant. I
thought of it as one of those
necessary evils
 I learned that I previously
dedicated a lot of time and
energy to stifling my own
thoughts and feelings and its
a weight off my shoulders
now that I've begun trying to
stop.
 It effected my relationship
with my boyfriend. I told him
the truth about how i felt
sometimes, which lead to our
break up. Of course this was
bound to happen eventually,
I was glad that it happened
now rather than later.
 I definitely feel a lot closer to
people. Just being honest and
opening up to people on a
deeper level definitely brings
you closer together. I love it!
 [I learned that ] I lie a lot to
people because it's easier
than telling them the truth.
Most people only know
snippets of who I really am
because I feel that they won't
be able to handle everything
my life has to offer.

 My other struggle was with
my boyfriend. ... we often
bicker over small things. It
was difficult keeping the
conversation from turning
into an argument and to get
my point across while being
kind and supportive.
 Overall I have found that the
other appreciates such
optimism, thoughtfulness,
and kindness. Thus, I am
trying to incorporate this
positivity and optimism into
my everyday behavior
 I feel the same with others as
I did before the study,
however, if anything I feel as
if they view me in a more
positive, respectable light.
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CommunicationConsciousness
 I felt that this made me
misspeak on fewer occasions
and helped me manage
expectations when delivering
unfavorable news to others.
 I felt like I was more cautious
around people. This reflective
process also affected my
ability to respond to people. I
will say that the experience
made me feel better.
 It was challenging talking to
my ex because I was feeling a
lot of strong emotions.
 Being conscious of my
communication has made me
more aware of the different
levels of friendship I have
with people. I realized that I
held back a lot to certain
friends
 With my supervisor, I tried to
focus on aligning our
communication, because I
tend to be brusque and get to
the point, whereas he's much
more old-school, polite, and
roundabout, which
sometimes makes me
frustrated.
 What also made this difficult
was the fact that I went on a
first date during this time
period which was a bit
different than my usually
types of conversations with
close friends.
 It didn't really change the
way I interacted with people.
However, I would be more
conscientious of what I said
and how I said it. I would also
note how I often slurred my
words or mumbled..

 By communicating honestly I
found that I had much more
meaningful conversations
with my friends about
anything and everything.

 It felt good to make kindness
my ultimate goal, although it
was a bit of a challenge to
keep from stealing the
spotlight of conversation
back, which would have been
rude and unkind.

 I've always communicated
very consciously with my
close friends, but I think I've
begun to extend it to
strangers and acquaintances.
So I think my relationship
with those individuals has
changed for the better

Note. Participants responded to a free-response question in each nightly survey asking
them to write about their experience and the extent to which they complied with the
experiment. Participants also answered free-response questions about what they learned
from the experiment and how it influenced their relationships during the two-week follow
up survey. Table 3 presents examples of these responses.
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Figures

Figure 1. The anticipated, actual, and retrospective effects of honesty and kindness
on hedonic well-being
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Figure 2. The anticipated, actual, and retrospective effects of honesty and kindness
on eudaimonic well-being
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CHAPTER FIVE
ON BENEFICENT DECEPTION:
ASYMMETRIC PREFERENCES FOR LIES OF OMISSION AND COMMISSION
IN HEALTHCARE COMMUNICATION
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Scott Halpern

ABSTRACT
The use of deception in doctor-patient communication has long been debated
in medical ethics. Although some have advocated for the use of beneficent deception
– deception that promotes patient well-being – most scholars and practitioners
prohibit it. However, no empirical research has investigated when physicians and
their patients engage in and appreciate deception, or when they judge deception to be
beneficent. The present research fills this gap. We study physicians’, patients’, and
healthy adults’ moral judgments and preferences for deception and we document a
robust asymmetry between physicians’ and patients’ preferences for different forms
of deception. Specifically, physicians believe that it is more ethical to lie by omission
(i.e., withhold information) than to lie by commission (i.e., provide false hope),
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whereas patients often believe the opposite. We document this asymmetry across
multiple clinical circumstances with real cancer patients and oncologists and we
discuss the psychological and practical implications of this research for medicine,
behavioral ethics, and human communication.
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ON BENEFICENT DECEPTION:
ASYMMETRIC PREFERENCES FOR LIES OF OMISSION AND COMMISSION
IN HEALTHCARE COMMUNICATION

Imagine a patient with terminal cancer. The patient’s cancer is no longer
reacting to chemotherapy and the physician knows that the patient is very unlikely to
have any other treatment options available to them. The patient has already prepared
for the worst, but remains optimistic and wants to pursue any and all options that
might prolong their life. The physician must decide what information to share with
this patient at this time. Should the physician honestly tell the patient that they have
run out of treatment options? Perhaps the physician should say nothing and allow the
patient to maintain the illusion of hope. Or perhaps the physician should lie to the
patient, saying they too are optimistic about the possibility of future treatment
options.
Physicians face these types of ethical dilemmas every day. They must decide
how to communicate with vulnerable patients during some of the most challenging
and distressing moments in their lives. These decisions are particularly difficult
because they reflect a key conflict between two principles of medical ethics:
autonomy and beneficence (Beauchamp & Childress, 2003). Autonomy reflects the
patient’s right to be fully informed and to make their own decisions. Beneficence
reflects the need to promote the patient’s well-being (Gillon, 1994). In the opening
example, a physician may choose to be completely honest with the intention of
helping the patient make a fully informed decision about how to live the rest of their
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life. Such honesty, however, often has emotional costs. Thus, a physician may instead
choose to engage in some form of deception, by either omitting information or by
actively lying to the patient with the intention of preventing emotional distress and
promoting psychological well-being during the patient’s final days.
Professional organizations (American Medical Association Code of Ethics,
2006; World Medical Association International Code of Ethics, 2016) and ethicists
(Apatira et al., 2008; Beste, 2005; Herring & Foster, 2012; Sarafis, Tsounis,
Malliarou, Lahana, 2014) primarily advocate for honesty, suggesting that physicians
should prioritize patient autonomy over beneficence. Although some ethicists and
practitioners suggest that omission, withholding information until a more appropriate
time, is also a reasonable course of action (American Medical Association Code of
Ethics Opinion 8.082, 2006), very few advocate for the active use of deception.
These medical guidelines, however, are based on normative assumptions
about preferences for and consequences of deception. For example, existing
scholarship assumes that patients would rarely, if ever, consent to being deceived
(e.g., Bakhurst, 1992; Bok, 1978; Gillon,1994) and that deception will have long-term
costs for patient health and eventually erode trust in the doctor-patient relationship
(Jackson, 1991). However, empirical data is needed to understand whether these
assumptions are correct. Without examining the consequences of different ethical
decisions, and patients’ preferences for different ethical principles, we cannot
possibly know whether the normative assumptions that guide practice actually
promote effective medical practice. In the present research, we fill this gap by
examining patients’ and physicians’ judgments of and preferences for deception.
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Specifically, we focus on two research questions. First, we explore whether different
stakeholders (i.e., doctors, patients, and potential surrogates) have different beliefs
about the acceptability and beneficence of deception in healthcare communication.
Second, we examine how these stakeholders perceive different types of deception
(i.e., lies of omission and commission) within healthcare communication.
Answering these questions deepens our understanding of medical ethics,
moral judgment, and human communication and has important practical and
theoretical implications. Practically, we document a robust asymmetry between
physicians’ and patients’ preferences for different forms of deception. We
demonstrate that these stakeholders have divergent beliefs about the acceptability of
lying to provide false hope or manage a patient’s anxiety. If physicians and patients
have fundamentally different beliefs about the type of communication that is
acceptable, this may lead to predictable miscommunication, conflict, and distrust.
Theoretically, this work sheds light on the egocentric biases that guide
communicators’ and targets’ preferences for deception across contexts. We posit that
communicators focus on the psychological costs of deception when making
judgments of what is right and wrong, whereas targets focus on the benefits of
deception to them. In the healthcare context, the costs of deception may include
concerns about violating rules of the profession and fear of liability, and the benefits
of deception may include patient hope, comfort, and optimism. However, across
contexts, communicators may overweigh the guilt of lying, missing the opportunity to
provide their conversational partners with emotional support. Thus, this work paves
the way for future research on asymmetric evaluations of lies that are intended to help
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others. These dynamics are likely to be particularly important in conversations that
involve balancing honesty with comfort, such as discussions of layoffs, poor
performance, or social rejection.
Asymmetric preferences among physicians and patients
In the present research, we conceptualize deception as any act that
intentionally misleads the target. Thus, deception may include the intentional
omission of information, or the intentional provision of false information. We
consider omission to be deceptive when it is motivated by a desire to maintain a
patient’s existing illusion, or to hide new information.
We limit our investigation to circumstances in which honesty is unpleasant. In
these circumstances, individuals may use deception with beneficent intentions: to
protect the patient from despair and promote the patient’s psychological well-being.
Indeed, past research has demonstrated that individuals are unwilling to justify selfish
deception, but justify and welcome beneficent, or prosocial, deception quite often
(Levine & Schweitzer, 2014, 2015; Richard, Lajeunesse, & Lussier, 2010).
We focus the present investigation on understanding perceptions of different
types of deception. Existing research on beneficent deception and medical ethics does
not always distinguish between lies of omission and lies of commission. However, we
expect this distinction to matter. Specifically, we predict that the parties involved in
healthcare communication view these two forms of deception very differently. Put
formally, we expect the perceived acceptability of lies of commission relative to lies
of omission to be moderated by role.
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First, we expect physicians to judge lies of commission as less acceptable than
lies of omission. We assume that physicians, like most individuals, are motivated to
behave ethically (Aquino & Reed, 2002). When individuals engage in unethical
behavior, including deception, they experience psychological costs such as guilt and
shame (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).
Lies of commission may be particularly likely to elicit these negative feelings because
they reflect an intentional, active behavior. Indeed, prior work has demonstrated that
acts of commission are perceived to be more intentional, harmful, and blameworthy
than acts of omission (Alicke, 2000; Cushman, 2008; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron,
1991).
These concerns may be intensified in the medical context because doctors are
explicitly advised not to engage in active deception. Physicians may internalize this
advice and see lying as inconsistent with their medical duties. They may also be
concerned about the potential legal ramifications of actively misleading patients
(Herring & Foster, 2012). Thus, we expect that physicians will perceive lies of
commission as less acceptable than lies of omission.
We do not expect that patients and potential patients (i.e., healthy adults) will
always share this belief. Beneficent lies of commission, despite reflecting a more
severe transgression from the perspective of the communicator, may provide greater
benefits to the target than lies of omission. Omission itself may cause harm to
patients. Specifically, the omission of information is likely to leave patients feeling
uncertain. Scholars in many different domains, including economics, cognitive
psychology, and medicine have demonstrated that individuals are generally averse to
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the experience of uncertainty (Dow & da Costa Werlang, 1999; Epstein, 1999; Fox &
Tversky, 1995; Fox & Weber, 2002; Politi, Han & Col, 2007). Thus, individuals may
resent lies of omission because it prolongs this negative state. Patients are likely to
become particularly distressed and confused if their doctor omits information that
they had been expecting. Beneficent lies of commission, however, can resolve the
aversive experience of uncertainty, at least in the short run, and may improve the
patient’s psychological experience. It is important to note that honesty also resolves
uncertainty, and is likely to be seen as more acceptable than either form of deception.
However, perceptions of honesty are not the focus of the current framework.
The proposition that communicators and targets will judge lies of omission
and commission differently is consistent with existing research on actors’ and
recipients’ asymmetric evaluations of prosocial behaviors (Zhang & Epley, 2009).
Actors focus on costs when evaluating their prosocial actions, whereas recipients
focus on the benefits. For example, when exchanging gifts, gift-givers focus on how
much they spent on the gift but gift-receivers focus on how much the gift benefited
them. We expect the same egocentrism to influence moral judgments of deception.
We expect communicators to focus on the potential costs of deception to them, and
thus judge lies of commission to be less acceptable than lies of omission. But, we
expect targets to focus on how deception benefits them, and thus judge lies of
commission to be more acceptable, at least in some cases, than lies of omission.
Overview of study
To test this hypothesis, we examined physicians’, patients’ and healthy adults’
judgments of deception during difficult healthcare conversations. Although our
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predictions pertain primarily to patients and physicians, we also examine healthy
adults to examine whether our effects are unique to the experience of being ill, or
whether they generalize to anyone who takes the perspective of the patient.
In this study, we examine judgments of deception by omission and
commission across four hypothetical conversations between an oncologist and a
cancer patient. We focus on cancer because most individuals have some level of
exposure to cancer, and because it is a setting in which the tension between honesty
and beneficence is particularly common and intense (Surbone, 2006).
We had participants rate the acceptability and beneficence of omission,
commission, and honesty in each conversation. Although our theory focuses on the
distinction between omission and commission, we include honesty for completeness.
We measure both acceptability and beneficence to distinguish between two possible
sources for an aversion towards beneficent deception. On one hand, individuals may
not actually see deception as beneficent. In other words, even when deception could
presumably provide hope, it may not be seen as improving patient overall well-being,
and thus, not consistent with the value of beneficence. On the other hand, individuals
may see deception as unacceptable despite believing that deception is sometimes
beneficent (i.e., promotes patient well-being). Distinguishing between these two
possibilities helps us understand whether individuals see communication as reflecting
a tradeoff between different medical obligations, and which of these obligations more
heavily influences preferences.
Method
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Participants. We recruited 60 participants for this study: 20 healthy adults, 20
oncologists, and 20 cancer patients. All participants were recruited from the same
geographic region (a city in the Northeast region of the United States).
Healthy adults (60% female, Mean age = 33) were recruited by a university
laboratory. To participate, individuals had to be over 18 years of age, and nonstudents. We recruited participants to arrive to a laboratory in 30-minute increments.
They completed our study one at a time, in a private focus room and received $20 in
exchange for their participation.
Oncologists (60% female, Mean age = 43) were recruited by email. We
reached out to oncologists that members of the research team knew personally, or that
practiced at university-affiliated hospitals. Oncologists received $50 in exchange for
their participation. We scheduled appointments with the oncologists and administered
the study in their offices.
Patients (45% female, Mean age = 58) were recruited at a university-affiliated
hospital. We recruited patients with any cancer at any stage. Patients received $20 in
exchange for their participation. When we recruited oncologists, we asked them for
permission to approach their patients. If oncologists consented, we approached their
patients during their chemotherapy infusions, or while they were waiting for infusion.
We administered the study to consenting patients in private infusion suites, while
patients were receiving their infusion.
Procedure and materials. All participants judged four clinical scenarios.
Data collection included qualitative data and survey responses. Each participant met
with a member of our research team in a private space and answered open-ended
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questions verbally, and answered questions using an iPad with Qualtrics enabled.
Each participant’s verbal responses were audio-recorded.
This approach allowed the research team to gain insight into participants’
thought process, and allowed participants to ask for clariﬁcation and discuss the
scenarios openly. To ensure this approach did not alter our survey results, we ran a
replication of the present study in which the entire survey was completed on the
computer and no members of the research team were present.19
Clinical scenarios. We presented participants with four clinical scenarios that
were designed to reflect difficult clinical conversations that might occur between a
physician and a patient over the course of a patient’s illness. After reading each
scenario, participants were prompted to say, aloud, how they would want their doctor
to communicate [physician perspective: how they would communicate]. These
responses were audio-recorded. Then, participants judged three communication
tactics that a physician might use in each scenario: honesty, omission, or commission.
We presented the scenarios in a fixed order to simulate the actual trajectory of
conversations that a cancer patient is likely to face (see order below). We randomized
the order in which honesty, omission, and commission appeared within each scenario.
Patients and healthy adults read scenarios that were written from patient perspective.
Oncologists read identical scenarios, except they were written from the physician’s
perspective.

19

The replication of Study 1 consisted of identical scenarios and questions as Study 1. However, we
administered the survey virtually to a sample of healthy adults on Amazon Mechanical Turk who took
perspective of patients (N = 40), and a convenient sample of medical students and trainees (N = 47)
who took perspective of physicians. We conceptually replicate all results.
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Thus, the full design of the study was a 3(Population: healthy adult, patient,
physician) x 3(Communication tactic: Honesty, Omission, Commission) x
4(Scenario). Population was a between-subjects factor, and all other factors were
manipulated within subjects. The patient perspectives of the four scenarios and their
corresponding communication tactics appear below. We add bold text below to
indicate the key manipulations.
1. Scenarios 1: Suspicious scan
Imagine you go to the emergency room with abdominal pain. It turns out that
acid reflux was causing the pain, but while you were there you had a CT scan
of your abdomen to help rule out something more serious. Several days later,
you follow up with your primary care doctor, who notices that the CT scan
shows an abnormal spot on your liver. The spot could be cancerous and the
doctor believes that it probably is, but he cannot be certain without additional
tests. The spot does not cause any symptoms and it is very unlikely that it will
cause any immediate problems. You do not yet know that the doctor has
noticed a spot, and you have no reason to suspect that you are ill. The doctor
will be more confident in a diagnosis after doing some blood work.
[Omission]
Imagine the doctor decides not to tell you any information about the spot
on your liver at this time. He orders blood work to help confirm the diagnosis,
but he tells you the blood work is just “routine.”
[Commission]
Imagine the doctor decides to tell you that everything with your scan is fine
at this time. He orders blood work to help confirm the diagnosis, but he tells
you the blood work is just “routine.”
[Honesty]
Imagine the doctor decides to tell you that there is an abnormal spot on
your liver, that he believes it is likely cancer, but it could also be a benign
tumor. He orders blood work to help confirm the diagnosis.

2. Scenario 2: Prognosis
Imagine you were recently diagnosed with lung cancer. Your doctor has not
yet provided you with any prognostic information. However, you’ve known a
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handful of people in similar medical circumstances who all made full
recoveries, so you are optimistic that your chance of recovery is quite high.
You have no reason to believe that your prognosis will be unfavorable, and
your doctor knows that you are reasonably optimistic.
After looking over all of your test results, the doctor determines that the fiveyear survival rate for people with your stage of disease (meaning the
percentage of patients who are alive five years after diagnosis) is 5%. There is
a small chance that your prognosis could actually be much better, however,
depending on the results of a test that has not yet come back.
[Omission]
Imagine the doctor decides not to provide you with any prognostic
information at this moment.
[Commission]
Imagine the doctor decides to tell you that there is a good chance you will
survive for several years.
[Honesty]
Imagine the doctor decides to tell you that to the best of his knowledge, the
five-year survival rate for people with your stage of disease is 5%.

3. Scenario 3: Treatment effects
Imagine you were recently diagnosed with lung cancer that has spread to your
liver. Although your prognosis is not optimistic, it is important to you to try all
possible courses of action to fight your cancer and prolong your life.
You are visiting a doctor to discuss your treatment options. You are simply
discussing your options today – you will make a decision about your treatment
during a future appointment. You discuss chemotherapy, which you believe
can eventually eliminate your cancer. The doctor knows that chemotherapy will
not be curative. That is, although chemotherapy could potentially prolong your
life, it will never cure your cancer.
[Omission]
Imagine the doctor decides not to say anything about the curative nature
of chemotherapy at this moment.
[Commission]
Imagine the doctor decides to tell you that chemotherapy could cure your
cancer.
[Honesty]
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Imagine the doctor decides to tell you that chemotherapy will never cure
your cancer.

4. Scenario 4: Future treatment options
Imagine you are visiting a doctor to discuss the progress of your lung cancer,
and the effectiveness of your chemotherapy and radiation treatment. You were
diagnosed with lung cancer seven months ago. The doctor informs you that
your treatment has not been effective and that the cancer has now spread to
your bones and brain. The doctor knows that there are no existing treatment
options that will be effective for prolonging your life and the doctor does not
expect any new treatments to be approved within the timeframe that the doctor
expects you to live.
You still have hope that new options will become available, or that you could
qualify for a medical trial in the next few months. It continues to be important
to you to try all possible courses of action to prolong your life.
[Omission]
Imagine the doctor decides not to say anything about whether or not you
will have new treatment options available in the future.
[Commission]
Imagine the doctor decides to tell you might have new treatment options
available to you in the future.
[Honesty]
Imagine the doctor decides to tell you that there are no more options
available to stop the spread of the cancer.

The scenarios were reviewed and revised by pulmonary and critical care
faculty as well as researchers without medical backgrounds to ensure
understandability and ﬁdelity to real clinical situations. The scenarios were designed
to be as realistic as possible and to feature details (e.g., the patient’s desire to prolong
his life) that would prompt participants to consider the potential benefits of hope. All
scenarios also described circumstances in which there was momentary uncertainty
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that would be resolved sometime in the future, and thus, described circumstances in
which physicians might believe that deception is a reasonable communication tactic.
Dependent variables. Participants answered six questions in response to each
communication tactic (omission, commission, honesty), within each of the four
scenarios. Participants judged the ethicality of the communication tactic using two
items: “How ethical is this behavior?” (1 = completely unethical, 7 = completely
ethical) and “This behavior would violate your autonomy [Physician perspective:
This behavior would violate the patient’s autonomy]” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 =
strongly agree). Participants also judged the desirability of the communication tactic
by rating their agreement with one item: “I would want my doctor to behave this way
[Physician perspective: I would behave this way]” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree). These three items loaded together on a single factor in an exploratory factor
analysis (Principal axis factoring, Varimax rotation). Thus, we combined them into a
single measure of acceptability (α = .90).
Participants also rated the beneficence of each communication tactic using
three items: “This behavior would spare the patient from anxiety and fear”, “This
behavior would promote the patient’s well-being”, “This behavior would improve the
patient’s quality of life” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). These three items
also loaded together on a single factor in an exploratory factor analysis (Principal axis
factoring, Varimax rotation). Thus we combined them into a single measure of
perceived beneficence (α = .89).
At the end of the study, all participants received a signed copy of their consent
form and contact information for the research team after completing the study. No
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personal identifiers were collected in the survey. A professional transcriptionist
transcribed participant interviews and all personal identiﬁers were removed from the
interview transcripts.
Results
We focus only on responses to the four clinical vignettes in the present
manuscript. We are currently coding the patient-physician conversations. We
conducted mixed within-between subject ANOVAs on acceptability and perceived
beneficence, using Communication Tactic (omission, commission, honesty) as the
within-subjects factor and Population (healthy adult, patient, physician) as the
between-subjects factor. In our main analyses, we include Scenario as a covariate.
The effects are unchanged if we do not control for Scenario.
Acceptability. We found a main effect of Communication Tactic, F(2, 236) =
138.39, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .37, on perceived acceptability, such that honesty (M = 5.88,
SD = 1.24) was seen as more acceptable than both omission (M = 2.77, SD = 1.54,
t(159) = 22.37, p < .001) and commission (M = 3.02, SD = 1.96, t(159) = 19.72 p <
.001). Furthermore, commission was perceived to be marginally more acceptable than
omission (t(159) = 1.93, p = .05).
We also found a main effect of Population, F(2, 236) = 8.41, p < .001, η2𝑝 =
.07; such that healthy adults (M = 4.19, SD = .45) rated the communication tactics as
more acceptable than physicians (M = 3.62, SD = .45, t(39) = .09, p < .001) and
patients (M = 3.87, SD = .45, t(39) = 2.29, p = .02) did. Patients also rated the
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communication tactics as marginally more acceptable than physicians did (t(39) =
1.80, p = .07).
Importantly, these effects were qualified by a significant Population x
Communication Tactic interaction, F(2,236) = 14.42, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .11. Consistent
with our hypothesis, physicians judged commission to be less acceptable than
omission (p = .02) but patients judged commission to be more acceptable than
omission (p < .01). Healthy adults did not judge commission and omission differently
(p = .45). All thee populations judged honesty to be more acceptable than either form
of deception (ps < .001). We depict this pattern of results in Figure 1.
--Figure 1 and Figure 2 here-Perceived beneficence. We found a main effect of Communication Tactic,
F(2, 236) = 13.81, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .06, such that honesty (M = 4.14, SD = 1.81) was
perceived to be more beneficent than both omission (M = 2.89, SD = 1.50, t(159) =
7.44, p < .001) and commission (M = 3.50, SD = 1.79, t(159) = 3.66, p < .001).
Commission was also perceived to be more beneficent than omission (t(159) = 5.42, p
< .001).
We also found a main effect of Population, F(2, 236) = 7.96, p < .001, η2𝑝 =
.06, such that healthy adults (M = 3.84, SD = .46) rated the communication tactics as
more beneficent than physicians (M = 3.30, SD = .46, t(39) = 3.70, p < .001) and
patients (M = 3.38, SD = .46, t(39) = 3.14, p = .002) did. There was no difference
between physicians and patients (t(39) = .56, p = .58).
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We do not find a significant Population x Communication Tactic interaction,
F(2,236) = .14, p = .87, η2𝑝 = .001. However, as shown in Figure 2, there were patients
and physicians had very different evaluations of lies of commission and omission.
Specifically, physicians rated omission and commission as equally beneficent (p =
.37), whereas patients rated commission as significantly more beneficent than
omission (p < .001).
Discussion
In this study, we gain initial insights into stakeholders’ beliefs about the
acceptability and beneficence of deception in healthcare communication. Importantly,
we find that honesty is generally perceived to be more acceptable and beneficent than
deception. This finding is consistent with recent physician surveys (e.g., Huang et al.,
2015) and suggests that existing guidelines prioritizing honesty may be wellinformed. Existing guidelines that suggest omission is more acceptable than
commission, however, may be misinformed. Consistent with our hypothesis, we
identify an asymmetry between physicians’ and patients’ judgments of lies of
omission and lies of commission. Physicians generally believed that it was less
acceptable to lie by commission than omission, but patients believed the opposite.
Interestingly, we find that physicians judge lies of commission and omission to be
equally beneficent. The discrepancy between physicians’ judgments of acceptability
and beneficence suggests that physicians may be influenced by their personal
concerns about lying, rather than the desire to promote patient well-being. Patients’
judgments of acceptability and beneficence largely followed the same pattern.
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This research highlights how physicians and patients see ethical dilemmas
differently. This is important because these asymmetries may be the source of distrust
and miscommunication. For example, a patient may see a physician as immoral and
lose trust in him if he fails to provide (even false) hope, which is a consequence
physicians are unlikely to anticipate. To overcome this asymmetry, medical
communication training should encourage physicians to seek out patient preferences
rather than omitting information altogether.
Limitations and future directions
Our initial study was exploratory in nature. Two key strengths of this study
were the realism of the vignettes and the use of clinical populations to test our
hypotheses. This gives us confidence that these effects do exist within actual
healthcare conversations. However, it will be important for future work to more
precisely tease apart the mechanisms underlying and boundary conditions
surrounding our effects. For example, future work should more carefully control the
differences between omission and commission and present knowledge and future
outcomes. Small differences in language may significantly alter perceptions of
commission. For example, saying “you’re probably fine” is much different than
saying “you do not have cancer.”
Future research should also delve deeper into the differences between
physicians and patients. We recently ran a study to examine whether the asymmetry
between physicians and patients is driven by structural or individual differences (e.g.,
liability concerns in medicine, medical training, comfort with uncertainty) or whether
it is driven by the perspective difference between communicators and targets, as we
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propose. In this study, we randomly assigned healthy adults to evaluate lies of
omission and commission from the perspective of either the physician or the patient.
Our initial results reveal that the differences between physicians and patients are
driven by perspective differences; we replicate the pattern of results from our first
study with a simple perspective manipulation. We also find that individuals in the
perspective of the communicator (i.e., the physician) focus more intensely on the guilt
associated with lying, whereas individuals in the perspective of the target (i.e., the
patient) focus on the benefits of hope. These results suggest that examining
perspective differences in preferences for lies of omission and commission across
contexts is a valuable endeavor for future research.
The present research also raises important questions that are beyond the scope
of the present investigation. For example, will these effects hold across cultures? The
United States healthcare system tends to prioritize autonomy above beneficence, but
this is not the case across the world (Shahidi, 2010). It will be interesting to examine
how physicians and patients respond to these dilemmas in cultures that embrace a
more paternalistic model of healthcare.
Finally, future work should examine whether perceptions of beneficence
correspond with reality. We believe that it is valuable to study perceptions of
beneficence to gain insight into sources of miscommunication and distrust in the
doctor-patient relationship. However, to confidently make recommendations to
clinicians, we must understand when lies actually promote health and psychological
well-being and when they do not. Future research could examine how patients fare,
based on the practices exhibited and endorsed by their physicians.
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Concluding thoughts
In medicine, ethical principles are in place to ensure the protection and well-being
of patients. Surprisingly, we know very little about the ethical principles that patients
care about and how current ethical guidelines affect patient well-being. In the present
research, we explore patient perceptions of autonomy and beneficence by examining
the case of beneficent deception. We document asymmetries between patient and
physician preferences for beneficent lies of omission and commission, suggesting that
physicians’ moral proclivities may not accommodate patients’ desire for hope. This
research highlights the promise and importance of studying moral judgment in the
medical domain and we hope it opens the door for future research on this topic.
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Figures
Figure 1. Perceptions of Acceptability by Communication Tactic and Population
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Figure 2. Perceptions of Beneficence by Communication Tactic and Population
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